1. Preliminary considerations

From the beginning of the 13th century, the discussion which surrounded the explanation of causality in the world—from the point of view of philosophical analysis—and, within that specific context, the speculation surrounding the composition of its nature (whether considered as a whole, or considered within the plurality and diversity of the beings the world sustains), was a quaestio that occupied the Masters of Paris. Proof of this can be found in Philip the Chancellor’s Summa, written at the beginning of the 13th century1.

From an epistemological perspective it seems possible to state that Philip the Chancellor both contributes to the development of an exegetic series of texts that carried auctoritas, and provides the methodological and speculative continuity of the disputatio in his questioning and resolution of the paradoxes which appear when treating the quaestiones. In his Prologue to the Summa, the Chancellor is clear to make the intellectual objective of his work evident, in light of his exegesis of the biblical passage in which Ruth asks Boaz2 for permission to pick the ears of wheat that the reapers in his fields are dropping3. By projecting his own work within the allegorical context of this Biblical scene, Master Philip states that, much as Ruth, on Boaz’s authority, collects the ears of wheat which fall from the hands of the reapers4, he himself walks the field of knowledge contained within the scriptures, which reapers, “ancient fathers and doctors”, had collected with their high intellects, dropping “for posterity a set

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2 Cf. The Biblical passages to which the Chancellor refers at the start of his Summa are Ruth II, 2 and 7.
3 Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, Prol. 3/1: Vadam in agrum et colligam spicas quae fugerunt manua metentium.
of issues to discuss”, much like the ears which fell from the hands of the reapers working on Boaz’s fields.

Philip the Chancellor is clear to point out that, much like Ruth, he also collects from the field of knowledge, but in the manner of “someone who follows the words of others not merely as their reader, but as someone who questions and goes deeply into what he has received”. And this work is what – in his own words – constitutes the the understanding of questions (intelligentia quaestionum) in the development of knowledge.

This is how Philip the Chancellor defines the objective of his Summa and so limits the development of his theme on the level of the fundamentals of thought, as J. Aertsen aptly points out. This careful consideration characterising Philip’s argumentation in the prologue of his Summa ratifies this interpretation. When he explains how he will handle his sources, he clearly shows the intellectual links that he seeks to establish between auctoritas and ratio: “Our aim is to assert and support what we say using the authority of the Holy Fathers […] and even the reasons of the philosophers, as well as to examine the words of modern writers”. This Summa thus provides us with a text in which he unfolds the correspondence between the argumentative path of natural reasons and the intelligence of faith, as Trottmann pointed out by examining the Chancellor’s gravitation towards the path of medieval noetics.

On the other hand, Master Philip’s Summa – known within the medieval tradition as Summa de bono – owes its name to the fact that it is completely integrated within the analytical-justificatory development of the diffusive path of the bonum, from the consideration of the causality of the world to its perfective evolution. From this perspective we must highlight the speculative weight of content in Philip the Chancellor’s Summa in his development of a


6 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, Prol. 3/9-11: Absque rubore quidem colligit qui ita sequitur aliorum quod non est tantum recitator, sed si quae dimissa sunt discutit et inquirit. (Our translation)

7 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, Prol. 4/37: intelligentia quaestionum.


9 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, Prol. 3/16 ff: Propositum nostrum est auctoritatis sanctorum patrum … et etiam philosophorum rationibus ea quae dicemus firmare vel falsare, nihilominus tamam modernorum dicta inspicere. I have carefully examined the content of the prologue in: Laura Corso de Estrada, “Unidad y jerarquía cosmológica en la ‘Summa’ de Felipe el Cancellor”, Anuario Filosófico, 2011 (XLIV/1), pp. 75-94. (Our translation)

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concept of *natura*, which provides both unity and plurality. This theme would lead the Master of Paris to a specific consideration of the *natura* of man as part of the world and, at the same time, as emerging from it.

