

THE SACRAMENTAL VISION OF LONERGAN'S GRACE AND FREEDOM

That Bernard Lonergan stands as one of the theological masters of twentieth century Catholicism is beyond doubt. Even during his lifetime international conferences were assembled, dissertation and books written, journals established to penetrate, apply, and perpetuate his thought. Most scholarly attention has been directed to his heuristic theory, a well plowed field of intellectual endeavor, that many other philosophers and theologians have harrowed in the second half of this century. Surely Lonergan's interest in scientific, historical, philosophical, and theological method, begun when he was a Jesuit scholastic, accompanied all his reflections long before flowering in *Method in Theology*. Yet beyond his concern for the proper way of discovering and presenting truth Lonergan devoted most of his life to actually explaining the truth in various dogmatic and philosophical treatises. Ultimately the thinker, especially the Christian theologian, must be more concerned with the truth than with his manner of thinking it. The scholarly neglect of Lonergan's theological treatises is to be regretted. That neglect, however, becomes difficult to justify with regard to *Grace and Freedom*, a revised version of Lonergan's doctoral thesis on *gratia operans* published in the newly nascent *Theological Studies*¹. This work deserves attention for many reasons. First, it was introduced by Lonergan's first developed reflections on theological method². Second, it devotes prolonged reflection to conversion, a central notion in Lonergan's later heuristic theory. Third, Lonergan refers to it repeatedly in his later works; indeed *Method* not only employs it as a paradigmatic illustration of theological progress but also admits «profound affinities» with its positions despite «several significant differences»³. Finally, it has been alle-

¹ B. LONERGAN S. I., *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. J. Burns (New York: Herder, 1971). The articles were originally published in *Theological Studies* 2 (1942) 289-324; 3 (1943) 69-88, 375-402, 533-578. Despite small changes in chapter ordering and various phrases, the book faithfully reproduces the article and shall be cited hereafter in footnotes as «G». Henceforth, unless otherwise noted, all footnote references will be to Lonergan's works.

² The introduction was published separately as «The Gratia Operans Dissertation: Preface and Introduction», ed. F. Crowe, *Method* 3 (1985) 9-49. D. Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan*, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 39-44, first drew scholarly attention to the methodological reflections.

³ *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) [henceforth: «M»], pp. 352, 107, 162f. n. 5, 165f., 241, 309f. It is also approved and presupposed in *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. D. Burrell (Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame, 1967) [henceforth: «V»], pp. 111 n. 81, 139 n. 241, 147 n. 29, 148 n. 37 (*Verbum* is a collection of articles originally published in *Theological Studies* from 1946 to 1949); *Insight* (1958; rpt. New York: Harper & Row, 1978) [henceforth: «In»], p. 664; *De Verbo Incarnato*, 3rd ed. (Romae: P.U.G., 1964), [henceforth: «DVI»], pp. 433, 443, 592; *De Deo trino*, II, 3rd ed. (Romae: P.U.G., 1964) [henceforth: «DT»], pp. 266f., 269. The page references to the *Grace* articles are as follows: V: 375-402, 533-578; I: 387ff.; DT: 377ff., 381-402, 533-537; DVI: 541ff., 547-552. These references include all of chapters 4-6 and the Concluding Summary of *Grace*, which presupposes ch. 2 and implicitly its parallel of habitual grace in ch. 3. Since ch. 1 only serves as an historical introduction, one might say that Lonergan maintained his doctrine of *Grace* until at least 1964. Although *Verbum* alone (1949) refers to ch. 6 and the Concluding Summary, the central doctrine of premissions is contained in ch. 5, reaffirmed in 1964.

ged that Grace and Verbum constituted «two groundbreaking, perhaps definitive, interpretations of Aquinas»⁴. Since Lonergan claimed to discover the Angelic Doctor's thought on nature and grace, the reconciliation of divine omnipotence and human freedom, behind the Bañez-Molina controversy, this topic of itself deserves study. For it has divided not only Dominican and Jesuit but also Protestant and Catholic. Thomas' and Lonergan's insights on this crucial *quaestio disputata* are bound to be helpful for ecumenical dialogue. Indeed one student, Q. Quesnell, claimed that through *Grace* «a thorough grasp of this one transforming reality of «operating grace», the phenomenon called «justification» or «the infusion of sanctifying grace» or «God's love poured forth in our hearts», contains the answer to all questions on grace that have vexed theologians through the centuries»⁵.

