Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Título : La vida entre conceptos abstractos y conceptos saturados. Dilthey y Husserl en torno a la naturaleza y el espíritu
Autor : Rabanaque, Luis Román 
Palabras clave : FILOSOFIAHusserl, Edmund, 1859-1938Dilthey, Wilhelm, 1833-1911ESPIRITU
Fecha de publicación : 2013
Editorial : Academia Nacional de Ciencias. Centro de Estudios Filosóficos Eugenio Pucciarelli. Argentina
Cita : Rabanaque, Luis Román. La vida entre conceptos abstractos y conceptos saturados. Dilthey y Husserl en torno a la naturaleza y el espíritu. [en línea] Escritos de filosofía. Segunda serie, 1 (2013) Disponible en:
Resumen : In opposition to both metaphysical construction and naturalistic reductionism, Dilthey takes the life of the spirit as a clue for distinguishing human from natural sciences. Life in this sense appears as nexus or connection of Erlebnisse, which stand to one another in a relationship of whole and part, and which the later Dilthey conceives in terms of meaning. He contrasts the abstract concepts of natural science with those of human science, which are “lived and saturated with life”. The task of the latter consists in taking the works in which life has fixed itself as signs or expressions which call for a hermeneutical understanding. In his later work, Husserl sees the life of the spirit in terms of experience of nature and spirit within the life-world. He discloses a stratification of constitutive levels founded one upon the other, such that nature is abstract in character and both persons and “things” have a spiritual meaning that is apprehended through expressions impressed in their corporeality. This allows us to sketch some parallel developments in Dilthey’s and Husserl’s late work.
ISSN : 2344-9586
Disciplina: FILOSOFIA
Derechos: Acceso abierto
Appears in Collections:Artículos

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
vida-entre-conceptos-abstractos.pdf278,56 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record

Page view(s)

checked on Feb 22, 2023


checked on Feb 22, 2023

Google ScholarTM


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons