

OBSERVING PARTY DISCIPLINE AT NATIONAL CONGRESS IN LATIN AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNORS IN ARGENTINA

La disciplina partidista en el Congreso Nacional en sistemas federales latinoamericanos: el rol de los gobernadores en Argentina

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Abstract

How do governors affect party discipline at the National Congress? In this article, we evaluate governor's influence on national legislators' behavior, within the context of a federal State such as Argentina. Through an analysis of roll-call data, we determine that governors do influence on legislators' behavior on a way that when they keep one voice in relation to their position on a particular issue, the discipline is much stronger than when they have conflicting opinions, even more so among deputies than senators. Findings reinforce the under covered importance of considering governors a key role player on national Executive-Legislative relation and party discipline.

Key words: Governors; Executive-Legislative relations; IT (Independence-Territoriality) Index; Party Discipline; Territoriality.

Resumen

¿Cómo afectan los gobernadores a la disciplina partidaria en el Congreso Nacional? En este artículo, evaluamos la influencia del gobernador en el comportamiento del legislador nacional, en el contexto de un Estado federal como la Argentina. Por medio de un análisis de las votaciones nominales, determinamos que los gobernadores sí influyen en el comportamiento de los legisladores de tal modo que, cuando se mantienen unánimes respecto de su postura en un tema en particular, la disciplina es más fuerte que cuando presentan opiniones en conflicto, más aún entre diputados que entre senadores. Los hallazgos refuerzan la importancia encubierta de considerar a los gobernadores como un actor clave en la relación Ejecutivo-Legislativo y la disciplina partidaria.

Palabras clave: Gobernadores; Relaciones Ejecutivo-Legislativo; IT (Índice de Independencia-Territorialidad); Disciplina Partidaria; Territorialidad.

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INTRODUCTION

Do governors affect party discipline at the National Congress in a Federal System? In such case, how do they do it? Do they strengthen or weaken it? In modern political science, studies about the relationship between Executive and Legislative Powers are very

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common, especially about the relationship between the Executive Power and the votes from legislators, including in their analysis players such as the political parties.

Regarding the modern Argentine case, a highly important political vote which also had research purposes was the bill sent by the Executive Power, seeking ratification for the Ministry of Economy's Resolution # 125, which deals with rolling tax withholdings applied to agricultural exports (Bill PE 013-08 to ratify Resolution ME 125/08).

The importance of this event can be found either on the conflict escalation and its political institutional consequences, or on the background discussion that considered these withholdings as a method to control prices, income redistribution and —what generated most legal discussions— as a tax burden.

In fact, the debate about rolling tax withholdings was disclosed in March, 2008 and the demand of the agricultural sector helped join the four entities representing it, which at that time were considered antagonizing entities. The level of political and social concern made some people argue that certain sectors had generated a “destabilization climate” in order to endanger the continuity of the current administration. In order to avoid a strike from the agricultural sector, which had never occurred in Argentina before, the president of the Argentine Republic sent to the Congress a bill ratifying the contested measure, hoping that she would obtain a favorable result as her administration had majority of votes in both Houses. The most outstanding moment of the conflict took place early in the morning when the bill was rejected in the Argentine Senate, when the vice president had to give his final decision after a tie of votes.

This outcome led to consider different questions: what was the criterion taken into account by legislators (senators and/or representatives) when voting? Did they respond to their partisan ideology (“cohesion”), their party discipline or the interest of the territory in which they were elected? Considering the wide publicity of the governors' opinion about it, we can add: Did the governors play an important role when determining the legislators' vote? And in that case, how did they do that?

On the other hand, and continuing with the essence of what was already considered, is this only applicable for the Resolution # 125 vote, or can it be extended to other votes?

Is it possible to observe a behavioral pattern? All this strengthens the academic interest in analyzing the legislators' behavior with concepts such as “ideological cohesion”, “party discipline” in the Argentine Congress or the level of relevance assigned by legislators to the territories they represent (what we call *territoriality*). However, the essential academic interest consists of empirically adding the influence of certain players that, until now, have never received enough attention when researching this subject: the governors.

Thus, the aim of this research is to detect legislative behavior patterns (if any), considering if it is an election year, if the proposal is an opposition's or the Executive's initiative, and whether or not there is an agreement among the governors; all this, measured through an index that allows us to know the governors' influence, which is called *Independence-Territoriality Index* (IT) (Coronel and Zamichiei, 2012a), and which was also used for the complete first presidential period of Cristina Kirchner.

For that purpose, this article will start with a deep theoretical revision of different, current, approaches that are applied to address the Executive-Legislative relationship, so that the methodological strategies used to carry out empirical measurements can then be addressed.

Then, all logical and methodological aspects that enabled reaching the already mentioned IT will be specifically developed.

Finally, this new IT will be applied in the 2007-2011 legislative period in order to obtain new perspectives about theory and already existing measuring methods and, thus, to allow reaching a new and better understanding of the legislative dynamics in Latin American federal systems.

THE BEHAVIOR OF LEGISLATORS: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH

There are many empirical approaches about party cohesion in National Legislators (Bowler *et al.*, 1999; Hazan, 2003) regarding different institutional factors, such as: benefits and costs of discipline for party members (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2004), tension between parties' collective interest and the personal interest of their candidates (Fiorina, 1977; Katz, 1980; Cox, 1987; Ames, 1992; McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1994; Reed, 1994), the bond between "voting as a whole" and party funding (Quinn, 2002), the absence of party discipline in hegemonic party systems (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005) and the absence of immediate reelection of legislators as the root cause of party discipline (Ugalde, 2000; Magar and Weldon, 2001; Nacif, 2002).

In addition, there are different academic trends as regarding the relationship between party unity and political system. Thus, some approaches consider that the parties are often portrayed as being highly cohesive in parliamentary systems, and not so united in presidential systems, generating issues when the Executive Power establishes the legislative agenda (Linz, 1994; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Shugart, 1998; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). However, other approaches contradict these statements when highlighting in their analyses the role of the Presidents when legislative coalitions that favor them are created (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000; Siavelis, 2002; Amorim Neto, 2002; Weldon, 2002; Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh, 2004).

As to what concerns academic studies about party discipline and territorial dimension specifically, these can be grouped in different approaches. The first group deals with the subject using the Rice Index (1925) or considering it as a tool for measuring party discipline (Ózbudun, 1970; Ames, 2000), whose result in the Argentine case was 98% of cohesion (Morgenstern, 2003).

The second group of approaches finds very different results when dealing with the subject in relation to the territorial dimension, specially the bond between party cohesion and ideological and territorial dimensions (Moon, 2005; McElroy, 2007), as well as the relationship between party cohesion and election rules (Sartori, 1976; Uslander, 1985; Jacobson, 1990; Mainwaring, 1991; Ames, 1992; Geddes and Ribeiro Neto, 1992;

Shugart and Nielson, 1993), especially the greater or lesser tendency to respect the party discipline regarding the single-member per constituency, proportional and combined systems (Massicotte and Blais, 1999; Shugart, 2001; Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001; Kunicova and Remington, 2008), or regarding the election systems that enable competition among several candidates for the same party in general elections, such as the “double simultaneous voting” lists (Ames, 1995; Chang and Golden, 2001; Hix, 2004).

There is also a third group which considers that the main source that generates discipline is the party organization within the Congress and its ability to provide incentives to each of its members, rather than the election system characteristics (for instance, appointments for Commission presidency by the party leader), some of them associating the parties to cartels (Cheibub, Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000; Jones, 2002; Jones, Hwang and Micozzi, 2009; Calvo, 2007).

Thus, for the Argentine case, Jones and Hwang (2005) adapt the cartel theory thought for the us (which states that legislators have certain autonomy to control their own political careers and delegate certain power to the national leaders as long as this promotes their own political interests). This constitutes a difference from the work of other authors that dismisses the role of the sub-national players and analyzes the Argentine case from several perspectives, whether observing the role of the economic interests of the legislator’s district of representation, or analyzing the relationship between the Executive and Legislative powers as an agenda control shown through presidential veto, or the legislative function seen from the interests behind the bills submitted plus the resources applied and the legislators’ self-perception of their role, among other explanatory factors (such as Etchemendy and Palermo, 1997; Mustapic, 2000; Bonvecchi and Schijman, 2005).

But the role of the governor as an influential factor on the legislators has begun to be included in what could be considered as a fourth study group about the subject, which is a more recent one and that not long ago did not have systematized empirical evidence. These researchers have begun suggesting that the Argentine case (among other countries) has a particular characteristic given by the governor, who delegates certain powers to the national/central government as long as this benefits their own goals and interests (in the form of wire transfers, grants, positions in the National Public Administration, as examples of actions inherent to the patrimonialism).

Aligned with this trend of considering governors as important players in the Executive- Legislative relationship, Carey (2001) states that through the analysis of some situations arises the fact that there is an additional reinforcement of the party unit due to the additional impact that governors have over the usual levels of party unit, using a strong hand to discipline allied legislators.

Likewise, sometimes governors (even if they are not decisive players in shaping the legislator’s vote) may oppose to the position taken by the party’s national leaders (even of the Executive Power if it is the governing party), which makes the governor a direct competitor of the national authority regarding the influence on the legislator’s voting.

That said, this diverse study group is originated in anecdotal and journalistic versions, or even from personal experience, but with the empirical evidence only starting to be

known during the last years, and not always showing the influence of the sub-national players; or sometimes doing so, but unfortunately in a not very serious manner; and most of the times, non critically “importing” theoretical models thought for other contexts.

The attempt to strengthen (through different means) the academic approach of the role of governors in the activities of the National Legislative Power has fallen into studies such as the ones made by Abrucio (1998), Mainwaring (1999), Carey and Yannitell Reinhardt (2001), Rosas and Langston (2011), Coronel (2010), Coronel and Zamichiei (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012b), and Inchauspe (2012), among others. The last ones tried to empirically fill the academic void by generating a matrix of roll-call votes and a permanent follow-up of bills passed, and the position of governors and legislators’ changing allegiances (something very frequent in present-day Argentina).

In this way, “voting unity” of the legislative blocks —predisposition of the legislators belonging to the same block, coalition, or party, to vote as a group (Carey, 2002)— could be measured including the influence of governors thanks to the creation of an Independence-Territoriality Index (IT). Such Index was elaborated as an adaptation of the classic Rice Index, but including, with analytical purposes, the position of the governors regarding each bill and the creation of the previously data matrix with roll-call votes of national legislators, comparing the data with variables such as the governor’s position regarding the subject, or legislators’ allegiance to the governing or opposing parties, either national, provincial or any other government (see Appendix A).

Needless to say, IT Index was not thought as an attempt to reject the different legislative voting influences (performed by public opinion, lobbyists, national party leaders, the president, and so on), but as an instrument that allows the measurement of the governor influence when leaving all of the other factors isolated. This is especially of great importance since, as it was stated before, there is a lack of empirical studies on this subject.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Particularly, some preliminary clarifications must be done. Firstly, it is considered that the correct perspective to be adopted for making a correct political analysis of cohesion and discipline in the Legislative Power does not correspond to that of a literal reading of constitutional law, which expresses an absolute separation of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers hard to observe in the real world.

As Martínez Elipe (2000) argues, the contemporary constitutional systems must be understood not only from the analysis of Executive-Legislative relationship, but mainly from the government-opposition relationship (i.e. on one side the executive and the ruling party benches and, on the other, the opposition legislators).

Moreover, a literal reading of the Argentine Constitution indicates that Congressmen represent the interests of the people and Senators of their provinces, at any time without involving the participation of political parties and other stakeholders such as governors in definition of the positions of such legislators. Needless to say, it is not so.