If the neglect of *Grace* can scarcely be justified, it can easily be explained. The text is difficult, and not just because of the technical, scholastic terminology employed⁶. Lonergan shifts constantly from Thomas to Aristotle, to Augustine, to the preceding medieval tradition, to baroque scholasticism, and back again. Thomas' synthetic doctrine involves many diverse strands that developed gradually and piecemeal. There were undulations as Thomas pushed forward in some quarters, while falling back in others, only to recoup the lost ground in later advances. The careful exegesis, mental balancing, and creative interweaving of the strands involve a very wide vision, and the great synthetic force of Lonergan's mind is airtight apparent in his first major study. Finally, tensions and obscure points remain in Lonergan's text. Indeed, a central point, the understanding of «premotion», cannot, it seems, be adequately understood without the help of a previously unpublished manuscript only recently made available to scholars by the labors of F. Crowe and R. Doran⁷.

Our analysis of *Grace* will start with the human recipient of grace before moving to the types of divine causality that span the difference between the providence of God's knowing and willing and their effective realization as fate. Since the facticity of sin has traditionally provided the stone of scandal on which theories of grace ha-

⁴ R. DORAN S. I., «Introduction —Lonergan: An Appreciation», in *The Desires of the Human Heart*, ed. V. Gregson (New York: Paulist, 1988), 2.

⁵ Q. QUESNELL, «Grace», in *Desires*, 169. Actually *Grace* clearly distinguished between operative, actual grace and justification or the infusion of operative sanctifying grace. Quesnell presupposes a clear identity between *Grace's* doctrine and *Method's* insistence on «God's love poured forth in our hearts» without noting the «significant differences». The course of this article should allow readers familiar with Lonergan to perceive the significance of the development from *Grace* to *Method*.

⁶ QUESNELL, 169: «The actual presentation of the details is metaphysical and very technical, using thought patterns and objective language of Scholasticism. It has to be passed over». J. PRICE, «Conversion and the Doctrine of Grace in Bernard Lonergan and John Climacus», *Anglican Theological Review* 62 (1980) 345 n. 45, simply referred readers to «Lonergan's own more difficult treatment» in *Grace* while remaining himself with the later Lonergan of *Method*. Of the many articles consulted on Lonergan's doctrine on grace and conversion only one treated of *Grace* with anything more than a brief reference. Even in that one K. COLLERAN, «Bernard Lonergan on Conversion», *The Dunwoody Riview* 11 (1971) 10, admitted that his few pages dedicated to it were «brief and selective», before he moved on to later works.

⁷ «Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis: The Restoration of All Things», ed. F. Crowe and R. Doran, in *Method* 9 (1991) 139-172 [henceforth: «R»]. Though this study was completed in 1935 there are many points of convergence between it and *Grace*. *Grace* certainly manifests a more complete understanding of human freedom and grace, but the notion of «premotion» central to *Grace*, is clarified greatly by this earlier work.

ve shattered, Lonergan's understanding of sin and its «necessity» must be analysed. Against that background the divine operation that concretely moves the human will to salvation instead of to sin can be better understood. Various ways of describing God's providential workings in inner-world fate are finally reduced to the «divine premotion», a concept that becomes fully clear only in view of Lonergan's earlier essay on «The Restoration of All Things». A summary of the relevant parts of that work reveals how Lonergan's «premotion» was to be understood, thus resolving certain difficulties in *Grace*. Finally on the basis of our new interpretation Lonergan's subsequent development on grace and freedom can be better appreciated. The tensions driving that further development will have been more accurately defined. Our attention will primarily be focused on *Grace*, making use, however, of other works to clarify and supplement pertinent issues.