2. The diffusive path of the *bonum* in the composition of the world

As I have elsewhere\(^1\), we find that the exposition in the *Summa’s pars prior* runs along the same lines as an earlier *Summa*, namely William of Auxerre’s statement on the affirmation of the unity of the world in the identification between being (*esse*) and good (*bonum*). The thesis by which the reality of the First Good is affirmed, previous to any other entity and with an encompassing power over all that proceeds from it, constitutes the central axis of the Chancellor’s determination within the metaphysical sphere. This statement of the encompassing reality of Good, as J. Aertsen points out, methodologically constitutes a *principium*\(^2\) which reveals the patency of its truth. And in this context, the affirmation of the reality of Good implies the affirmation of the existence of other *principia* which constitute, with the *bonum*, the *communissima: ens, unum* and *verum*\(^3\). This is why the encompassing reality of Good is projected in the configuration of the complete structure of the Chancellor’s *Summa*, in that the reality of a First Good constitutes the first organizing principle of all the text\(^4\).

It is of methodological interest to say that, according to the Chancellor’s express purpose mentioned above\(^5\), the development of this theme will require us to go further into the “reason of the principles”\(^6\). *Quaestio* I in Master Philip’s *Summa* has as its objective the consideration of the speculative derivations of the *principia*, which is why its first commitment is to examining the relationship between *bonum* and *ens* and the affirmation that they are the same\(^7\): “Good and being are convertible: because everything that is being is

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\(^{1}\) Cf. Article mentioned above: Laura Corso de Estrada, “Unidad y jerarquía cosmológica en la ‘Summa’ de Felipe el Canciller”, pp. 75-94.


\(^{3}\) Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, Prol. 4/ 43: “Communissima hæc sunt: ens, unum, verum, bonum”.

\(^{4}\) Cf. también J. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Trascendentals*, p. 27. In this sense, the identification between “*ens*” and “*bonum*” implies the express objective of the Chancellor to refute the manichean heresy, cf. *Summa de bono*, Prol. 4/39 and 40.

\(^{5}\) Cf. *supra*, part I.

\(^{6}\) Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, Prol. 4/39: “ratio principiorum”.

\(^{7}\) Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono* I, q.1, De comparatione bonis et entis.
good, and vice versa. Through this metaphysical statement, the Chancellor has defined himself in contrast to the Platonic tradition which affirms the reality of good as a principle of the intelligibility of the world as a whole, but even beyond mundane entities. In this sense, as Pouillon points out, we can spot in Chancellor’s position on the primacy of good, as in William of Auxerre, the influence of Neoplatonic sources, and their doctrinal agreement with the Dionysian conception when determining the possible predications of the notion of good, and stating that: “Good is the appropriate name for the divine essence,” which means that in accordance with this predication, primâ and principalis, bonitas is stated in an “absolute way.”

But in quaestio I of his Summa, the Chancellor admits a second “notion of good itself,” which is possible because “good is diffusive and multiplying in being.” In this second sense, it is fitting for Good to have the capacity of communicating being, and with this good, to all other beings. In this passage in the Summa, in which he begins his exposition of the participation of Good in the plurality of the world, the Chancellor states this property in the statement of what bonum is in relation to what ens is. But here, taking in the Aristotelian classification of the categories, he explains that: “Good, in effect, is said of God because he is an end, and of created beings because they are ordered towards this end; just as ‘ens’ in a primary sense is said of the substance that is ens in itself, and in a derived sense of the accident which is [ens] through its substance.” Moreover, he specifies, justifying the semantic openness of this predication of the notion of good, that “the Good that is said of God can be

