Immigration restrictions and the causal paths to global poverty

Nicolás Maloberti*
Senior Fellow at Liberty Fund

Revista Cultura Económica
Año XLIV • N°111
Junio 2026: 11-39
https://doi.org/10.46553/cecon.44.111.2026.p11-39

Abstract: This article argues that stringent immigration restrictions imposed by wealthy countries constitute a significant yet overlooked causal factor in the persistence of global poverty. While prevailing accounts attribute poverty primarily to the deficient institutions of poor countries, the paper contends that such explanations implicitly treat immigration restrictions as fixed background conditions rather than as variables with independent explanatory power. Drawing on institutional economics, political theory, and the literature on exit and voice, it argues that restrictions on international mobility reduce the bargaining power of citizens in poor countries by limiting credible exit options, thereby reinforcing exclusionary political coalitions and inhibiting institutional reform. The article further examines the normative implications of this causal relationship, maintaining that common justifications for immigration restrictions fail to account for their contribution to institutional stagnation and poverty. It concludes that debates on global justice should reconsider the moral and political legitimacy of restrictive immigration regimes

Keywords: Global poverty; immigration restrictions; institutional development; global justice; exit and voice; political institutions.

Restricciones migratorias y los mecanismos causales que conducen a la pobreza mundial

Resumen: *Este artículo sostiene que las estrictas restricciones migratorias impuestas por los países ricos constituyen un factor causal significativo, aunque ampliamente ignorado, en la persistencia de la pobreza mundial. Mientras que las explicaciones predominantes atribuyen la pobreza principalmente a las instituciones deficientes de los países pobres, el trabajo argumenta que tales enfoques tratan implícitamente las restricciones migratorias como condiciones de fondo invariables, en lugar de considerarlas variables con un poder explicativo propio. A partir de los aportes de la economía institucional, la teoría política y la literatura sobre exit y voice, el artículo sostiene que las restricciones a la movilidad internacional reducen el poder de negociación de los ciudadanos de los países pobres al limitar sus opciones creíbles de*

* El Dr. Nicolás Maloberti falleció previamente a la publicación de este artículo. El Dr. Maloberti es licenciado en Ciencias Políticas por la Universidad de Buenos Aires, magister en Economía y Ciencias Políticas por ESEADE y PhD en Filosofía por Bowling Green University.

salida, reforzando así las coaliciones políticas excluyentes e inhibiendo las reformas institucionales. Asimismo, examina las implicancias normativas de esta relación causal y sostiene que las justificaciones habituales de las restricciones migratorias no tienen en cuenta su contribución al estancamiento institucional y a la pobreza. Finalmente, concluye que los debates sobre la justicia global deberían reconsiderar la legitimidad moral y política de los regímenes migratorios restrictivos.

Palabras clave: *pobreza mundial; restricciones migratorias; desarrollo institucional; justicia global; salida y voz (exit and voice); instituciones políticas.*

A recurrent line of argument in the literature on global justice emphasizes the need to take the prevailing explanation of the main determinants of poverty more seriously.[1] It exhorts that philosophers' normative claims on what societies owe each other must be better informed by social scientists' causal claims about what makes countries do well. The importance of these empirical matters must be fully recognized, but we must also recognize one basic philosophical insight. The adequacy of any causal explanation is partially determined by our own explanatory interests, rather than by the objective structure of the world exclusively. Our own interests determine the causal factors that we take to be fixed or invariant and, thus, as background conditions, and the ones we take to be subject to variability and, thus, as having explanatory value. What interests us when dealing with social issues, in turn, is often constrained by the moral commitments we hold.

The prevailing explanation of the main determinants of poverty locates them in poor countries' own institutions. Thus, philosophers have relied on this explanation to deny rich countries' substantial responsibility for the fortunes of the global poor. More concretely, they have relied on it in resisting proposals for redistribution on a global scale through questioning both their rectificatory status and their effectiveness at generating sustainable growth when advanced merely through an appeal to duty to aid. We must recognize, however, that the emphasis on poor countries' own institutions is a consequence of addressing the specific interest embedded in the inquiry for the determinants of the wide gap between rich and poor countries. In addressing this interest, we highlight how different characteristics of societies account for differences we observe in their economic performance. But in doing so, we treat the global order characterized by rich countries' widespread reliance on stringent immigration restrictions as a mere background condition.[2] This is problematic in the context of attributing responsibility for global poverty. This would be due to the causal role played by immigration restrictions in poor countries' institutions and the contested moral status of those restrictions.

The causal role of stringent immigration restrictions is related to the costs they impose on exit from poor countries. These costs are a major determinant of the payoff matrix faced by the relevant local agents in the strategic interactions underlying the development and stability of their deficient institutional structures. At a theoretical level, the importance of meaningful exit options for institutional development has been recognized in both economics and political science.[3] The potential significance of exit at the international level has often been downplayed because of the assumption of large mobility costs. Yet this would be unwarranted in the presence of highly attractive conditions abroad for large parts of poor countries' populations. The findings of a nascent body of empirical literature on emigration and political development support the familiar theoretical considerations and also suggest complementary causal channels to traditionally highlighted ones.[4]

Given the theoretical and empirical plausibility of these causal considerations, we must bring attention to their profound implications for global justice. In the absence of compelling justifications for rich countries' stringent immigration restrictions, there would be no rational basis for relegating them to the status of background conditions in our explanation of the determinants of global poverty. At the same time, the overlooked causal role of those restrictions should lead us to reconsider the value of the justifications offered in their defense.

Several authors have stressed the costs imposed on the global poor by stringent immigration regimens, where these costs are measured primarily in terms of the gains immigrants would accrue by their entry into rich countries. However, these costs include those imposed on the global poor through the causal role of those immigration regimens in the deficient institutional structures of their home countries.[5] Rationales for immigration restrictions based on the brain drain phenomenon have ignored this matter. Insofar as they have conceptualized the underlying moral problem in terms of rich countries' obligations of beneficence toward those they exclude, rationales on the basis of the consequences for destination countries have ignored it as well. The problem is that the reasons we might offer to justify preventing would-be immigrants from escaping poverty do not justify causing the poverty they are trying to escape.

Thus, the explanatory value of the institutional account of global poverty should be granted, as well as the resulting limitations of redistribution at a global scale as a rectificatory measure. But this is consistent with attributing to rich countries a substantial responsibility for global poverty. This is because rich countries' widespread reliance on stringent immigration restrictions would be a major causal determinant of poor countries' institutions and because the rationales that have been advanced to justify those restrictions would be inadequate in light of that causal role.

I. Institutional determinants of global poverty

Following the extensive literature dealing with both the centrality of institutions for economic growth and the dynamics of institutional development, we can conceive of a society's overall institutional framework as comprising two main structures: a property rights structure and a political structure.[6] Alternative configurations of the property rights structure would differ in terms of the rules —both formal and informal— governing all matters relating to the use, exclusion, income, and disposition of a society's resources, as well as in the quality of their enforcement. Alternative configurations of the political structure would differ in terms of the decision-making power assigned to individuals concerning, among other matters, the configuration of formal aspects of the property rights structure and the allocation of public resources among alternatives.

Economic growth is the product of property rights configurations under which a broad segment of individuals face incentives to increase their physical and human capital stocks, face low transaction costs, specialize, and have the flexibility to react to changes in relative prices. Economic stagnation is the product of prevalent high transaction costs, predation, or the granting of special privileges that overwhelm the incentives for investment, innovation, production, and trade. Thus, growth-inducing property rights demand that the political structure be able to guarantee the provision of essential public goods, such as protection from private predation and an adequate legal infrastructure. However, they also demand political decision-making to not disincentivize individuals' productive efforts. With varying degrees of success, this is typically handled through different mechanisms of precommitment and accountability, such as institutional checks and balances, the holding of periodic elections, the granting of universal political rights, and an independent judiciary to uphold the rule of law.

The properties of institutional structures are the result of a diverse set of societies' historical circumstances; they include resource endowments, relative scarcities, and culturally transmitted value and belief systems. Those historical circumstances determine the constraints and opportunities of alternative groups with conflicting interests over the distributional outcomes of alternative institutional arrangements. In doing so, these circumstances determine the distribution of bargaining strength among those groups. Crucially, their relative bargaining strength will depend on both their differential control over resources and their capacities to resolve collective action problems. For most of human history, the historical circumstances of societies have conferred disproportionate bargaining strength to coalitions that secure special privileges to members by excluding a large part of the populations from access to growth-inducing configurations of property rights.

When not because of the absence of a coalition capable of monopolizing the use of violence and, thus, to provide essential public goods, the persistent economic stagnation of poor countries today would be due to the stability of their dominant exclusionary coalitions' bargaining strength. Growth-inducing institutional change occurs when there is a significant reduction in that bargaining strength relative to that of a nonexclusionary coalition, meaning a coalition whose benefits do not depend on excluding large numbers of individuals from access to the benefits of adequate property rights. These substantial alteration in distribution of bargaining strength often occur, for example, through demographic shocks, technological innovations, or radical cultural developments.[7]

These considerations help us understand why deficient institutional structures often persist despite the economic stagnation to which they give rise. At the most basic level, they persist because of the gains they yield for those who have the capacity to initiate institutional change. These considerations also help us understand the severe constraints assistance efforts must face. The mere transference of resources is rarely beneficial and is often counterproductive because they empower dominant exclusionary coalitions. Assistance in terms of institutional reform also faces serious challenges because of the difficulties in altering a society's distribution of bargaining strength by merely altering the formal elements of institutional structures. Although the configuration of those formal elements is of great importance in shaping the expectations of all actors, this can only be reliably achieved when the resulting institutional change is expected to constitute a relatively stable equilibrium.

This is a highly simplified account of the main tenets of multiple theories in political economy and institutional economics. Several important matters have been omitted, such as issues of path dependence, transaction costs in "political markets", and the relative importance of agents' cognitive models in the perception and evaluation of their options. Nevertheless, this crude picture should be sufficient to appreciate the bases for the implications that several authors have derived in relation to the issue of global justice.

Although these authors differ in terms of their emphases and moral commitments, it is possible to reconstruct their main point around the following observation: a country's prosperity is mainly determined, as Risse puts it, by "what people do with each other within shared institutional frameworks" (2005b: 116). The lack of economic growth faced by the global poor in any given country is mainly due to the relationships among that country's residents "rather than to relationships among them and outsiders" (Risse, 2005a: 357). This observation amounts to a denial of the existence of causal paths of significance (in terms of their effect size) that can be traced from global poverty back to the actions of rich countries, and thus, to a denial of a substantial *contribution-based responsibility* on their part.

Furthermore, both because of the relative inefficacy of resource transfers in the presence of deficient institutions and because of the severe constraints on assisting with institutional reform, there would be no significant omission to which we could appeal as grounding a substantial *assistance-based responsibility* on rich countries' part either.[8]

This line of argument recognizes that particular policies of rich countries, such as agricultural subsidies and trade barriers, have negative consequences for the global poor. However, while those policies would be indefensible, their effects would be insufficient for attributing to rich countries' a substantial responsibility for global poverty. This is because their elimination would not likely make a substantial difference in that regard.[9] Ultimately, this is because of the centrality of poor countries' historical circumstances in determining the bargaining strength of their different groups. Therefore, as Lomasky and Tesón note, rich countries could "properly stand accused as secondary victimizers, as culpably making worse a distress of which they are not themselves the agents" (2015: 89).

II. Explanatory adequacy and moral responsibility

The institutional account upon which philosophers have derived those normative implications is a causal model. As with all such models, it highlights a series of causal factors and paths of significance in terms of their effects. But this highlighting is not necessarily due to the absence of several other factors and paths of comparable significance. This is a mere implication of the widely recognized problem of causal selection; that is, the problem of promoting some factors to the status of causes and demoting others to background conditions.

In explaining why a fire broke out, we rarely highlight oxygen as its cause. As Hart and Honoré (1959) point out, we reserve the title of "cause" for factors like short circuits, a dropped lit cigarette, or lightening. The most straightforward account of why we do this appeals to our own explanatory interests. Those interests determine that the relevant contrast case of a state of affairs in where the fire breaks out is invariant in relation to the presence of oxygen.[10] Similarly, a reference to the contamination of the release valve by food residues often constitutes an adequate explanation of why a pressure cooker explodes. However, the explosion is not caused by that contamination any more than it is caused by the numerous small areas of aluminum composing the walls and lid of the pressure cooker. We do not highlight the causal effect of any of those areas simply because we want them to be there.

Thus, the causal factors and paths we highlight could be more or less relevant in the extensive causal network underlying any event or state of affairs. Nevertheless, from the disinterested point of view of the universe, none of the comparable relevant causal factors have any priority. Our own explanatory interests are what lead us to assume certain aspects of a situation as fixed or invariant. Often, we are interested in how to prevent certain outcomes without altering the factors that we assume to be invariant. This could be so because either they are out of our control or their alteration comes with costs we are unwilling to bear. In dealing with social matters, those costs are typically of a moral nature, and they therefore depend on the moral views and commitments we hold.