Secondly, the difference between cohesion and discipline must be considered. “Cohesion

siveness” refers to the degree to which the members of a group share similar preferences and “discipline” refers to the degree to which group leaders are able to elicit unified voting of the group, regardless of member preferences. Carey (2002) refers to this formula:

$$\text{CLOSE}_j = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{\text{THRESHOLD}} * \left| \text{THRESHOLD} - \% \text{aye} \right| \right)^2$$

for legislature as a whole on vote j

As votes approach toss-ups (as CLOSE approaches 1), a handful of switched votes one way or the other could turn the outcome. In that case, party leaders should be increasingly inclined to impose discipline.

For this study, THRESHOLD and CLOSE tools were used to determine how hard-fought each session was.

On the other hand, when thinking about the influence of governors on national legislative votes, a number of questions arise. First of all, does governor position represent the local interest? It is not possible to assert that governor’s preferences (“independence”) will always and by all means be representative of the state interest (“territoriality”). That is the reason why we call this index Independence-Territoriality Index. *But in any case, both might reflect/explicit a tension between national and local interest and in that sense the IT Index would be able to measure the prevalences within such a tension.*

Second, is the governor the key factor of the state politics? Is the subnational politics centered in the governor’s figure? In a competitive and federal democracy, it would be logical to assume *that the major role in local politics is the state party leader*. Local party centrality might be shared between governor and the *state/province* party president. Nevertheless, in the Argentinian case, we were able to find out that most of the governors were, at the same time, the *state/provincial* party presidents. *Whether its plausible influence might come from being governor or state party leadership (or both) is something the Index is unable to detect, but it is clear that in a controversial issue the local power will interact with the national one and in that point, the Index will reflect clearly which one was more influential in any case.*¹

On the other hand, such data might be understood in the context of electoral and party system in both countries. In that sense, the US party system is a long-term bipartisan one, while the Argentinian system is quite unstable and fragmented, especially during the last fifteen years. It has observed an important number of relevant political parties (at least five during the period analyzed).

On the other hand, the US electoral system is constituted by single-member constituencies, while in Argentina there are multi-member districts. This particular combination of a fragmented party system with a multi-member electoral system affects the

¹ Even more, empirical data *for the period analyzed* suggests that, otherwise, when governor and local party leader were not the same person and both had incongruent positions in respect of a law project (i.e. Neuquen Province: MPN-Sobisch case), all of the national legislators voted according to the governor’s position *in 100% cases*. That is, the governor’s posture *undoubtedly* prevailed.

dynamics of the decision making process in Argentina, giving more relevance to the governor figure (i.e. often being a relevant actor when establishing the list of candidates to the National Congress).

This matter presents a big contrast with the US political system, because while in Argentina both careers (the governor and the legislative ones) are highly tied and it usually leads to a permanent consultive performance, as an empirical study refers.²

On the contrary, in the American system, governor and Congress members have their own independent power base.³

Now, without trying to describe the construction of *Independence-Territoriality Index* (IT), it is necessary to specify the criteria used for the selection of both cases and variables involved (and their categorization criteria) in order to, afterwards, properly interpret the results (for further information about IT, see Appendix).

In this sense, we can start with the selection criteria of cases. First, given the decision to take the roll call votes of legislators as data-input, a case would be considered (as a first approximation) any proposal or issue that was brought to the legislative chambers to be subject to roll call by legislators, without distinction as to the origin of it (i.e., opposition, executive or legislative ruling bloc). That is, *a priori* excludes all those cases or initiatives that have not reached the voting precinct instance (for instance, those that were voted in parliamentary committees only and did not pass to the chamber).

Then, as a second instance of filter or selection, actually analyzed cases are those which, besides the condition fulfilled in the previous paragraph, have generated a level of national debate that would lead to the governors to state their positions on the issue (explicitly or implicitly).

² That is exactly what an empirical study carried out among national deputies in Argentina (MEL survey) in 2012-2013 showed: the representatives clearly stated that they consulted their governors and were influenced by their statements. The influence of the governors on the voting of the representatives from the same party and province was 6.96 (in a scale from 1 to 10 being 1 *no influence at all* and 10 *absolute influence*).

³ As it was stated by Professor Thomas Patterson, consulted in December 2015 about which influence do have governors over the Congress members, he clearly stated:

Not much. That doesn't mean that they don't work together, particularly if they're from the same party. One of the things about the American political system, and the reason we have candidate-centered politics, is that each elected official has his or her own power base. So, if you're on the House of Representatives, is because you have a majority of the votes in the congressional district; if you're in the Senate is because you got a majority of the votes in the Senate race in your state; and if you're governor, you also have a majority votes within your right. So each of them has independent power base and that makes them somehow independent from each other. That doesn't mean that they don't work together if they're from the same party. And sometimes they work together even from the opposite parties. For example, we have a lot of military bases here in the United States (...). Now, if that was threatened (and periodically military bases are threatened with closing), if that was threatened, you can be sure that the Republican and Democratic lawmakers alike in the state (...) would fight it tooth and nail to stop it from happening. So you do get cooperation when you're with you've threaten local and state interest" (Patterson, Thomas E., 2015. American Government course, Harvard Kennedy School of Government (HarvardX: HKS101A), Unhangout video #2, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Qis511Umlag).

Here arises the first difficulty, which is how to determine when the second condition is met or not. In this sense, the decision taken was to detect, in the first place, issues that made the voting of initiatives a topic mentioned in the different national newspapers. That is, to the extent that they were not only a topic in itself but also that the fact of the (future) vote of such a topic in Congress achieved mention in national journalistic media.

Once the proposal is selected, another issue needs to be resolved: how to determine the position of the governor and the source of data. In this sense, an exhaustive search is performed not only on national newspapers (which for Argentina there are at least two of reference: *Clarín* and *La Nación*) but also in major newspapers in every province of Argentina.

In either case, this monitoring was able to find support or rejection by the governors. It considers all manifestation explicit where the governor stated his position on the issue, for example, in a report, a request with his signature, an attendance at a meeting organized for that purpose by the governing groups or other actors where they spoke openly against/ in favor, party meetings where the body is manifested openly advocate for/against, photos on the same conditions as previously reported, to name the most common.