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18 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono 5/77: “Bonum et ens convertuntur, quia quidquid est ens, est bonum et e converso”. (Our translation)
19 Plato, Republica 509 b.
21 Cf. H. Pouillon, in the mentioned article: “Le premier Traité des Propriétés transcendentales”, p. 42.
22 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.1/7, 41 and 42: “Bonum est nomen appropriatum divinae essentiae”; cf. Pseudo Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV, 1; PG III, 694 B: “Vocantes, ut arbitror, bonitatem ipsam essentiam divinam … et quia sic essentia sua bonus est Deus”. Cf. also: “sol ille noster que, eo ipso quod est, illuminat universa quae quoquo modo lucis eius sunt capacia”; De divinis nominibus IV, 1; PG III, 694 B.
23 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.1/7, 42: “absoluta bonitas”.
24 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.1/7, 46: “Altera ratio ipsius boni”.
25 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.1/7, 46 and 47: “bonum est diffusivum aut multiplicativum esse”.
26 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.1/7, 48 ff.
27 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.5/23-27: “Bonum enim de Deo dicitur quia finis, de creatura quia ad finem ordinationem habet, sicut ens secundum prius dicitur de substantia quae est per se ens, secundum posterius de accidente quod est per substantiam”.

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common, because in a direct and primary way it is said of Him himself, and indirectly in a secondary way, of created beings. That is why Chancellor continues—“we must take ‘common’ and ‘self’ in reference to the way of saying”, that is, the name of good can properly be predicated in the context of the created world.

In William of Auxerre’s Summa we can already find, as Pouillon has pointed out, an explicit precedent for this thesis which in Philip the Chancellor’s work achieves a wider and more systematic formulation. In his Summa, traditionally known as aurea, William of Auxerre introduces a study which he entitles De natura boni, as a preambula to his examination of good in the moral sphere, which he explains in his tractatus De virtutibus. There he examines the preaching of the notion of bonitas and, in this aspect, focuses on the Augustinian statement according to which: “All things, in that they are, are good.” Its objective is to study whether the predication of good is for the work created in itself, or in relation to another good. William of Auxerre analyses the issue: “When it is said: ‘this creature is good’, what is said to be ‘good’ is predicated of some goodness.” And in a significant sentence with metaphysical implications, in continuity with his exegesis of the Augustinian text, this gives way to the identification between being (esse) and good (bonitas), when William explains:

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28 Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono* I, q.5/23-30: “Dico ergo quod bonum quod dicitur de Deo indifferentes est illi et tamen commune potest esse, quia directe et secundum prius dicitur de ipso, indirecte et per posterius de creatura. Et ibi est accepere ‘commune’ et ‘proprium’ quantum ad modum dicendi”. (Our translation)
29 In this sense, the Chancellor’s elaboration on the “communissima”: “ens”, “bonum”, “unum”, “verum” in the corresponding treaty, is predicated by “appropriation” (appropriatur) of God and “in a common way” (communiter) of created beings; cf. *Summa de bono* I, Pro. A/41 ff.
32 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract. XI.
33 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract. XI.
34 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract. X, c. IV, q.1: *Quid bonitas et utrum omnia dicantur bona*.

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“that goodness is and, insofar as it is, it is good. But that goodness is, and so it is good”\textsuperscript{37}.

William of Auxerre pauses to examine this, tackling the question as to whether the created being “is good because of its good or another good”\textsuperscript{38}. And he suggests the following deduction in reference to the first option: “if it is good in itself, then it is good because of itself; therefore it is good in essence and therefore, it is the First Good”\textsuperscript{39}. He thus discards the possibility that this could be predicated of the created work\textsuperscript{40}. But in relation to the second option, he develops the following argument: “If it were said that the second goodness is not good because of itself, but because of a third goodness, and then we were to ask whether this third [goodness] is good in itself or because of a further goodness, we would go on infinitely in the same way”\textsuperscript{41}, an option which is also discarded.