HUMAN FREEDOM

In analysing man's freedom Lonergan identified four presuppositions of a free act:

- (A) a field of action in which more than one course of action is objectively possible;
- (B) an intellect that is able to work out more than one course of action; (C) a will that is not automatically determined by the first course of action that occurs to the intellect; and, since this condition is only a condition, securing indeterminacy without telling what in fact does determine, (D) a will that moves itself⁸.

Though Thomas emphasized various elements at different times, all four elements are essential; hence Bañez' attempt to equate freedom with indifference alone went contrary to St. Thomas' doctrine. The self-moving will should not immediately be interpreted along Molinist lines, for mutual causality between the intellect, that specifies, and the will, which exercises the choice, was understood in a new way⁹. Unlike Molina who allowed the free will to withdraw itself from the attraction exercised in order to choose it freely, Lonergan's dynamic understanding of nature conceived the will as a faculty already dynamically oriented to a goal. Thomas spoke of a *praecedens inclinatio*, based on «either a past choice or orientation» and Lonergan decisively rejected the conceptualist notion of freedom as a type of abstract judging a judgment or choosing a willing. Instead he stressed «psychological continuity»:

Dispositions and habits of will constitute a very real limitation on human freedom. The human will does not swing back to a perfect equilibrium of indifference with every tick of the clock; its past operations determine its present orientation [...] It can be changed but such change always requires a cause.

God can effect that change insofar as He «operates in the hearts of men as he pleases»¹⁰. For as universal cause God alone can operate within the will and orient it

⁸ G 95, 96f.; DT 269. In DVI 436 Lonergan allowed for the will's freedom of choice, even when Christ knew beforehand what He was to choose; only deliberation was rendered superfluous.

⁹ G 95-97, 101. For an analysis of the different understandings of freedom by the followers of Bañez and Molina cf. our article «The Neo-Scholastic Analysis of Freedom», in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 34 (1994) 149-165.

¹⁰ G 99, 53, 54, 57, 51 n. 31, 55.

to Himself, the *bonum universale* beyond that He gives the «special motion» of grace, be it habitual or actual, to effect a determinate willing of the good. Thus God effects «the liberation of liberty»¹¹. But this movement of the will by God from without, *ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis*, raises the question about the will's self-movement. With Thomas Lonergan had rejected Aristotle's purely passive will; as a result «now there are two first movers, the intellect *quoad specificationem actus*, and God *quoad exercitium actus*»¹². But was not the will self-moving in exercising its choice? Remarkably Lonergan perceived no difficulty in the juxtaposition of such texts. He himself even joined God and the self-moving will in describing the latter's freedom: «The specification is caused by the intellect, the exercise, by the self-motion of the will; and this self-motion involves a first mover acting on the will itself»¹³. How God, the First Mover, acts on the self-moving will, provides the nub of Lonergan's solution reconciling grace and freedom. A wider view of grace is needed.

GRACE

Thomas had accepted the abstract distinction between natural and supernatural clearly elaborated by Philip the Chancellor and made further progress by distinguishing actual grace from sanctifying grace¹⁴. Both types of grace could be operative and cooperative. Sanctifying grace supplied the soul with a new form, elevating as well as healing the soul; since *agere sequitur esse*, the elevated soul was capable thereafter of making free, meritorious acts, cooperating with the habitual grace, now acting as an efficient cause. The operative bestowal of this habitual grace effected a change of the will's basic direction as the soul remained passive under its effects; then the soul, self-moving as well as moved by grace, cooperated freely by accepting this result of grace. For grace has given the will the capacity to cooperate by moving it to cooperate¹⁵. In explaining how the initial infusion of habitual grace is a premotion, Lonergan wrote:

It is a change from one spontaneity to another, a straightening out of man, placing his higher faculties in subordination to God and his lower faculties in subordination to reason. When such a change is produced in adult consciousness, it naturally gives rise to acts of free will, acts of faith and repentance, that both acknowledge this change of attitude and result from it¹⁶.