Thus, cases are determined to analyze and complete the variable "*position of the governor*" with the data for each governor as "*for*", "*against*" or "*no data*" categorization used when despite the exhaustive search it was not able to obtain any information as to place the governor in a position on the issue.

This last category lead us to another situation, which is to decide what to do when there are many governors that did not show their position using the data sources proposed. In this sense, a last criterion was adopted for the final selection of the case (or to discard it):

- if there were up to five governors with "no data", then such provinces are discarded from the analysis;
- if there were more than 5 "no data" governors (25% of cases or higher) then the case is dropped completely.

The delimitation, although arbitrary, is a decision that seeks that governors' silences would influence the outcome as little as possible. Otherwise, the research could be biased according to how we want to interpret these silences or for the eventual bias of having different behavior between governors expressing their views and those not, leaving this empirically unprovable.

Thus, the voting shortlisted in 2008 met the conditions set: Resolution 125, Nationalization of Pension Funds, and Nationalization of Aerolíneas Argentinas. For 2009, projects that fulfilled these conditions were: Advancement of Elections, Delegated Authority, Broadcasting Law and Political Reform. For 2010, the projects were: 82% Mobile Retirement, Treasure Office Contributions and Glacier Act. For 2011, the Bicentennial Fund (see Annex 1).

Once determined the study cases, it only remains to explain the categorizations made about the status of the legislature party politics against national and/or provincial government. For this case we used three categories with the same national or provincial criteria: *ruling*, *ally* or *opponent*.

When we say *ruling* we made reference to any congressman/senator who had been part of the official list that supported the president/governor candidate. Should he belong to another unofficial list but also supported who later became president/governor-elect, then that legislator is categorized as an *ally*. Finally, if the legislator had been part of a list whose candidate for president/governor had been different to the elected candidate, then it is categorized as an *opponent*.

However, the Argentinean political dynamics leads to consider another not less important aspect: the breakdown of legislators from the parties (parliamentary blocs) that give them the base of choice as well as the position of the governors related to the National Executive power. In other words, it is not surprising that a candidate who was elected by the running with the ruling party then moves out of that party and/or block in Congress and joins another block (opponent or not) or makes a block himself (many times being the only member of it), while declaring an abandonment of the positions of the party that gave him shelter. Something similar also happens with opposition legislators who become part of the ruling or allied blocks (this situation could be considered as *co-optation*).

This led to a decision about whether the categorization of their position regarding the legislature's executive national/provincial should consider the list by which he was elected (looking beyond the statement some of them made affirming a change in loyalty even before starting office) or if it should be updated according to the actual changes of each legislator.

This resulted in the deciding to create a timeline for each legislator (congressmen and senators) which recorded shifts in legislative blocks with the exact date, and what position the new block formed adopted. In this sense, the movements were generally former government legislators forming blocks that became part of the opposition (e.g. Federal Peronist block) or opponents who became allies (block Solidarity and Equality, for example).

As a final point it is worth noting that the dates used in demonstrating the change of parliamentary blocks were officially provided by the Parliamentary Secretary (of Representatives and Senate) containing only the date on which legislators formally stated the change.

Additionally, a timeline for governors was also constructed, since in contemporary political dynamics we can also see how some governors passed from allied to opposition positions (for example, some of the *governors* called *K*), or opponents that were transformed into allies (for example, the Popular Movement Neuquen), also the case of a ruling party that became opposition (as was the case of governor Das Neves in Chubut). Moreover, there were periods when the governor's periods did not coincide exactly with the national legislators of that province time in Congress (e.g., Santiago del Estero and Corrientes) enabling possible changes in the province (and its position on the national government) while keeping the same legislators (for example, the case of Corrientes). In short, this governors' timeline allowed us to take into account the political changes of governors for the entire period of study and for each vote to be analyzed.

As it can be seen, the analysis of legislators and governors requires constant monitoring. Now that all operational issues are clarified we can go forward with the analysis of the selected votes.

Indeed, we can observe situations in which within government, allies or opponents unanimity is found between the standing of governors, but also where these groups' position is divided regarding a specific proposal, be it initiatives coming from their own party or another one.

Other measurements used in the study of executive-legislative relations which served in previous studies to validate this new IT index can be seen in Coronel and Zamichiei (2012a).

A horizontal scale with arrows at both ends. Above the scale are three labels: '-1' above '(perfect discipline)', '0' above '(higher inner tension)', and '+1' above '(perfect independence-territoriality)'. A vertical tick mark is positioned below the label '0'.

By contrast, opposition congressmen did not have a tight party discipline, but seemed to reflect some influence of the governors: in some cases the result, although negative, is pretty close to zero (Nationalization of Pension Funds —AFJP—, nationalization of national airlines —AA—) and in the case of Media law it is positive (+0.34). Meanwhile, the situation of MPs allied closely resembles that of the opponents.

Regarding the opposition senators there are two positive values for IT, that of AFJP (Pension Funds) and Glaciers. Comparing votes with their peers in the House of Representatives, it can be seen that territoriality affects opponents indiscriminately of the Chamber of origin. Thus, the vote on Nationalization of AFJP resulted in +0.34 and -0.18 for senators and opposition congressmen. But the vote on Media law was the

inverse, throwing $-0.34 + 0.34$ for senators and deputies opposed to the national government. In other words, territoriality matters between opponents and can be measured but it does not account for a pattern distinct for congressmen and senators so far.

This is particularly the case of allied senators. There it could be find that, in general, these smaller blocks function with less national party discipline, and where provincial realities seem to outweigh what happens at the Chamber of Deputies. The observed differences in IT between congressmen and senators allies are important. This fact may respond to the nature of these parties, of limited nationwide scope, which often move around a single well-recognized politician but whose alliance with the national government has some leeway, at least in relation to the party discipline that can be seen in the ruling party.