So in his masterly determination of the issue, William of Auxerre argues that a distinction must be made with regard to a double predication of the term \textit{bonitas}, in the same way that we must distinguish a double predication of the term \textit{esse}. So, our author explains that when we state that “Socrates is”, we are talking about being in two ways: the created being that is in Socrates (\textit{ut in quo}) and the uncreated being by which (\textit{a quo}) Socrates is\textsuperscript{42}. And under this second idea, William of Auxerre explains that “in any created being we can perceive the divine being” and that in relation to this: “any creature is”\textsuperscript{43}. The identification between \textit{esse} and \textit{bonitas} justifies a correlative predication of the double predication of \textit{bonitas} which, in itself, corresponds to the \textit{bonitas creata} and the \textit{bonitas increata}, “in respect of which all good is created”\textsuperscript{44}. This position is taken up again in the next \textit{quaestio} when he states that “all things, insofar as they are, are good; therefore the being of the thing is its goodness, and so it is the same

\textsuperscript{37} William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa aurea} III, tract. X, c. IV, q.1: “illa bonitas est bona, quoniam 'quicquid est, in quantum est, bonum est'. Sed illa bonitas est; ergo est bona”.
\textsuperscript{38} William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa aurea} III, tract. X, c. IV, q.1: “est bona se bonitate vel alia bonitate”.
\textsuperscript{39} William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa aurea} III, tract. X, c. IV, q.1: “Si se bonitate, ergo est bona se ipsa; ergo est bona per essentiam; ergo est prima bonitas”.
\textsuperscript{40} William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa aurea} III, tract. X, c. IV, q.1: “Cum ergo dicitur: 'haec creatura est bona', significat bonitas, quae non est pure bonitas, sino quid bonum prima bonitate”.
\textsuperscript{41} William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa aurea} III, tract. X, c. IV, q.1: “Si vero dicatur quod bonitas secunda non est bona se ipsa, sed tertia bonitate, iterum quaeritur de illa tertia, utrum sit bona se ipsa vel alia bonitate. Et sic erit procedere in infinitum”.
\textsuperscript{42} Cf. William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa aurea} III, tract. X, c. IV, q.1, sol.
\textsuperscript{43} William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa aurea} III, tract. X, c. IV, q.1, sol: “in quolibet esse creato intelligitur esse divinum; et ideo cum dicitur: 'quaebit creatura est', sic ponitur duplex esse”.
\textsuperscript{44} William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa aurea} III, tract. X, c. IV, q.1, sol: “duplex bonitas, scilicet bonitas creata et bonitas increata; [bonitas creata] dicitur bonitas secundum comparationem quam habet ad primam bonitatem”.
to be and to be good”⁴⁵. According to this view, as Gregory has aptly pointed out, the world is constituted as a way of reading the creating principle which is the cause of its intelligibility⁴⁶, which is applicable to the exposition of both of these Masters of Paris.

3. The problem with the diffusion of bonum in the practical/moral order

The justification for predicating the word good in the created sphere⁴⁷ allows us to enter into the predicative and hierarchical line of diffusion and communicability of Good in its strict primary sense, because the Chancellor structures his Summa according to the gradation and modality which are fitting for that which is bonum naturae. In this sense, and from the methodological perspective of philosophical elaboration, we must point out that the matrix of the Chancellor’s speculation in his Summa is based on the consideration of the Primum Ens which is Unum et Bonum per se and which, through a hierarchical participation, proceeds to the distinction of the nature of what is created in contrast to what is not created, and to the determination of the modalities of this participation in the world. This means that his cosmological speculation is epistemologically inserted in an ontology of the created being.

In quaestio I of his Summa, within the context of the Aristotelian theory of act and potency, the Chancellor examines the modality of being of that which, in its constitution, lacks non-division, because it in some way has within it a mode of unfinished being characteristic of the potentiality in composition with the reality of its entitative good⁴⁸. In this way, the presence of immanent good in cosmic nature comes from the diffusion and communicability of undivided Good, which consists of: “The flow of things from the First”⁴⁹; or its assimilation⁵¹. This diffusion and communicability of being and good implies also the diffusion of unity and of truth, with which good is identified in being; so they

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⁴⁵ William of Auxerre, Summa aurea III, tract. X, c. IV, q.2, sol: “omnia, in quantum sunt, sunt bona; ergo esse rei est bonitas eius; et sic idem esse et esse bonum”.
⁴⁷ Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, Prol. 4/41 ff.
⁴⁸ Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.1/7, 33 ff.
⁴⁹ Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.7/26: De fluxu rerum a Primo.
⁵⁰ Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.7/1: “de fluxu aliorum bonorum a Primo secundum rationem boni”.
⁵¹ Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.1/7, 42 ff.
are communissima: ens, bonum, unum, verum, are also concomitant in those creatures that possess them derivatively\textsuperscript{52}.