Thus, we can conceive of adequate explanations as both accurate identifications of causal relations and appropriate answers to our explanatory interests. This implies that recognition of the adequacy of any causal explanation of global poverty cannot constitute the proper basis for attribution of responsibilities. Those bases might lie in what —for the purposes of addressing an explanatory interest— we have implicitly relegated to the status of background conditions. Therefore, the value of the knowledge provided by the institutional explanation does not lie in any sort of straightforward support for the denial of rich countries' responsibility for global poverty. The value of that knowledge lies in providing theorists of global justice with two well-defined tasks, which are given by the practical nature of our attributions of moral responsibility.

The first task is to conceive of possible sets of alternative conditions —ones that could realistically be brought about by rich countries— under which the historical circumstances of poor societies would not lead to economic stagnation, at least not with the same degree of certainty. The second task is considering whether this realistic change in conditions is morally advisable. This will be determined in relation to the value of everything else that would be altered as a result of that change or, alternatively, in relation to potential violations of moral constraints that would not allow for the corresponding tradeoffs.

To carry out these tasks, it is helpful to represent the institutional account as a mediational causal model. Institutional structures would be the mediating variable on the causal relationship between societies' relevant historical circumstances and their economic performance. Thinking of the institutional model in terms of mediation is compatible with the possibility that some historical circumstances, such as geographic or cultural matters, affect economic performance without being mediated by institutional structures. However, the indirect effects of such matters and others —the effects that are mediated by institutional structures— are believed to have greater significance than their direct effects.[11] Thus, the possibility that we must consider is whether certain policies of rich countries can be seen as substantial moderators of the causal path from poor countries' historical circumstances to their institutional structures. In other words, we must consider whether alternative configurations of those policies could have important effects in increasing or diminishing the strength of the underlying causal relationship. Those effects result from how those policies alter the distribution of bargaining strength resulting from poor countries' historical circumstances.

Two potential moderators of this causal path have been highlighted in the literature on global justice. The first is the global trade regimen (Pogge, 2008: 18-23), and the second is the recognition of a dictator's right to rule and the resulting granting of resources and borrowing privileges (Pogge, 2008: 118-22; Wenar, 2016).[12]

With regard to the first, the emphasis is often placed on the direct welfare effects of greater income resulting from the elimination of trade restrictions. But resulting alterations in income distribution can also positively affect the distribution of bargaining strength that sustains economic and political institutions.[13] Nevertheless, it is unclear that rich countries' current trade restrictions are significant enough that their elimination would have any substantial indirect effect on that front.

The causal role of resource and borrowing privileges would be related to the incentives granted for seizing power through military coups and the disincentives created for sharing control of the state or for implementing structural reforms conducive to economic growth. Cohen questions the significance of resources and borrowing privileges on the basis that a large proportion of the world's extremely poor is found in countries that neither live under dictatorship nor have significant natural resources (2010: 38-9). However, he also questions whether the institutions of poor countries would be highly responsive to changes in global rules in relation to those privileges (2010: 38-9). This concern can be restated in terms of the causal considerations discussed earlier. Given the relevant historical circumstances of poor societies, we might believe those changes would be insufficient to alter the relative bargaining strength that sustains the strategic equilibrium underlying their deficient institutions.

More generally, Cohen notes that he does not see a story "that would make domestic institutions and poverty strongly endogenous to global rules, and thus no empirically plausible way to embed the explanatory importance of domestic institutions in a larger story about the explanatory sufficiency of global rules" (2010-38-9). But Cohen does not consider the potential significance of the causal role of rich countries' immigration regimens in that regard. The moderating role in question would depend on the extent to which the equilibrium of the strategic interaction underlying the stability of poor countries' institutions is sustained by the mobility costs entailed by the stringency of those regimens.

Despite the extensive literature on the importance of exit options for institutional development, social scientific research has not highlighted the lack of those options as a cause of why nations fail. For the reasons already discussed, this should not be understood as suggesting the causal inefficacy of those options. The explanatory interests that have guided that research might have been constrained by an implicit recognition of states' moral prerogatives to rely on immigration restrictions or by a recognition of the political unfeasibility of removing those restrictions. Contrary to the suggestion of self-serving bias and fallacious reasoning underlying Pogge's indictment against social scientists' "explanatory nationalism", we can merely note that our explanations are necessarily constrained by our explanatory interests (2008: 4, 6, 16).[14] And that social scientists' likely constraints are not appropriate when our interest lies in attributing responsibilities for global poverty.

Section III will address the first task mentioned earlier, that is, the task of conceiving whether a realistic change in conditions—the removal of rich countries' stringent immigration restrictions—could be expected to substantially moderate the causal role of historical circumstances in determining the deficiency of poor countries' institutional structures. Section IV will address the second task, which is related to the moral advisability of nonetheless relying on those immigration restrictions.

III. Mobility costs as moderators of global poverty

Unlike roving bandits, stationary bandits must take into account how their predation affects their victims' future decisions. This is the basic insight behind Olson's (1993, 2000) memorable model. If stationary bandits were to steal everything today, their victims would respond by abstaining from investing in anything tomorrow.[15] Thus, the stationary nature of these bandits determines that they have fewer degrees of freedom than roving ones, and their potential victims have greater bargaining strength in terms of the specification of their property rights or, eventually, their access to political rights. Olson's model is helpful for appreciating the essence of the strategic interactions that govern the formation and change of institutional structures. However, to fully appreciate the causal effects of mobility costs, it is useful to think in terms of the stationary or roving nature of the targets of the bandits —or rulers— instead.

We can begin by assuming the stationary nature of rulers and an unrealistic scenario of costless mobility for their subjects. Such rulers could be conceived of as backed up by dominant coalitions through either democratic or nondemocratic means.[16] In this scenario, rulers' actions —either in terms of specific policies or in terms of the configuration of the economic and political institutional structures— would not merely be constrained by individuals' responses in terms of their expected economic investments and political actions within the jurisdiction. They would also be constrained by their potential decisions to exit. Actions perceived to impose greater net costs relative to those adopted by alternative jurisdictions would create outmigration toward the latter.