It is also interesting to observe the differences between allied congressmen and senators. The different values for each IT ballot suggest that allied Senators are much more permeable to territoriality. There we find values for the most dispersed IT: from -1 (perfect discipline) for the vote of 82% Mobile, to the very close to perfect territoriality of Resolution 125 ($+0.87$). While results are the extremely varied, there is almost always a significant difference in territoriality compared to allied congressmen (Resolution 125: $+0.87$ vs. $+0.27$; Advancement of Elections: $+0.43$ vs. -0.62 ; Airlines: 0 vs. -1 , etc.). This makes us think that in senatorial allied blocks, competition between national party discipline and territoriality is even more than in any other case.




FIGURE 1. RESULTS FOR RULING PARTY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS




FIGURE 2. RESULTS FOR ALLIED CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS




FIGURE 3. RESULTS FOR OPPOSITION CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS

Moreover, when crossed with other data variables, results are different, although the number of cases analyzed are insufficient to make greater inferences. In particular, it is observed that when the ruling governors kept one voice in relation to their position on a particular issue, the discipline is much stronger than when there are conflicting opinions, even more so among congressmen than among senators (Figures 4 and 5).




FIGURE 4. RESULTS FOR RULING PARTY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS
(WITH TOTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN RULING PARTY GOVERNORS)




FIGURE 5. RESULTS FOR RULING PARTY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS
(WITH NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN RULING PARTY GOVERNORS)

However, as shown in subsequent graphs, that pattern is not recorded for cases of allied or opponents legislators. For both situations, the results show (so far) quite a dispersion.




FIGURE 6. RESULTS FOR ALLIED CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS
(WITH TOTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALLIED GOVERNORS)




FIGURE 7. RESULTS FOR ALLIED CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS
(WITH NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALLIED GOVERNORS)




FIGURE 8. RESULTS FOR OPPOSITION CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS
(WITH TOTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN OPPOSITION GOVERNORS)




FIGURE 9. RESULTS FOR OPPOSITION CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS
(WITH NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN OPPOSITION GOVERNORS)

When analyzing data according to their correspondence by election year or not, the results are interesting: in election years, both senators and congressmen belonging to the ruling party show a strong discipline, while in non-election years the spectrum is much broader, reaching to be positive.




FIGURE IO: RESULTS FOR RULING PARTY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (IN ELECTORAL YEAR)




FIGURE II. RESULTS FOR RULING PARTY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (IN NON ELECTORAL YEAR)

On the other part, the allied deputies have an important disciplining behavior in electoral years and a lot of dispersion in non-electoral years. Allied senators, however, appear to be more undisciplined regardless of it being an electoral year or not.




FIGURE I2. RESULTS FOR ALLIED CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (IN ELECTORAL YEAR)




FIGURE 13. RESULTS FOR ALLIED CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (IN NON ELECTORAL YEAR)

Among the opposition it is still not easy to see a behavioral pattern. It can be stated so far, with the exception of the Media Act, that congressmen had a very disciplined behavior in electoral years and far less disciplined behavior in non-electoral periods, but until a greater number of cases is analyzed, we cannot determine if the Media Act represents an exceptional case or not.




FIGURE 14. RESULTS FOR OPPOSITION CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (IN ELECTORAL YEAR)




FIGURE 15. RESULTS FOR OPPOSITION CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (IN NON ELECTORAL YEAR)

By controlling data through the origin of the proposal (ruling or opposition), we find that lawmakers are much more disciplined with ruling party initiatives than those of the opposition.




FIGURE 16. RESULTS FOR RULING PARTY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (WITH RULING PARTY INITIATIVE)




FIGURE 17. RESULTS FOR RULING PARTY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (WITH OPPOSITION INITIATIVE)

Meanwhile, the allies have a particular behavior: on an official proposal, congressmen have much more discipline than the senators, while in projects coming from the opposition, allied Senators were more disciplined than congressmen.




FIGURE 18. RESULTS FOR ALLIED CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (WITH RULING PARTY INITIATIVE)




FIGURE 19. RESULTS FOR ALLIED CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (WITH OPPOSITION INITIATIVE)

Finally, opposition lawmakers have not a defined behavior, still presenting a wide behavior spectrum. In some cases there is a strong discipline, while in other cases there is a greater indiscipline (Nationalization of AFJP among senators and Media Law among congressmen). Perhaps in the future a larger number of cases will let us find opposition behavioral patterns by origin of the initiative. However, it must always take into account the particularities of the current Argentine party system, in which there is not one opposing party but many which could, in consequence, be affecting the observed results.




FIGURE 20. RESULTS FOR OPPOSITION CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (WITH RULING PARTY INITIATIVE)




FIGURE 21. RESULTS FOR OPPOSITION CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS (WITH OPPOSITION INITIATIVE)

CONCLUSIONS

In this article we studied the role and influence of governors on party discipline at national legislative level. In the Argentine case, the vote held in 2008 regarding Resolution # 125 turned to have a highly political importance and research interest. Not only due to the fact that the governing party, having majority of members in both Houses, lost the voting in the Senate, but also due to the high public exposure of certain underexplored sub-national players: the governors.

Thus, exploring whether legislators voted considering their partisan allegiance or the territories they represent (*territoriality*), and up to what extent governors really influence the vote of legislators belonging to their same party and province became an extremely interesting research issue. In order to answer these key questions and considering the empirical void that exists within the current approaches to the subject, the objective of this work was to identify potential behavioral patterns of the legislators according to their political position regarding the national and provincial governments, the position of the corresponding governors, and other situational variables by using the Independence-Territoriality Index (IT) during Cristina Kirchner's administration.

Results for both Houses showed really interesting conclusions. First, as proved in the empirical data analysis, when conducting studies on this subject, it becomes necessary to research representatives and senators separately. However, the most important theoretical contribution of this article is the understanding that including governors when studying and/or measuring the Executive-Legislative relationship entails an unavoidable need.