The resultant free acts presuppose the intellectual apprehension of an object and flow immediately, «in the very same instant», from the conversion operated by the infusion of habitual grace. «The infusion of the virtues results in immediate acts of virtue. For habitual grace is like any other form: it gives not only *esse* but also *ope-*

¹¹ G 102, 123, 55, 52; cf. also 100, 134; DT 269.

¹² G 101, 134; DT 269; «On God and Secondary Causes», in *Collection*, ed. F. Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967) 65, 59. This article was originally published in 1946.

¹³ G 95.

¹⁴ G 13-17, 19, 21, 35-40.

¹⁵ G 21, 36-42, 44f., 52, 55, 58f., 61, 125f., 128, 132, 134; DT 263, 269.

¹⁶ G 57f., 59, 100f., 134.

rari». So the converted heart «leaps to cooperation»¹⁷. Thus grace's conversion, free acts, and the remission of sins are joined in a single movement: «The infusion of grace is *motio moventis*, the free acts are *motus mobilis*, and the remission of sin is *consummatio motus*»¹⁸.

If the habitual grace functioning as a cooperating grace acted as an efficient cause, it did not mean that the soul henceforth possessed every operational power within itself and had no further need of external help from God. Certainly the supernatural form of habitual grace in the newly justified soul helped it to operate more excellently, but more was needed. For the justified have to pray for the subsequent grace of divine operation that functions as an cooperating grace, no matter how much habitual grace they possess. These graces are added as motions to infused grace. Lest this external influence imply violence, «the gifts of the Holy Spirit make connatural to the creature the external guidance and aid of the Spirit of truth and love»¹⁹. So man is linked dynamically to the sole source of absolute perfection, which is not immanent in him as are the virtues. Yet these external helps are seen as «transient motions». So cooperative actual graces also seem to be involved in the free acts of the justified»²⁰. Cooperative grace after justification embraces actual and habitual graces simultaneously. On the one hand habitual grace cooperates as an efficient cause with the soul in producing good works; for the *esse* brings an *operari* by inclining the soul to certain acts and «offers the capacity for persevering until the end». On the other hand, because a habit's inclination never suffices to guarantee man's correct action, further assistances in the way of actual graces are needed»²¹.

With time, according to Lonergan, Thomas directed his attention from sanctifying to actual grace. Here again the physical analysis of motion supplied the analogy for God's working in the soul. But, whereas for sanctifying grace the *motio moventis* was distinguished from the *motus mobilis* as the infused habit from the «entitatively distinct and causally dependent free act», the analogy has been slightly changed: «in actual grace the two are identified: "actus moventis in moto est motus", according to Aristotle's *actio est in passo*». Conversion again supplied the principle instance of this grace, effecting the turning of the soul to God, previous to and preparatory for the infusion of habitual grace. «Grace effects the will of the end». Actual grace, like habitual grace, can be both operative and cooperative. «The first act does not presuppose any object apprehended by the intellect; God acts directly on the radical orientation of the will». As with habitual grace, the subsequent acts, cooperating with actual grace involve a previous intellectual apprehension and a new response of the will to them. In the final analysis the same grace, as operative, produces some effects by itself without the will's cooperation, and, as cooperative,

¹⁷ G 56f., 58, 61, 38.

¹⁸ G 60, 119.

¹⁹ G 29, 38, 42-44, 61.

²⁰ G 44, 61, 141.

²¹ In this Lonergan was balancing two positions on sanctifying grace disputed in the schools. Some saw habitual grace as an active potency serving as an operative principle for meritorious good acts. Others interpreted habitual grace as a passive potency to which actual grace had to be added to effect meritorious works—so Trent stressed the need of the grace of final perseverance (DS 1541, 1566) apparently distinct from habitual grace since it was unowed and the justified had to pray for it.

ve, produces others with the will's cooperation»²². But if God must first reorientate the will to its end before the will can freely move itself in choosing the means to the end²³, can the conversion be said to be a free human act? Against Cajetan's position that the will, so long as it can dissent, remains free when God moves it and He moves its «sweetly according to its condition», Lonergan wrote: «Now if freedom, *domina sui actus*, proves self-motion, then necessarily the absence of self-motion, *mota et non movens*, proves the absence of freedom». Has Lonergan fallen into the Bañezian trap of denying man's freedom in order to preserve God's sovereignty? And had not Thomas rejected his earlier notion of freedom as a mere non-coercion, a position that Lonergan himself considered «a momentary aberration»?²⁴.