The assumption of costless mobility would thus further increase productive individuals' bargaining strength in relation to Olson's original comparison between stationary and roving bandits. The extent of that increase would be a function of the net aggregate loss imposed on the rulers by their exit. Because of both the differential economic value of individuals' assets and their exit's differential impact along other dimensions, the significance of the aggregate loss for rulers would depend on the size and composition of the set of those facing a positive exit payoff. Those who could leave, however, might be powerful, organized groups in search of special privileges. Furthermore, the exit of many of constituents could create a net gain to exclusionary coalitions. For example, those tempted to leave could be those who are most costly to subdue or those who would send valuable economic remittances back home.[17] The exit of those who are the most discontented could also weaken the power of voice, in Hirschman's sense, of those who stay.[18] Thus, if we leave aside the potential competitive dynamics among the multiple jurisdictions, costless mobility need not produce growth-promoting institutional change. It is the presence of highly attractive options abroad for a large part of the population that makes this institutional change more likely to occur.[19]

In the presence of those attractive options abroad, the potential gains that emigration can report to exclusionary dominant coalitions would likely be nullified by significant reductions in the workforce and size of the market, as well as by the correspondingly diminished scale economies and important fiscal losses. Because of the large exit payoffs of a great proportion of the population, the matching of these payoffs would likely only be reliably secured by the sort of economic performance resulting from widespread access to secure property rights and their corresponding political guarantees. Sharing of the existing exclusive rents of the dominant coalition would not be an option insofar as it will tend to dissipate the rents. Thus, dominant coalitions would face incentives to relax economic privileges and support the development of credible mechanisms of precommitment to foster trust and incentivize long-term investments, such as those that underlie the institutional structures of contemporary wealthy nations.

These considerations highlight the causal channel of exit emphasized by the traditional literature, as is more evident in discussions of fiscal federalism.[20] However, in addition to this resource channel, there is also a voice channel. As Hirschman (1978, 1993) himself most explicitly notes in his later contributions, voice is often empowered through the underlying credible threat of exit.[21] Ultimately, this is due to greater incentives to respond to the expressed demands. Because of this, however, credible exit threats also provide greater incentives to voice demands. Those incentives would then assist them with overcoming the collective action problems that provide exclusionary dominant coalitions part of their bargaining strength. The organized expression of these demands for change also amplifies public consciousness of the system's failure. This further increases the power of those demands by influencing political attitudes.[22]

Thus, in the presence of highly attractive conditions abroad, exclusionary dominant coalitions should be expected to be heavily constrained by the potential mass exit of their populations. Contrary to the belief that sustains skepticism about the significance of exit options in international matters, the initial assumption of costless mobility is largely unnecessary in the presence of those types of conditions abroad. In the absence of immigration restrictions, individuals' expected costs of building a life in a foreign nation and leaving their current life behind are rather substantial. However, the expected costs of not leaving that life behind are often perceived to be much larger.

Under ordinary conditions, individuals' decisions to migrate would be related to the magnitude of two main gaps.[23] The first is the income gap, and the second is the sociocultural gap. The income gap is given by the difference between the expected income abroad and the expected income at home. The sociocultural gap is given by the difference in the expected social and cultural value in living abroad in relation to continuing to live at home. For individuals to be willing to migrate, the gains from the income gap must be large enough to compensate for the expected losses from the sociocultural gap. Those gains must also naturally compensate for the direct costs of migration. These are the costs involved in the process of settling abroad. A reduction of this cost from the introduction of steamships is what explains the offset of the age of mass migration.[24]

In relation to a hypothetical scenario of costless mobility, the recognition of the potential significance of extra-legal mobility costs should be expected to reduce the size of the potential migration flow. However, it should also be expected to alter the composition of that flow. This is because of the relatively higher exit payoff for individuals with more working years ahead. For that set of individuals, the stream of future lifetime income tends to be large enough to offset the sociocultural costs. This change in the composition of the migration flow then likely results in the opposite effects of those associated with the so-called demographic dividend, here with a potentially greater significance and more rapid onset.[25] Those main effects would be reductions in the labor supply and lower per capita production, along with reductions in savings and the worsening of prospects for capital accumulation and growth, which in turn implies significant reductions in the tax base and, thus, a considerable fiscal loss.[26]

Therefore, in the presence of highly attractive conditions abroad for a large part of the population, the recognition of extra-legal positive mobility costs is unlikely to matter in terms of the expected needed alteration in bargaining strength. The introduction of stringent immigration restrictions makes a radical difference, however. If policies restrict immigration mainly through certain characteristics, such as specific skills, would-be immigrants face two main courses of action: assuming the costs of acquiring the required characteristics or assuming the costs of illegal residency. The costs of the latter option are typically large enough to deter all but the most desperate. The costs of the former option are typically large enough to deter all but the most fortunate. The consequence of this is that poor countries' exclusionary dominant coalitions are protected from facing the prospects of a large economic and political loss. As a result, large proportions of their population are prevented from acquiring the corresponding increase in bargaining strength that would result in growth-inducing institutional change.

The empirical evidence for the moderating effects of immigration restrictions on global poverty under the presence of highly attractive conditions abroad is naturally limited. This is because of the widespread reliance on those restrictions since the time technological advancements reduced the direct costs of migration in dramatic terms.[27] However, the few studies on the institutional consequences in origin regions during the age of mass migration supports the causal hypothesis in question. The most significant finding is that the main mass migration waves coincided with stronger demand for political change, greater responsiveness from economic and political elites, the adoption of democratic institutions, and the expansion of suffrage in Europe.[28] As significant as the age of mass migration might have been, the exit payoffs today would be much larger for extremely high numbers of the global poor than those faced by European immigrants at that time and, thus, the potential losses imposed on exclusionary dominant coalitions. For one, the current income gaps are much higher than the ones characteristic of the age of mass migration (Pritchett, 2006: 18-20). Modern forms of communication, as well as greater cultural globalization because of increased flows of goods, capital, and ideas across national boundaries, have also narrowed the sociocultural gap (Pritchett, 2006: 18-20).

The previous considerations are general in nature. The significance of the causal effects of immigration restrictions would depend on multiple empirical matters that could show tremendous variance across societies. These matters include, for example, the composition of the dominant coalition, degree of state capacity, relative importance of various sectors of the economy in terms of liquidity and mobility of assets, and the relative strength of cultural factors such as informal norms and value and belief systems. Importantly, the significance of the moderation effect of immigration restrictions would depend on the dominant coalition's degree of autonomy regarding large parts of the population.[29] For example, exclusionary dominant coalitions with a high degree of reliance on natural resources would not be equally constrained because of the lower economic cost implied by the exit of their residents. In such cases, the moderation effect of stringent immigration restrictions could be seen as complementary to the moderation effect of granting resource privileges. The recognition of these matters, however, should not lead us to discount the significance of the causal role played by immigration restrictions in global poverty. Such discounting should be supported either on 1) advancing a theoretical account of the persistence of institutional schemes in the face of dramatic changes in relative bargaining strength or 2) questioning the expected magnitude of those changes in a sufficiently large number of poor countries based on their particular circumstances.