To justify this statement on the diffusion and communicability of the communissima, the Chancellor asks as follows: “if in all created beings it is the same to be and to be good”\textsuperscript{53}. On one hand, and according to what we have seen above, he takes a position in respect to the question establishing that all created being is “good because it comes from the good”\textsuperscript{54}. Because of this he also appeals to Augustine’s authority to sustain the idea that something is good “according to the fact that it is” or “through participation”\textsuperscript{55}, which corresponds to the passage in De Trinitate in which the Ipsum Bonum, which is God himself, is distinguished from this or that particular good\textsuperscript{56}. But, on the other hand, the Chancellor states that the creature is said to “participate in good” because it is “in its being, partly good, unlike the Summum Bonum which is wholly good”\textsuperscript{57}.

But we must focus on the problem which Master Philip tackles in the pars posterior of his Summa to examine the participation of good in the practical-moral sphere of human actions. The status questionis which composes its development of the quaestio de virtute in communi\textsuperscript{58}, allows us to observe the debate between metaphysical and anthropological suppositions and, specifically, the problem surrounding the notions of natura and of ratio which the positioning of an author from that time implies and which is placed before the question of virtutis definitio.

My objective is to analyse one of the mentioned definitions of virtue and its suppositions, that is, the definition which Philip the Chancellor assigns to a philosophical source to by attributing it to the philosophus, which in this case does not refer to Aristotle but Cicero\textsuperscript{59}, when in his De inventione Rhetorica II, 53, 159 he states that virtue is “the habit of the soul in harmony with the order of nature and reason”\textsuperscript{60}. This locus has theoretical synergy with another passage in

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.7/15 ff: “sunt … conditiones concomitantes”.
\textsuperscript{53} Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.8: “Utrum omni creato idem sit esse et esse bonum”.
\textsuperscript{54} Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.8/18: “Bonum est quia est a bono”.
\textsuperscript{55} Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.8/22 and 23: “quaerit Augustinus in libro De Trinitate, cum unumquodque sit bonum, aut est bonum participatione aut secundum id quod est”.
\textsuperscript{56} Agustín, De Trinitate VIII, 2: PL 42, 949.
\textsuperscript{57} Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I, q.8/46 and 47: “dicitur bonum quia habet bonitatem partitam in suo esse ex opposito quo summum bonum habet bonitatem per totum”.
\textsuperscript{58} Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono II (III/II: De gratia, De gratia gratumfaciente), q.1.
\textsuperscript{59} Cf. N. Wicki, in his comentary on the use the Chancellor does of the term philosophus and which he uses to refer to Aristotole but also Cicero, Seneca and Boethius, cf. Introd., p. 45.
\textsuperscript{60} Cf. In Cicero, De Inventione Rhetorica II, 53, 159: “virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus”, passim.
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*De inventione Rhetorica* that was often referred to during the medieval period, according to which Cicero pronounces himself in favour of the existence of a natural law (*natura eis*) which constitutes a “certain natural force” (*quaedam in natura vis insivia*)61 according to which his aretology is inserted in a vision of reality as a whole62.

Within this context, it is of interest to examine the questions which Philip the Chancellor brings out of this definition, and which lead us to the central issue: “What does *ratio* say there, and, at the same time, what does *natura* say, and in which way do these things find each other in conformity?”. The initial questioning of the Chancellor, “what does *natura* say, what does *ratio*” and *in which way* can they find conformity, leads us to his thesis that the *ratio* itself is a certain nature (*quaedam natura*) and, as such, holds the principle that tends towards (*principium inclinativum*) which the Chancellor judges to be in accord with the excellence existing in properly human virtue.