DIVINE CAUSALITIES

Actually Lonergan severely criticized Bañez' *praemotio physica* for attributing to a creature an irresistible effect, which is the property of divine transcendence alone. More complex was his own understanding, attempting to transcend both Bañez and Molina. Not that Lonergan rejected all aspects of Molina's system. He admitted that God can influence the human will by «created antecedents». Circumstances, moods, temperaments, intellectual attitudes, and mental patterns all condition and determine free acts. Indeed, these seem to constitute various aspects of fate, the dynamic pattern or disposition by which various secondary causes in the created order are interwoven to accomplish the workings of providence, the divine plan in God's mind. Yet the Canadian Jesuit recognized that these created antecedents are not «rigorous determinants of the free choice». They cannot ground the infallibility, irresistibility, and efficacy of the divine transcendence that occurs in the «cooperation of eternal uncreated actions with created and temporal acts»²⁵. At one time Thomas himself imagined the influence of the First Cause upon secondary causes in terms of an Aristotelian «cosmic hierarchy», in which every lower cause is subordinate to a higher cause influencing it. This transmission of causes from God over creatures would «lead inevitable to a position resembling the Bañezian», but Lonergan considered this an «anomaly» and «blunder», a position that Thomas stated in general but did not rely on in explaining particular details²⁶.

In transcending both Bañez and Molina, Lonergan stressed God's providence as the universal cause whose effect is certain in all cases. He did not argue from God's causality in particular cases to His universal causality, as did Molina and Bañez, but he concluded to particular causality from God's universal causality. The divine transcendence, which the sixteenth century theologians misunderstood, provided Lonergan's foundation. Since God is «the sole proportionate cause of being», all other causes of being are His instruments insofar as they participate in His art, and this constitutes fate. Hence God can be said to apply every agent to its activity.

²² G 142, 65f., 122, 124-126; DT 269.

²³ G 133-135, 137; DT 269.

²⁴ G 130, 51 n. 31, 94.

²⁵ G 115f., 83f., 89, 109, 144; DT 430f., 441.

²⁶ G 75f., 90.

For as cause of substance, He causes substance's active potency. In other words, He «causes causation» or «operates an operation»²⁷. Since God stands «above and beyond the created orders of necessity and contingency» and all time is present as «now» to His eternal immutability, He knows, wills, and effects both the necessary and the contingent. Though fate is contingent, insofar as it arises from God's will it can be said to be hypothetically necessary. «And what hypothetically is necessary, absolutely may be necessary or contingent». That means that «God not only gives being but also the modes of being», i. e., «not only reality but also the modes of its emergence; among these are necessity and contingency». Hence, «what providence intends to be contingent will inevitable be contingent». God produces a contingent effect through a contingent cause with «equal infallibility, efficacy, and irresistibility» as He produces a necessary effect. Applied to human willing, this means that God, who alone can operate within the will as universal cause, is «more a cause of the will's act of choice than the will itself». To Him belongs then the principal, indeed the «entire credit» for the good willed and accomplished²⁸.

That God's transcendent causality causes both necessary and contingent may at first seem somewhat strange. As Lonergan noted, «We think of any creature as a contingent being». But here he remained Aquinas' commentator. St. Thomas had taken over Aristotle's view of the heavens as «necessary beings», even though the essence-existence distinction would render all finite realities radically contingent in his Christian universe. But Aquinas was not rigorous in drawing out all the implication of that insight. «Regularly St. Thomas uses the term *contingens*, *possibile*, in three senses: a corruptible creature; the *per accidens*; the free act of the will». Lonergan developed Thomas' example of a geometer:

Though the geometer can make triangles either equilateral or isosceles at his pleasure, still his pleasure does not extend to the possibility of making equilateral triangles with only two sides equal. Similarly, when God irresistibly produces a contingent effect, He does so, not through a necessitated, but through a contingent, cause²⁹.