IV. The morality of immigration restrictions

Considering the theoretical and empirical plausibility of the causal hypothesis discussed above, we must bring attention to its profound normative implications. Those implications would follow from the considerations discussed in Section II. If we were to lack a compelling justification for rich countries' immigration regimens, we would lack a non-arbitrary basis for relegating them as background conditions in our attributions of responsibility for global poverty. But a compelling justification of those regimens must not ignore their causal role in the institutional determinants of global poverty.

This causal role clearly questions the adequacy of justifying immigration restrictions on the alleged costs that emigration would impose on poor countries. The argument from the brain drain phenomenon is the clearest example in this regard. That phenomenon is the reason why Miller argues, for example, that immigration cannot be considered a human right. This is because that sort of status would be inconsistent with the optimal protection of other human rights, that is, the human rights of those who are unable to leave (Miller, 2016a: 110). The most fundamental ethical response to this line of argument is based on the illegitimacy of keeping individuals as hostages to the fortunes of their fellow nationals.[30] The causal considerations developed earlier suggest an alternative type of response.

An implicit assumption in the discussions of the brain drain phenomenon is that open immigration will leave a disproportionate number of the unskilled, poor, and vulnerable behind because of the direct costs of migration. This assumption could be challenged on the basis that those costs would be dramatically lower in the absence of stringent immigration regimens.[31] But we must bring attention to the most fundamental issue. Stringent immigration restrictions remove the exit payoffs for a large part of the population that could afford the costs of migration. The rationale from the brain drain phenomenon is that, in doing so, we are protecting those who are unable to afford migration. The difficult moral questions raised by precluding the exit of some to minimize the harm to those who must stay can be put to the side. What we must note is that the bargaining strength of the large part of the population that could leave would be greatly reduced, and the persistence of deficient institutional structures would likely be increased as a result. Thus, those who could not afford to leave, rather than being protected would be made more vulnerable.

Because of the brain drain phenomenon, Miller suggests that by allowing citizens of poor countries to immigrate, “rich states can be accused of complicity in creating human rights shortfalls” (2016a: 109-11). This could be so, but only in relation to their current reliance on immigration regimens that grant preferential treatment to small groups of individuals in possession of valuable skills. However, in relation to a condition characterized by the removal of all immigration restrictions, the opposite of Miller’s indictment would be true. That is, the complicity of rich states in creating human rights shortfalls would lie in their reliance on stringent immigration restrictions instead. That complicity would rest on the shielding of poor countries’ exclusionary coalitions from the costly prospects that available attractive exit options would otherwise entail for them.[32]

Thus, the problem with justifications of immigration restrictions that rely on the potential costs for origin countries is that they fail to appreciate how those costs are, under certain historical circumstances, instrumental for the likelihood of institutional change. In other words, the problem is not related to the existence of a trade-off between some positive effect from the emigration of skilled workers —such as those derived from their remittances back home— and the negative effects derived from a reduction in the numbers of the skilled workforce. However, neither is the underlying point that the mass exit of poor countries' population will be beneficial to those countries. The point is, rather, that exclusionary dominant coalitions will be incentivized to minimize the likelihood of that exit, and thus of its associated costs.[33]

Brock (2015: 39-40) bases her concerns for the brain drain phenomenon partly on its damage to institutions and institution building, and therefore on the loss in opportunities for development due to the loss of human capital and tax revenues. These might be valid considerations in relation to what Brocks refers to as "responsible, but poor" countries (2015: 60). The governments of these countries, while lacking resources, would have the incentives to establish the right sort of institutions. But the potential irrelevance of this category of countries is precisely the problem we face. The persistence of deficient institutions in poor countries is typically not a consequence of the lack of access to resources and human capital, but rather of the gains such deficient institutions yield for exclusionary coalitions. The fundamental point is that the large costs a potential mass exit of their citizens would inflict on those coalitions would increase those citizens' bargaining strength and, thus, increase the likelihood of institutional change.

The appreciation of these matters should lead us to reassess the limitations of the debate over the ethics of immigration more generally. Standard lines of argument in defense of immigration restrictions appeal to the costs imposed on the populations of receiving countries. These lines of argument stress the expected costs for native populations in terms of, for example, the weakening of their cultural ties, the distributional consequences for particular groups of individuals, or the viability of the welfare state. Responses are often based on the moral demands arising from a presumption of individual liberty, on the moral arbitrariness of political boundaries, and on the magnitude of the humanitarian gains that could be achieved through the opening of borders.[34] These responses lead us to examine the weight we must assign to the presumption of individual liberty relative to other values, the grounds and scope of the alleged duties to rectify morally arbitrary factors, and the cost limits we may observe in helping others. They will also lead us to examine the normative relevance of the availability of alternative forms of discharging a duty to aid the global poor.

The alternative positions on all these matters share a common understanding of the most pressing moral issue raised by immigration restrictions: whether we should allow individuals to escape poverty by migrating to rich countries given the expected costs for those already residing in them. This shared understanding is characterized by the accounting of the cost borne by the global poor in terms of the precluded opportunities to increase their welfare by moving to rich countries. But we must include the costs resulting from the widespread existence of deficient institutions, and thus for the persistence of global poverty. In other words, we must include the costs borne by the global poor in their home countries irrespective of whether they are willing and capable to move. Therefore, the estimates of the potential poverty mitigating effects of immigration, as high as they might be, would fall short of capturing them in their real dimension. This is in itself morally significant. But it is also significant in that it leads us to appreciate that the central points of contention over the ethics of immigration do not necessarily capture the essence of the problem at hand.

What would be at stake is not the limits that is permissible to set on the costs immigration is expected to imposed on native populations along various dimensions. Rather, what would be at stake is whether those native populations should face virtually no limits on the costs they themselves can impose on the global poor along more fundamental dimensions. What would be at stake is not whether the presumption of individual liberty of those wishing to escape poverty could be taken to have a greater weight than the benefits immigration restrictions would secure for native populations. Rather, it would be whether there are any grounds for recognizing rich countries' prerogative to cause the poverty from which immigrants might want to escape. This is why it is misleading to ask whether the duty to aid the global poor could be discharged by means other than the admission of immigrants, such as through foreign aid or direct intervention. The right question would be whether rich countries' have the right to place the global poor in the perilous situation they face.[35] The discussion over the grounds and extent of our duties to rectify the consequences of morally arbitrary factors would also lack much relevance. What would be at stake is not whether the global poor have a right to immigrate to rich countries because they did not get to choose where to be born. What would be at stake is whether rich countries have a right to determine the deficient nature of the institutions under which the global poor happen to be born.