As well as the mentioned segments in *De inventione Rhetorica*, other manuscripts not mentioned in the Chancellor’s first text, such as *De officiis*, a piece of work mentioned in the study guide of the University of Paris in the 13th century for the treatment of moral science –as Lafleur demonstrated63–, and the indirect transmission of developments of *De Republica* and *De legibus* –amongst other texts– present in Augustine and Lactantius, can be thought of amongst the documentation through which Master Philip could have been in contact with the main theses of the Ciceronian concept of natural law and his theory of virtue. And in this sense, we maintain that Cicero is one of the main sources of medieval documentation for the reception of the thesis of stoic thought which establishes “conformity with nature” as the paradigm of moral life. From a methodological point of view, in his philosophical texts Cicero appeals to nature as a justification of the moral order through the reception and reconfiguration of the stoic teachings which identify nature and rationality64.

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62 I have studied the binomium nature-moral life in the set of Ciceronian philosophical texts in: Laura Corso de Estrada, *Naturaleza y vida moral. Marco Tulio Cicero y Tomás de Aquino*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2008.
In this way, the specific and mutable beings which inhabit the world and nature itself in its entirety are invested in a rationality which enters into all that exists and which is disseminated throughout them, turning them into the carriers of an immutable, divine and eternal teleological principle, which is the Law of nature (lex or ius naturae in Cicero’s language). This understanding of the omnipresence of a guiding principle of nature is expressive of the first Stoic teaching about the world in its entirety and of man’s specific participation in it as a component but also as an integral part of its order. Some fragments which have been preserved from the Hymn to Zeus by Cleanthes reaffirm the importance of this teaching to this school, that is: the statement of a universal governing of the Logos, which Cleanthes defines as principle (arché) and law (nomos) of all that exists and, because of it, as a common reason (logos koinós) and divine providence 65.

But it is important to point out that Cicero is a significant Latin testimony of these stoic teachings, particularly in combination with the Platonic and even Aristotelian theses through which he renews his sources 66 in an organic theory of human action. In this sense, and in a close relationship with the definition the Chancellor himself takes from him, and the exegesis I have just performed, we must consider a few central issues. In first place, and with the same definition of virtue presented in De inventione Rhetorica, Cicero knows the notion of Aristotelian teaching of virtue as hexis, that is, habitus, according to the Aristotelian meaning of this in Categories (8b26), as he states in various parts of his work, and in concordance with his declared use of Aristotelian texts 67. In the fragment of De inventione Rhetorica I, 25, 36, as in other loci, he defines habitus as: “perfection of the soul [...] contant and complete, like virtue, the knowledge of some art, even of science [...] not given by nature but acquired by effort and application” 68. So in this respect, as Nederman has pointed out, in the area of reception of sources, Ciceronian ideas have come to constitute a significant

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66 Without entering into the complexity of Ciceronian sources, we must indicate that numerous studies specifically point at the academic influx of Antiochus of Ascalon in the Ciceronian re-elaboration of stoic thesis in convergence with positions in the Platonic traditions. Cf. within this broad theme, amongst other works: J. Barnes, “Antiochus of Ascalon”, Philosophia Togata I. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 79, passim.
67 Cf. p.e., De finibus, III, 1, 1 ff, where he clearly shows his preference for reading Aristotelian texts.
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path of transmission for the thesis of Aristotelian ethics, which came before the knowledge of the *Ethica Nicomachea* during medieval times. As Grabmann points out, in relation to our Chancellor it is important to take into account the prohibition in relation to Aristotelian texts in the University of Paris from 1210, renewed in 1215 and lifted in 1231 by Gregory IX. But according to Grabmann himself, Master Philip was Chancellor of the University of Paris and teacher in the Faculty of Theology during the time of Gregory IX, even though knowledge of Aristotle in the Faculty of Arts and in the Faculty of Theology of Paris in 1250 was still immersed in an eclectic exegesis. This implies that Philip had read and assimilated aspects of Aristotelianism alongside theses from other traditions, such as the Platonic and stoic traditions, as some passages of his *Summa* seem to manifest.

