Buying stones: welfare spending and protests in Argentina, 2008–2019

Abstract

Abstract Why do some governments manage to curb protest while others cannot and turmoil escalates to a social outbreak? This study proposes a theoretical argument that specifies how discretionary spending reduces conflict, highlighting the role of social movements in managing protests. It examines this and alternative arguments in Argentina, a country with strong social movements and historically large mobilizations, using statistical analysis with an original database on protests and a population of 364 national government programs between 2008 and 2019. The article makes a contribution by finding a differential effect between specific types of social spending, programmatic and discretional, and protests. It also specifies the linkage between the main variables using qualitative evidence during two presidencies. The goal of discretionary distribution is not to win an election but to ensure governance. The article finally raises some comparative implications on the role of social movements and welfare spending in Latin America.