The existence of special obligations to our fellow citizens has been advanced based on alternative considerations. Those considerations would be related, for example, to the involvement in mutually beneficially schemes of cooperation, certain features of a shared citizenship or nationality, or the coercive nature of the institutions of a national state.[36] But these special obligations cannot be relied upon to justify immigration restrictions on the basis of, for example, the resulting priority that must be granted to the interests of the domestic poor. This is because those special obligations are naturally conceived of as limited by our universal, most basic moral obligations to foreigners. And these most basic obligations are believed to include an obligation to not preclude others from having access to the objects of their basic human rights in their countries of residence. This is the basis, for example, of the condemnation of the borrowing and resource privileges granted by rich countries to dictators. The benefits yielded by those privileges to our fellow citizens in rich countries are not a proper consideration in their defense. However, rich countries' immigration regimens might empower poor countries' exclusionary coalitions far beyond the potential reach of those privileges.

This same line of reasoning undermines the justification of immigration restrictions on the basis of the main alternative grounds relied upon to recognize communities' rights of self-determination. Those grounds include individuals' fundamental interest in the character of their national culture, our understanding of the right of association, and individuals' alleged collective ownership of their political institutions.[37] The lines of reasoning in defense of immigration restrictions would then not be primarily concerned with balancing the magnitude of citizens' and immigrants' costs. However, none of the considerations offered in support of this type of understanding of self-determination are taken to justify the right of a democratic public to make policy choices outside fundamental moral constraints. Those constraints, as Miller understands them, are given by "the responsibility to respect and help protect the human rights of outsiders" (2016a: 37). More concretely, Miller argues that the right of self-determination comes with an obligation to "provide all political communities with the opportunity to achieve self-determination and social justice" (2000: 177). In appalling to a form of collective ownership, Pevnik highlights the responsibility that any plausible conception of ownership entails to non-owners (2011: 39-40). Wellman argues that a legitimate state's right of self-determination allows it to exclude even "potential immigrants who desperately want to enter" (2011: 13). This is because the duty to aid them can be discharged in alternative ways.

Thus, the recognition of the limits of the right to self-determination along these lines would then be in clear conflict with its reliance on justifying rich countries' immigration restrictions. While the right to self-determination could be plausibly relied on to constrain the extent and form of the demands that can be imposed on rich countries for the purposes of alleviating the needs of the global poor, this would be so only under the assumption of their lack of responsibility for their fortunes. But this is precisely what is in contention. And this contention does not rest on a more demanding view of the obligations of assistance that Miller, Wellman, and Pevnik themselves recognize as constraining the right of self-determination. Rather, this contention rests on the most minimal premise upon which the plausibility of their views depends. That premise establishes that the scope of the collective right to self-determination is constrained by the obligations to respect the human rights of both members and outsiders of the relevant groups. As Wellman notes, this is the basic matter that would determine whether a state is legitimate and, thus, entitled to a right of self-determination (Wellman and Cole, 2011: 16). But the legitimacy of the state would then preclude a right of self-determination that included the prerogative to rely on stringent immigration regimens.

Brock's (2020) and Blake's (2020) recent defenses of states' right to exclude might be understood as relying on more robust understandings of the state's obligations to outsiders than is typical. Brock argues that states' rights to self-determination that entail the right to control admission to their territory are conditional on their discharging of obligations to "support institutional arrangements that can respect everybody's human rights" (2020: 37), and to "promote conditions that support self-determining, just communities" (2020: 33). Blake, on the other hand, argues that rich countries would have the right to exclude immigrants because their admission would impose on residents the unwanted obligations of protecting and fulfilling immigrants' human rights (2020: 71). Those two obligations, contrary to the obligation to respect, would be of a local nature. However, when political communities fail to discharge any of those three types of obligations, their members have a legitimate claim to have their human rights protected and provided by other communities. These lines of argument still fail to capture the basic nature of the problem at hand, however. The problem is neither that immigration restrictions are unaccompanied by adequate promotion efforts to secure human rights protections, nor that they exclude would-be immigrants who have a claim to have their human rights protected and fulfilled outside their countries of origin. The problem is that those restrictions in themselves would erode the protection of human rights and, thus, would fail to comply with the universal obligation to respect them.

V. Conclusion

Despite the path-dependent characteristics of institutional development, we could be justified in discounting the relevance of colonialism in attributing a responsibility for global poverty. This would be so if we have reasons to believe that the historical characteristics of colonialized countries would not have otherwise nonetheless led to the development of growth-inducing institutional structures. However, we have reasons to believe that the causal effect of the historical characteristics of poor countries, including the legacy of colonialism, is substantially moderated by the stringency of rich countries' immigration regimens.[38] Thus, if we were to focus our attention on the past, we should focus it on the widespread adoption of stringent immigration regimens during the first decades of the 20th century instead. We might have failed to do this because of our belief that this adoption, contrary to colonialism, is a justified prerogative of states. However, the rationales for this prerogative have not taken into account its causal role in poor countries' institutions.

What characterizes much of the current debate on the ethics of immigration restriction is the underappreciation of the significance of that causal role. Insofar as any role is recognized, it is mostly in the sense that global poverty would be diminished if more poor people were to move into rich countries. This is what leads many theorists to think of global poverty primarily in terms of either beneficence or assistance.[39] According to this standard view, stringent immigration restrictions could, at most, stand accused of withholding a benefit.

The coercive nature of immigration restrictions, along with the voluntary exchanges natives and would-be immigrants are prevented from undertaking, are often considered to be relevant in assessing this view.[40] In the absence of considerations with enough weight to prevent those voluntary exchanges from taking place, immigration restrictions would violate the rights of both citizens and would-be immigrants, rather than solely failing to assist the latter. But this line of argument rests on normative premises that the rationales for immigration restrictions reject, such as the primacy of individuals' freedom of movement and trade across national jurisdictions in relation to certain collective interests. If a collective right to self-determination is granted on the basis of those interests, the coercive nature of immigration restrictions would not be considered to be more problematic than the coercive nature of, for example, the right to exclude implied by the right to property or individuals' freedom of association. In particular, this coercive nature would not imply that the obligations we might fail to discharge when excluding others are a matter of justice rather than beneficence.