On the other hand, the electoral factor resulted to be an element that must also be considered: electoral years seem to have, in general, a greater party discipline than non-electoral years. This clearly contradicts Morgenstern (2003), who argues that the election period tends to break the discipline of agents.

Furthermore, the literature on Executive-Legislative relations and party discipline also benefits from this article as it empirically shows what Carey (2001) stated on the way that governors contribute to strengthen party discipline, specially seen on ruling party deputies.

Therefore, we can state that, from now on, studies regarding such relationship should be thought not as a dyad, but as a triad composed by the national Executive, the provincial Executive, and the national Legislative Powers.

In sum, data proved that governors are meddling in national legislative affairs and this provides preliminary results regarding the importance of certain factors (i.e. electoral year) and the differentiation between representatives and senators (rejecting the well-known academic trend that measures only Argentine representatives). The observation of the legislators' behavior considering other segmentation criteria (such as, province of origin of the legislators, and political parties, among others) is left for a future study when a greater amount of cases would be available.

Aware of the impossibility to generalize even more the conclusions about the legislative behavior, the study leaves a field open to incorporate more cases that will allow establishing other segmentation variables and thus find a pattern more suited to the role or influence of the governors in the legislative behavior while, at the same time, it would be interesting to replicate it in other Latin American federal republics in order to determine whether the Argentine case constitutes a peculiarity or a standard within the region.

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ANNEX I. LIST OF PROJECTS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS

Year	Projects mentioned in national newspapers	Origin of the Initiative	Governors without statements	Project situation	Legislative process result
2008	Resolution 125 (<i>Resolución 125</i>)	Ruling party	0	Process Ended	Rejected
	Nationalization of Pension Funds (<i>Nacionalización AFJP</i>)	Ruling party	4	Process Ended	Approved
	Economic Emergency (<i>Emergencia Económica</i>)	Ruling party	7	Process Ended	Approved
	Nationalization of Aerolíneas Argentinas (<i>Nacionalización de Aerolíneas Argentinas</i>)	Ruling party	5	Process Ended	Approved

ANNEX I. LIST OF PROJECTS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS (*Continúa*)

Year	Projects mentioned in national newspapers	Origin of the Initiative	Governors without statements	Project situation	Legislative process result
2009	Advancement of Elections (<i>Adelantamiento de las Elecciones</i>)	Ruling party	0	Process Ended	Approved
	Delegated Authority (<i>Delegación de Autoridad</i>)	Ruling party	19	Process Ended	Approved
	Broadcasting Law (<i>Ley de Medios</i>)	Ruling party	1	Process Ended	Approved
	Technological Tax (<i>Impuesto Tecnológico</i>)	Ruling party	22	Process Ended	Approved
	Political Reform (<i>Reforma Política</i>)	Ruling party	3	Process Ended	Approved
2010	Judiciary Reform (<i>Reforma del Consejo de la Magistratura</i>)	Oppo- sition	—	On-going Project	
	Coparticipation Act (<i>Ley de Coparticipación de Impuestos</i>)	Oppo- sition	—	On-going Project	
	Industrial Promotion (<i>Ley de Promoción Industrial</i>)	Oppo- sition ¹	—	On-going Project	
	National Treasure Contributions (<i>Aportes del Tesoro de la Nación</i>)	Oppo- sition	4	Process Ended	Approved ²
	Superpowers Reform (<i>Reforma de los Superpoderes</i>)	Oppo- sition	—	On-going Project	
	82% Mobile Retirement (<i>82% Móvil Jubilatorio</i>)	Oppo- sition	5	Process Ended	Approved
	Glacier Act (<i>Ley de Glaciares</i>)	Oppo- sition ³	5	Process Ended	Approved
	Treasure Office Contributions Reform (<i>Reforma a los Aportes del Tesoro Nacional</i>)	Oppo- sition	—	On-going Project	
	News Paper/Fibertel (internet) (<i>Papel Prensa/Fibertel</i>)	Oppo- sition	—	On-going Project	
2011	Bicentennial Fund (<i>Fondo del Bicentenario</i>)	Ruling party	0	Process Ended	Approved

¹ This bill was introduced at the request of the governors (of different political signs) themselves. It was categorized as an opposition initiative because of the stance against it of the National Executive.

² Approved in the Deputy Chamber only. It was not treated at Senate Chamber.

³ Despite the official senator Filmus was one of the proposers, we categorized it as an opposition initiative because of the antecedent that the National Executive vetoed such an initiative in the previous legislative period.

ANNEX 2. RESULTS OBTAINED FOR INDEXES IN DIFFERENT VOTING PROCESSES,
ACCORDING TO CONGRESS CHAMBERS AND POLITICAL GROUPS

TABLE 1. LIST OF PROJECTS STUDIED AND THEIR THRESHOLD
AND CLOSE VALUES. CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Project	Year	Initiative	Threshold	Close
Resolución 125	2008	Ruling Party	127	0.9843
Estatización Aerolíneas Argentinas	2008	Ruling Party	124	0.6532
Estatización AFJP	2008	Ruling Party	119	0.6387
Adelantamiento Elecciones	2009	Ruling Party	127	0.9449
Ley de Medios	2009	Ruling Party	77	0.0909
Reforma Política	2009	Ruling Party	118	0.8559
82% Móvil	2010	Opposition	121	0.8843
Ley de Glaciares	2010	Opposition	108	0.8056
Fondo del Bicentenario	2011	Ruling Party	120	0.7750

TABLE 2. LIST OF PROJECTS AND THEIR INDEXES VALUES
FOR RULING PARTY. CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Project	Year	¿Difference within governors?	IT	Rice	Unity	Rice Complete	Unity Complete
Resolución 125	2008	Yes	-0.6952	0.7087	0.6952	0.7231	0.7121
Estatización Aerolíneas Argentinas		No	-1.0000	1.0000	0.9889	0.9508	0.9431
Estatización AFJP		No	-0.9780	0.9780	0.9468	0.9160	0.8862
Adelantamiento Elecciones	2009	No	-0.9588	0.9588	0.9490	0.8361	0.8293
Ley de Medios		Yes	-0.8667	1.0000	0.9479	1.0000	0.9231
Reforma Política		No	-1.0000	1.0000	0.9681	0.9643	0.9310
82% Móvil	2010	Yes	0.0000	-0.9286	-0.8254	-0.9494	-0.8427
Ley de Glaciares		No	-1.0000	-1.0000	-0.7581	-0.9714	-0.7473
Fondo del Bicentenario		No	-0.9714	0.9714	0.8608	1.0000	0.8734