In second place, it is of special interest to highlight that the cosmic-theological conception of nature in its entirety which Cicero picks up from stoic thought implies the affirmation of a theology which constitutes its natural order, and because of that, its universal order. But in his re-elaboration of this teaching, Cicero has brought together—as Lévy shows—stoic finalism with the central thesis of finalism within the Platonic tradition, in which rationality is revealed in human nature in its apex and immateriality. This was expressed at an early stage in Cicero’s *De Republica*, specifically in Scipio’s Dream, where Cicero assumes the divine origin of souls in a Pythagorean-Platonic context, and similarly, the path of souls returning to heaven, and their emergence in the worldly sphere. Here we also find Cicero’s efforts to affirm their separate existence.

According to the Ciceronian philosophy of man, he is gifted by nature, because of his natural condition, which has an intrinsic teleology revealed in his

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74 Cf. Cicero, *De republica* VI, 14, 14, 15, 15; 24, 26, passim.
natural inclinations, which on their own predispose him to realize his humanitas. Cicero bases the inclination to specific excellence in human nature itself. So, in third place, we must highlight that rationality allows man to discover the law which he carries in his nature, in the gradual unveiling of his condition. From this point on, virtue cannot be other than the completion of nature, or as the stoic tradition states, the conformity with nature, because man carries in himself his perfecting seed, his sperm, his semina, according to the Latin formulation that Cicero was to include in the technical vocabulary of his moral philosophy. In this case, too, the stoic thesis receives from its Ciceronian re-elaboration a scope which implies the joint assimilation of Platonic and Aristotelian theses, such as the affirmation of the capacity of human self-determination in the face of nature and its inclinations.

In fourth place, we must state that Ciceronian philosophy appeals to nature to show its directing role in the knowledge and desire for moral good, to the extent that it tries to justify the germinal capacity of operating human powers in relation to their perfective objects, and moral life as the consummation of the work of nature.

Master Philip knows the Ciceronian tradition which states the existence of a ius or lex of nature, which he expressly acknowledges in his Summa, and specifically in his treaty on justice. He states that natural law (ius naturale) is said to be “because of nature” (a natura), because it is “as inscribed in natural reason”76, and this is the form in which it is predicated. The Chancellor thus insists that “reason is in itself natural” (ratio est ipsa natura), because we must distinguish “natura as the way of being from natura as reason”?7. On this basis, it seems possible to understand the scope of the Chancellor’s sententia when, prompted by the the Ciceronian definition of virtue, he states that the ratio itself is like a certain nature (quaedam natura). At this stage of my exposition, we seem to have discovered in what sense, according to the starting questions presented by Master Philip, nature and reason are linked: because “reason insofar as it is nature, is a certain [principle] which inclines” to man’s perfective dispositions78.

After affirming the transcendence of the Bonum Primum, Philip the Chancellor compiles and re-elaborates, through Cicero’s conception of virtue and ius naturae, the mediating role of nature in the participation of the First Good, in what remains of his work. The good is impressed in the natural inclinations of the beings of the world and, in a specific way, in the rationality

76 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono II, 1026/61 and 62: “quasi scriptum in ratione naturali”.
77 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono II, 1026/60 ff: “potest accipi natura ut natura vel natura ut ratio”. (Our translation.)
78 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono II/II, q.1; 536/2: “Ratio autem prout est natura quaedam est inclinativam ad habitum qui est virtus”.

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of the human soul. At the same time, the speculative effort of Philip the Chancellor salvages a founding principle of unity within plurality, in the mediating role which he assigns to nature in relation to the creating Principle.