For our purposes, what we must note is that immigration restrictions do not merely eliminate some means of getting ahead; what they preclude is not limited to partaking in the opportunities available in rich countries (Miller, 2010: 53). What we must note is that rich countries' immigration restrictions are a major causal contributor to global poverty through empowering poor countries' exclusionary coalitions. Thus, what immigration restrictions preclude is the opportunities of the global poor to have access to the objects of their basic human rights in their own countries. In what sense is this causal contribution of rich countries to the fate of the global poor better described as an instance of "allowing" rather than "doing" or "enabling" harm?[41] And in what sense is this a matter of mere beneficence rather than justice? Contrary to Pogge's (2008) familiar thesis, we can raise these questions without relying on an overly broad notion of harm and, thus, of the obligations entailed by our negative duties. Neither do we need to assume that the right to move between national jurisdictions is one of the basic human rights that rich countries fail to respect.[42]

Whether the familiar distinctions between doing and allowing, harming and failing to aid, and justice and beneficence have the moral significance that is often granted to them is open to debate.[43] The point is merely that those distinctions do not serve the purpose for which they are often relied upon in discussions of global justice. In particular, they cannot support the alleged justificatory role of the various concerns underlying the rationales for rich countries' immigration restrictions. This is because the point is not that rich countries can avert serious sufferings by removing those restrictions, and thus by allowing the global poor to improve their lives away from their homes. The point is that those restrictions themselves are a major causal factor in the poverty they endure and, thus, infringe upon a fundamental negative constraint endorsed by all liberal theorists: that the state does not exercise its coercive power in ways that prevent individuals from opportunities to meet their basic needs irrespective of where they live.

It must be clear, however, that the implications of the suggested causal relationship are not contingent on the value we grant to the distinction between assistance-based responsibilities and contribution-based responsibilities, or positive and negative obligations. If we put those distinctions to the side, the central question addressed by the debate on global justice would be whether changes in the policies of rich countries could have a substantial effect on global poverty and whether there are compelling reasons for them not to implement those changes nonetheless. Because of the causal effect of stringent immigration restrictions on global poverty, that fundamental question would concern the merits of granting a substantial prerogative to the state to determine who is to reside within its jurisdiction. The alternatives we face would have a variety of consequences in terms of, for example, the configuration of individuals' freedom of movement, the expected stability of communities' cultural practices, the scope of collective self-determination, and the feasibility of certain welfare programs.[44] All those consequences would imply different distributions of burdens and opportunities to different groups of individuals. Importantly, however, we must consider the significance of the burdens that would be imposed on the populations of poor countries through their deficient institutions. The type of question we must face is, for example, whether these costs are worth incurring for the sake of granting nations more robust collective rights of self-determination in relation to the means available to shape their collective character. Or whether those costs could be considered as a regrettable consequence of a more basic obligation to discharge our egalitarian duties to those already residing under the institutions of our states.

This line of argument does not entail that the removal of stringent immigration restrictions constitutes an easy shortcut to remedy the fate of the global poor. This removal could act as a destabilizing force on a society's well-functioning institutions because of the potential changes in its values and norms.[45] This concern should not be dismissed on the basis of a mere balancing between the losses and gains for those residing and migrating to the societies in question. This is because the likelihood of any substantial institutional change in poor countries would depend on the presence of highly attractive options abroad for sufficiently large parts of their populations and, thus, on the quality of rich countries' institutions. We must then carefully reflect on how those institutions could be reorganized to be resistant to rapid potential demographic and cultural changes in the short run and to the persistent effects of greater mobility in the long run. We must also reflect how to address the resistance that this reorganization will encounter because of its likely distributional consequences. These challenging matters deserve our attention. But do they justify treating rich countries' immigration regimens as a mere background condition rather than as a cause of global poverty?

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[1] See, for example, Risse (2005a, 2005b); Cohen (2010); Lomasky y Tesón (2015); Van der Vossen y Brennan (2018); Moller (2019).

[2] Insofar as Pogge's work has brought attention to the importance of the causal role of the global order in global poverty, there is a clear parallel with his writings. See Pogge (2008).

[3] The landmark contributions have been Tiebout (1956) and Hirschman (1970). For antecedents to those contributions, as well as for the contributions of later theorists, see Vaubel (2008).

[4] See, for example, Docquier et al. (2016). This emerging literature has brought attention to the positive consequences of emigration under current immigration regimens. Because of those regimens, however, the significance of those consequences will be limited. Furthermore, the relevant consequences will not always be unambiguously positive. For an extensive review of the multiple effects of emigration, see Kapur (2014). However, a small part of that same emerging literature on the positive effects of emigration has focused on the age of mass migration. The work of Jonathon Moses stands out in this regard. See, in particular, his *Emigration and Political Development* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[5] See, for example, Pritchett (2006) and Clemens (2011). For a review of this literature, see Dustmann and Preston (2019).

[6] The fundamental tenets of this literature are found in the seminal contributions of Douglass North (1981, 1990, 2005). See also North et al. (2009). The work of Acemoglu and Robinson has also been particularly influential. For an overview of their central contributions, see their *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty* (Crown Publishing, 2012).

[7] The work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) brings attention to the importance of the critical junctures that allow those excluded from the dominant coalition to overcome their collective action problem and, thus, increase their bargaining strength.

[8] For the distinction between assistance-based responsibility and contribution-based responsibility, see Barry and Øverland (2016).