TABLE 3. LIST OF PROJECTS AND THEIR INDEXES VALUES
FOR ALLIED PARTIES. CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Project	Year	¿Difference within governors?	IT	Rice	Unity	Rice Complete	Unity Complete
Resolución 125	2008	Yes	0.2667	-0.2000	-0.2000	0.0625	0.0625
Estatización Aerolíneas Argentinas		No	-1.0000	1.0000	0.8182	0.7241	0.6563
Estatización AFJP		No	-1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	0.7931	0.7188
Adelantamiento Elecciones	2009	No	-0.6250	0.6250	0.5882	0.2258	0.2188
Ley de Medios		Yes	-0.8000	0.5000	0.4000	0.7273	0.4571
Reforma Política		No	-1.0000	1.0000	0.8571	0.0667	0.0588
82% Móvil	2010	Yes	-0.1667	-0.5556	-0.4545	-0.1765	-0.1000
Ley de Glaciares		Yes	-0.1667	-0.4000	-0.3636	0.0435	0.0357
Fondo del Bicentenario		No	-0.7273	1.0000	0.7273	1.0000	0.7273

TABLE 4. LIST OF PROJECTS AND THEIR INDEXES VALUES
FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES. CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Project	Year	¿Difference within governors?	IT	Rice	Unity	Rice Complete	Unity Complete
Resolución 125	2008	No	-0.9474	-1.0000	-0.9000	-1.0000	-0.9780
Estatización Aerolíneas Argentinas		Yes	-0.3333	-0.6923	-0.6923	-0.5158	-0.4900
Estatización AFJP		Yes	-0.1852	-0.0667	-0.0588	-0.5056	-0.4500
Adelantamiento Elecciones	2009	Yes	-1.0000	-1.0000	-1.0000	-0.9341	-0.8500
Ley de Medios		Yes	0.3333	1.0000	0.3529	0.9048	0.1827
Reforma Política		Yes	-1.0000	-1.0000	-0.8235	-0.8043	-0.6981
82% Móvil	2010	Yes	-1.0000	1.0000	0.8333	0.9688	0.9051
Ley de Glaciares		Yes	-0.8000	0.8889	0.8000	-0.9714	-0.7473
Fondo del Bicentenario		Yes	-1.0000	-1.0000	-0.9524	-1.0000	-0.9524

TABLE 5. LIST OF PROJECTS STUDIED AND THEIR THRESHOLD
AND CLOSE VALUES. SENATE

Project	Initiative	Threshold	Close
Resolución 125	Ruling Party	37	0.9730
Estatización Aerolíneas Argentinas	Ruling Party	32	0.6875
Estatización AFJP	Ruling Party	34	0.6471
Adelantamiento Elecciones	Ruling Party	34	0.7647
Ley de Medios	Ruling Party	35	0.7429
Reforma Política	Ruling Party	n/d	n/d
82% Móvil	Opposition	36	0.9722
Ley de Glaciares	Opposition	35	1.0000
Fondo del Bicentenario	Ruling Party	Not voted	

TABLE 6. LIST OF PROJECTS AND THEIR INDEXES VALUES
FOR RULING PARTY. SENATE

Project	¿Difference within governors?	IT	Rice	Unity	Rice Complete	Unity Complete
Resolución 125	Yes	-0.5471	0.5484	0.5484	0.5610	0.5610
Estatización Aerolíneas Argentinas	No	-0.9200	0.9200	0.8519	0.9444	0.8293
Estatización AFJP	No	-0.7931	0.7931	0.7931	0.8500	0.8293
Adelantamiento Elecciones	No	-0.8667	0.8667	0.8387	0.7949	0.7561
Ley de Medios	Yes	-0.8667	0.8000	0.7742	0.7895	0.7692
Reforma Política	No	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
82% Móvil	Yes	0.0833	-0.7143	-0.7143	-0.6667	-0.6667
Ley de Glaciares	No	-0.5556	-1.0000	-0.7581	-0.9714	-0.7473
Fondo del Bicentenario	Not voted					

TABLE 7. LIST OF PROJECTS AND THEIR INDEXES VALUES FOR RULING PARTY. SENATE

Project	¿Difference within governors?	IT	Rice	Unity	Rice Complete	Unity Complete
Resolución 125	Yes	0.8667	-0.7143	-0.7143	-0.3333	-0.3333
Estatización Aerolíneas Argentinas	No	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Estatización AFJP	No	-0.2500	0.3333	0.2500	0.2500	0.2222
Adelantamiento Elecciones	No	0.4286	-0.4286	-0.4286	-0.1111	-0.1111
Ley de Medios	No	-0.2000	0.2500	0.2222	0.4000	0.3636
Reforma Política	No	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
82% Móvil	Yes	-1.0000	-1.0000	-1.0000	-0.4286	-0.4286
Ley de Glaciares	Yes	-0.5000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1429	0.1429
Fondo del Bicentenario	Not voted					

TABLE 8. LIST OF PROJECTS AND THEIR INDEXES VALUES FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES. SENATE

Project	¿Difference within governors?	IT	Rice	Unity	Rice Complete	Unity Complete
Resolución 125	No	-1.0000	-1.0000	-1.0000	-0.9091	-0.9091
Estatización Aerolíneas Argentinas	Yes	-0.3333	0.0000	0.0000	-0.6842	-0.5909
Estatización AFJP	Yes	0.3333	1.0000	0.3333	-0.5294	-0.4091
Adelantamiento Elecciones	Yes	-0.5000	0.0000	0.0000	-0.6842	-0.5909
Ley de Medios	Yes	-0.3333	-0.3333	-0.3333	-0.7000	-0.6364
Reforma Política	Yes	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
82% Móvil	Yes	-1.0000	1.0000	0.8000	1.0000	0.9310
Ley de Glaciares	Yes	0.4000	-0.3333	-0.3333	0.5556	0.5000
Fondo del Bicentenario	Not Voted					