It would seem that «necessity» applies to the celestial order, whose existence is contingent upon God's creation. God's free creation supplies the «hypothetical» in «hypothetical necessity», while «absolutely», i. e., considered «in-itself» abstractly from its contingent existence, a celestial being can be understood as «necessary». All terrestrial creatures remain «contingent» due to their corruptibility; the matter, which renders them corruptible is also responsible, as we shall shortly see, for the *per accidens* of the non-necessary intersection of causal series; finally human freedom remains irreducible to merely rational necessities. But how God controls the contingent, even human freedom, depends on one's interpretation of His knowledge and will.

GOD'S KNOWING AND WILLING

God's essence is identical with His knowing and will. «God is His own virtue;

²⁷ G 89, 86, 76, 78, 80, 82-84, 89-91, 143f.; In 664; DVI 433. The notion of «causing causation» and «operating an operation» is central to Lonergan's understanding of grace and will be discussed later.

²⁸ G 79, 97, 102-109, 116, 120f., 124, 141, 144; In 660-662, 664; DVI 428-436, 438f.

²⁹ G 108 n. 79, 109; «A Note on Geometrical Possibility», *Collection*, 112.

His essence, His potency, His action in the sense of principle of action—all are one». God moves all by His intelligence, for God «knows actively: "scientia Dei est causa rerum"—part of the production of the object and not its subsequent effect». God in no way is determined passively by the objects of His knowledge. All time is present to the eternal «now» of His transcendent, immutable Pure Act. As all is known to Him, so all is willed by Him. Lonergan so strongly stressed the identity of the divine knowing, willing, and essence that he eschewed in *Grace* almost all speculation about the various types of divine knowing and willing that had marked the earlier grace controversies. He considered a false problem the need of either reconciling divine attributes in God's absolutely simplicity or explaining how God knows the contingent. Precisely because God is «absolute explanation, pure intelligibility in Himself, and the first cause and last end of everything else», He does not have to be further explained, as if He were an additional datum³⁰. Correspondingly *Insight* rejected the conceptualist presentation of possibles, whereby «the things of this world order might exist in any of a range of orders», whose necessity was rendered actual only by «an arbitrary complement added by a voluntaristically conceived divine will». That fits in very well with a philosophy oriented to being that is known in a judgment, yet arises as a notion even prior to judgment and conceptualization as the object of the pure, unrestricted desire to know, a desire grounded in an infinite God, omnipotent, intelligent, wise, just, and merciful. The knower possesses a more immediate knowledge of reality than obtained in concepts, which prescind from existence and even encourage the erroneous supposition that «being is one thing and existing is another»³¹. Real being known in judgment enjoyed a preeminence over conceptual possibilities in Lonergan's metaphysics—and this aspect corresponded to the understanding of God as totally actual, not limited by possibilities.

Nonetheless in no way does the accentuation of the actual absolutize the present state of being and remove all possibilities from reality. As we just saw, «modes» of being, contingent and necessary, were postulated. This might seem at first to transpose to the finite universe the modes of knowledge: possible, real, and contingent futurable, which the conceptualist theology postulated in God. Yet besides the contingent finite beings *Insight* later acknowledged that God's infinite perfection, which guarantees His immutability, whether or not He creates any universe, also allows for a *scientia media* about «every possible world order»:

Hence independently of any free decision (*in signo antecedente omnem actum voluntatis*) God knows that if he were to will any world order, then that order would be realized in every aspect and detail; but every world order is a single intelligible pattern of completely determined existents and events; and so quite apart from any divine decision God knows exactly what every free will would choose in each successive set of circumstances contained in each possible world order³².

Though the Canadian Jesuit excluded «Molina's tendency to speak of the conditioned futurables as entities at which God looks for guidance», the existence of pos-

³⁰ G64, 84f., 103-106; V 194, 196, 201; In 658-660, 664; DVI 430; DT 197.

³¹ In 695f., 353f., 348, 651f.