[9] See, for example, Lomasky and Tesón (2015: 22–23), and Moller (2019: 194).
[10] The role of our own interests has been widely recognized in the philosophy of causation and explanation. For an account of how those interests determine the relevant contrast cases against which we judge the adequacy of causal explanations, see, for example, Lipton (1990).
[11] See, for example, Rodrik et al. (2004).
[12] The extensive literature on the resource curse has direct relevance for this line of argument.
[13] See Acemoglu et al. (2005); Puga and Trefler (2014). The impact of trade on institutional quality is not necessarily positive, however. This is because, for example, trade opportunities can lead to the concentration of political power in large exporters who are interested in raising barriers to entry or reducing competition in the factor markets. See, for example, Quy-Toan and Levchenko (2009).
[14] See also Pogge (2005).
[15] How much stationary bandits would decide to steal would then be determined by the expected value of that future loss. That value, in turn, would be determined by both the magnitude of their expected future income streams and by the probability of their own survival. The provision of basic public goods, such as minimal order, would in all likelihood yield a positive return because of its impact on those future income streams. The provision of others, however, might increase the likelihood of rebellion by reducing coordination costs, for example.
[16] Naturally, however, the type of political regime would be of major importance in determining the particular channels through which alterations in relative bargaining strength would be conducive to institutional development.
[17] For an account of the potential benefits of emigration to autocrats, see Miller and Peters (2020).
[18] This thesis is one of the most well-known aspects of Hirschman's seminal work. See his *Exit, voice, and loyalty*, pp. 45–46, 51–52, 100–102, 109–112.
[19] On the importance of a sufficiently large number of emigrants for political development, see Moses (2011: Ch. 3).
[20] See, in particular, Brennan and Buchanan (1980); Weingast (1995). For extensions of this line of argument to the national level, see, for example, Fleck and Hanssen (2013); Mariani (2007); Epstein et al. (1999); and Wilson (2011).
[21] Hirschman, however, had already noted this neglected aspect of his theory in his original contribution. See his *Exit, voice, and loyalty*, pp. 55, 82–3, 85. Thus, as the formal representations of his ideas have emphasized, Hirschman's most well-known seesaw pattern between exit and voice is only a special case. See Gehlback (2006), and Clark et al. (2017). For an emphasis on the complementary of exit and voice in the context of normative theory, see Taylor (2017).
[22] As shown by the studies on "political remittances", those who leave also contribute to this effect by the information and values they acquire abroad. See, for example, Docquier et al. (2016) and Levitt (1998).
[23] These two gaps would not account for the full significance of conditions that are characterized by war and ethnic or religious persecution, for example. For many other issues that theories of migration need to account for, see, for example, Massey (1999).
[24] See, for example, Hatton and Williamson (1998: Ch. 3).
[25] The demographic dividend refers to the accelerated growth that results from declines in the share of the nonworking-age population in relation to the working-age share. See, for example, Bloom et al. (2003).
[26] Exclusionary coalitions are not equally concerned for the social benefits of capital accumulation and economic growth as those in control of developed countries facing equivalent demographic changes. This is precisely the root of the problem. However, exclusionary coalitions are concerned about the perpetuation of the benefits conferred to them by their ability to stay in power, and that ability is expected to be eroded by the fiscal resources that result from contractions in the level of economic activity.
[27] Current migration flows, although higher in absolute volume, are significantly lower than those from the age of mass migration when measured in per capita terms. See Moses (2015).
[28] See Moses (2011); Karadja and Prawitz (2019). For a historical antecedent to this limited literature, see Hovde (1934). Studies on the institutional consequences of the Great Migration of African Americans out of the South, of the fate of the German Democratic Republic after Hungary's decision to allow East Germans to migrate to Austria, and of the largest migration flow

in human history within contemporary China could also be considered relevant. See Margo (1991); Hirschman (1993); Pfaff and Kim (2003); and Moses (2012).
[29] On the importance of this, see Clark et al. (2017).
[30] See, for example, Lomasky and Tesón (2015: Ch. 5), and Van der Vossen and Brennan (2018: 45-48). Blake, on the other hand, emphasizes the resulting unfairness in the distribution of the burdens of compliance with global justice. See Blake (2015).
[31] Furthermore, as the age of mass migration shows, remittances and loans from previous immigrants have constituted a major historical channel through which liquidity constraints have been relaxed. Also, in this historical experience, the great majority of immigrants were disproportionally unskilled because of larger income gaps. See Hatton and Williamson (1998: Ch. 2).
[32] It is thus a mistake to assume that the negative effects of the brain drain phenomenon under stringent immigration restrictions would be amplified by the removal of those restrictions. This mistake is made by Miller in suggesting that "an unrestricted right to immigrate would make things worse because it would no longer be permissible for rich states to close their border to professionals exiting from poor countries where their services are badly needed" (2016a: 51).
[33] Ypi notes that "justice in emigration requires limiting the outflow of more productive groups since it is precisely their exit which will most likely affect negatively sending societies" (Ypi, 2008: 409). Their actual exit might in fact do so. But this would not support limiting their outflow if increasing their opportunities to exit, along with the opportunities provided to everybody else, is necessary for sustained economic growth.
[34] See, for example, Carens (1987, 2013); Cole (2000); Kukathas (2005); Lomasky and Tesón (2015); and Van der Vossen and Brennan (2018). Kukathas's (2021) recent defense of open borders is unique in its emphasis on the curtailments of domestic freedoms that immigration restrictions entail.
[35] Oberman (2011, 2015) argues that the reliance on immigration policy to mitigate global poverty is problematic insofar as people have a human right to stay in their home states. Thus, states would be required to search for ways to address desperate poverty in situ instead. Pogge (1997) reaches a similar conclusion on pragmatic grounds. These lines of argument overlook how the availability of exit options for the global poor can be instrumental to the reduction of poverty in their own countries.
[36] See, for example, Blake (2001); Macedo (2007); Miller (2010). For a comprehensive critique of the reliance on special obligations to justify immigration restrictions, see Abizadeh (2016).
[37] See, for example, Miller (2016a); Wellman (2008); and Pevnik (2011).
[38] It is worth emphasizing that the moderating effects of immigration restrictions on institutional quality are not of a linear nature. In particular, a modest relaxation of the stringency of current restrictions, for example, could either have no effect or actually increase the relative bargaining strength of poor countries' nonexclusionary coalitions.
[39] For an explicit statement of this position see, for example, Levitov and Macedo (2018).
[40] See, in particular, Huemer (2010).
[41] For the notion of enabling harm, see Barry and Øverland (2016).
[42] On this issue, see Miller (2016b), and Oberman (2016).
[43] In the context of the discussion of global poverty, they could be considered, as Cohen puts it, to be "theological distractions from a moral disgrace" (2010: 29).
[44] For example, van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 224) argue that if a basic income scheme is to be made sustainable in the era of globalization, it is not possible to dispense with some form of exclusionary immigration strategy. While van Parijs and Vanderborght are concerned for the economic feasibility of a generous basic income scheme, other authors are concerned for the effects of increased cultural diversity on "social trust" and, thus, on the political support necessary to maintain a welfare state. See, for example, Miller (2008).
[45] Henry Sidgwick had already expressed this concern. See his *The elements of politics* (Macmillan and Co., 1891/1919), p. 309. For contemporary restatements see, for example, Buchanan (1995), and Collier (2013). For a response to this concern, see Kukathas (2021).