The IT Index formulas were inferred from certain logical matrices which get different shapes according to the political roles in the Congress chambers (ruling, allied or opposition) and the initiative proposer.⁴

TABLE A. LOGICAL MATRIX FOR RULING LEGISLATORS.
PRESIDENT **SUPPORTING** THE PROJECT

	RULING PARTY GROUP ¹	
National legislators votes	Governor SUPPORTING	Governor AGAINST
AYE	National discipline Provincial discipline Cohesion	National discipline Cohesion
NAY	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (both national and provincial)	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (national) Provincial discipline

¹ It must be stressed that while Rice Index pursue discipline measurement, the Territoriality Index (IT) focuses on the inverse effect. Seen as a logical matrix, the first difference with Rice Index is that while the latter intends to measure the first quadrant, the IT intends to measure the third one. The logic persists but the formula varies.

TABLE B. LOGICAL MATRIX FOR RULING LEGISLATORS.
PRESIDENT **AGAINST** THE PROJECT

	RULING PARTY GROUP	
National legislators votes	Governor SUPPORTING	Governor AGAINST
AYE	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (national) Provincial discipline	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (both national and provincial)
NAY	National discipline Cohesion	National discipline Provincial discipline Cohesion

⁴ For a deeper understanding of the methodological IT Index construction and assumptions see Coronel & Zamichiei (2012).

TABLE C. LOGICAL MATRIX FOR ALLIED LEGISLATORS.
PRESIDENT **SUPPORTING** THE PROJECT

	ALLIED PARTY GROUPS ²	
National legislators votes	Governor SUPPORTING	Governor AGAINST
AYE	National party discipline Provincial discipline Cohesion	Cohesion Cooptation
NAY	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (both national and provincial)	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (national) Provincial discipline

² In this particular period, allied parties had exclusively provincial structures, not having a national influence but a provincial one.

TABLE D. LOGICAL MATRIX FOR ALLIED LEGISLATORS.
PRESIDENT **AGAINST** THE PROJECT

	ALLIED PARTY GROUPS	
National legislators votes	Governor SUPPORTING	Governor AGAINST
AYE	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (national) Provincial discipline	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i>
NAY	Cohesion Cooptation	National party discipline Provincial discipline Cohesion

TABLE E. LOGICAL MATRIX FOR OPPOSITION LEGISLATORS.
PRESIDENT **SUPPORTING** THE PROJECT

	OPPOSITION PARTY GROUPS	
National legislators votes	Governor SUPPORTING	Governor AGAINST
AYE	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (national) Provincial discipline Cooptation	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (national and provincial) Cooptation
NAY	National party discipline Provincial indiscipline Cohesion	National party discipline Provincial discipline Pure territoriality

TABLE F. LOGICAL MATRIX FOR OPPOSITION LEGISLATORS.
PRESIDENT **AGAINST** THE PROJECT

	OPPOSITION PARTY GROUPS	
National legislators votes	Governor SUPPORTING	Governor AGAINST
AYE	National party discipline Provincial discipline Pure territoriality	National party discipline Provincial indiscipline Cohesion
NAY	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (both national and provincial) Cooptation	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (national) Provincial discipline Cooptation

TABLE H. LOGICAL MATRIX FOR OPPOSITION LEGISLATORS. PRESIDENT **AGAINST**
THE PROJECT. NATIONAL OPPOSITION PARTY AGAINST THE PROJECT

	OPPOSITION PARTY GROUPS	
National legislators votes	Governor SUPPORTING	Governor AGAINST
AYE	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (national) Provincial discipline Pure territoriality	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (both national and provincial) Cohesion
NAY	<i>Independence-Territoriality</i> (provincial) National party discipline Cooptation	Provincial discipline National party discipline Cooptation

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TABLE I. IT INDEX FORMULAS

Political Roles	President SUPPORTS the project	President AGAINST the project
Ruling	$IT_{rul} = \sum w_i G_i = w_a A + w_b B$	$IT_{rul} = (-1) \sum w_i G_i = (-1)(w_a A + w_b B)$
Allied	$IT_{al} = \sum w_i H_i = w_c C + w_d D$	$IT_{al} = (-1) \sum w_i H_i = (-1)(w_c C + w_d D)$
Opposition	$IT_{op} = (-1) \sum w_i I_i = (-1)(w_e E + w_f F)$	$IT_{op} = \sum w_i I_i = w_e E + w_f F$

In all these formulas, A , C and E always refer to national legislators whose governors are supporting the project. While B , D and F refer to those legislators whose governors are against that project.

Being the structure of A , B , C , D , E and $F = (\text{votes}_{\text{aye}} - \text{votes}_{\text{nay}}) / \text{votes}_{\text{hj}}$.

Votes_{hj} states, for each political group, the total number of legislators of the group (that is, the total amount of aye, nay, absences and abstentions for that group).

W is a weighting factor, being $w_a; w_c$ and $w_e =$ quantity of governors supporting the project divided by the total number of governors of the group (ruling, allied or opposition group); while $w_b; w_d$ and $w_f =$ quantity of governors rejecting the project also divided by the total number of governors of the group (ruling, allied or opposition group).

Thus, IT is able to get a continuous value between -1 and $+1$, where -1 represents perfect national party discipline and $+1$ means perfect territoriality. And 0 scores a high fragmentation situation which might allow detecting pre fracture conditions of the political groups under study.⁵

⁵ The numeric interpretation is the same for every coefficient, whether it was calculated for ruling, allied or opposition parties.