³² In 661f., 695; G 104; V 53; «Isomorphism», 143f.; DT 108; DVI 429, 437f.; «The Natural Desire to See God», *Collection*, 88f., 92-94.

sibles and even contingent futurables in God's mind, which are never actualized, introduces a distinction between God's willing and knowing. Indeed, all God's knowing cannot be creative, or active; for some possibles, or futurables, never attain real existence. This transcendence of God over the finite actual universe provides the basis for the affirmation that «possibility is ontologically antecedent to being». Though this final affirmation apparently refers primarily to human knowledge of essences that might or might not be affirmed to exist, depending on whether or not the intelligible essences were encountered in experience, nonetheless their ground of possibility rests ultimately upon God's infinite intelligibility transcending the human»³³. Thus the abstract knowledge of essences answering the question *quid sit*, though subordinate to and dependent upon the judgment of reality, can be said to enjoy a certain priority over judgment insofar as they reflect a distancing from the actual finite which the divine infinity involves. Though the judgment yields a knowledge of the real, the existential judgment follows the question posed about essences, whether they are real or not. In this sense the intellection resulting in the answer to the question, *quid sit*, precedes the judgment yielding knowledge of the real³⁴.

If these final statements seem at odds with the previous affirmation of reality's primacy over possibility, both statements really result from what Lonergan named the «paradox» of human understanding. The unrestricted desire to know does not guarantee that the finite human subject will know unrestrictedly. Indeed, he possesses only «a limited capacity to attain knowledge». Hence «the fact is that the range of possible questions is larger than the range of possible answers». For that very reason, viz., to prevent understanding from being equated with a fruitless wild goose chase and sapping the foundation of all knowledge, an infinite, unrestricted act of knowing, viz., God, had to be affirmed. The infinity of God relativizes human reason even while grounding it. For if the real is known by grasping the virtually unconditioned, i. e., «the conditioned that happens to have its conditions fulfilled», the finite real «is shot through with contingency». Ultimately the finite real which judgment affirms, must depend upon God's free creation»³⁵. Even the self-affirmation of the knower, which is the *punctum saliens* in Lonergan's argument for God's existence, depends upon the fulfillment of the conditions for knowing, and knowing

³³ In 663; «Isomorphism», 143, 150; «A Note», 107, esp. in view of V 44. Though Lonergan does not mention contingent futurables explicitly, they could not be excluded from divine knowledge if such texts as Lk. 10:13 are to have any intelligibility. Cf. G 141, 105f., for God's knowledge of contingent futures. In DVI 436-441 Lonergan had to distinguish an entirely determinate knowledge which God had to Christ's free human acts from His divine command which ordered acts «more or less indetermined». Referring to Mt. 26:35 in DVI 440 Lonergan wrote of what Christ said that He might do. Though this text does not speak directly about God's contingent knowledge, only about Christ's human knowledge of a contingent future event, depending on His free choice, the condition of possibility for that freedom was God's indeterminate command—which seems to imply a certain divine knowledge of contingent futurables. A command, which could in no way be fulfilled, would be meaningless; but in leaving His command open to various possibilities of fulfillment, God must have foreseen those contingent futurables. —Cf. E. PRZYWARA S. I., *Analogue Entis* (1932; rpt. Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1962), pp. 63f. for a similar argument showing how the infinite God must be the ground of all possibles.

³⁴ DT 159, 198, 314; «A Note», 107.

³⁵ In 639, 615, 654-656, 661-663. Cf. also E. PRZYWARA, p. 43.

itself, as expressed in judgment, depends upon the fulfillment of conditions³⁶. That should be obvious, since the finite knower is as contingent as any other limited reality. Human reason is caught between the real world of necessary affirmation, where what is cannot now be otherwise, and finite thought's infinite ground, God, to whom all outside Himself is contingent. Clearly the very structure of human judgment, unifying subject and existential predicate, joins in polar tension the finite subject and its infinite ground. The growth of knowledge occurs through a constant «dialectical oscillation» between God and the human intelligence³⁷. Without doubt Lonergan was maintaining a delicate balance between exalting human reason to such a height as to think that it had to justify God's creation in all details and so relativizing reason that finite reality loses any inherent intelligibility and with that its ability to serve as a means of allowing the mind to ascend to God. He wished to preserve the analogy between God and the world so that human freedom itself would not be reduced to an arbitrary whim.

To God's transcendence in knowing, willing, and causing were repeatedly ascribed infallibility, irresistibility, and absolute efficacy³⁸. Hardly anything else was to be expected since He is the universal cause of being and final end of all reality. His providence must rule all. Hence it seems at first somewhat paradoxical to discover in the created realm of fate the need of a further «application», i. e., «the causal certitude of providence terminating in the right disposition, relation, proximity between mover and moved; without it motion cannot take place; with it motion automatically results». This «application» seems to leave room for the «promotions» of actual and sanctifying grace to influence the will's orientation. «Operation in time presupposes a promotion»³⁹. The necessity of the promotion of grace to effect the proper relation between God and the creature, however, seems to postulate a created reality different from transcendent causality, as if God's transcendent providence had to employ created realities to achieve His plan. Does not that tie the effectiveness of God's providence to a created effect, a defect Lonergan espied in the Bañezian promotion? Before answering that question it will be useful to study the fact and the necessity which rendered the supernatural promotion essential to God's redemptive plan: sin.

SIN

Sin provided the great stone of scandal that both propelled Bañez and Molina to develop their conflicting theories of grace and crushed their attempted reconciliations of justice and mercy in an omnipotent God. Lonergan thought that his reconstruction of St. Thomas' thought solved the dilemma by avoiding baroque theology's false posing of the problem. Though Thomas did not discuss at length the problem of evil, Lonergan's rediscovery of his authentic thought claimed to resolve all problems. God wills the good directly; the evil of sin He in no way wills, but

³⁶ In 280-283, 315, 319f., 328-339.

³⁷ V 90.

³⁸ G 103, 107f., 116, 144; In 662; DVI 429, 432, 433f.

³⁹ G 84, 89, 71, 76f.

merely permits; the physical evil He wills for the sake of an intended good, to which the evil is attached. If absolute objective truth describes the commensurability of an object to the divine intellect, sin is «absolute objective falsity» since it involves a withdrawal from the order established by the divine intellect. Sin then is a «metaphysical surd» that excludes understanding. Since sin has no commensurability to the divine intellect, the ground of possibility for human understanding, one can explain it neither in terms of a cause nor in terms of a Bañezian «non-cause», or «policy of inaction that makes sin inevitable». For these involve an intelligible correlation, precisely that which sin's irrationality resists. Not reducible to divine design, sin is «first in its own order, due to the sinner alone». Sin then leads to punishment; though one may attribute precedence to God's reprobation «in virtue of divine omnipotence and omniscience», this precedence is merely an empirical, not an intelligible antecedent. Reprobation «does not cause, or lead to, or result in, the sin». As a moral lapse, it is «objective» and even allows «the subjective truth to be found in empirical affirmations and empirical classifications of its kinds». It is even possible to correlate *per accidens* the «fact» of sin, linking one sin with another, «for deficient antecedents have defective consequences». Only its explanatory correlation in terms of objective truth is denied⁴⁰.

The distinction between «fact» and «understanding» might first evoke the Thomistic doctrine of form and matter, form supplying intelligibility and matter allowing no further intelligibility. *Verbum* spoke of the «irrelevant», from which the understanding that issues in formal definitions abstracts, or of the «here and now», from which apprehensive abstraction allegedly prescind. This givenness of sensible, individual realities corresponds to prime matter, which «of itself is not knowable». Nonetheless in its conjunction with form matter constitutes the real things which are known in their individuality and totality by God. *Insight's* analysis involved greater complexity, but it also concerned itself with the «empirical residue», i. e., positive empirical data lacking immanent intelligibility but «connected with some compensating higher intelligibility of notable importance». In regard to this formal aspect the empirical residue apparently corresponds to «common matter», which «is included in the essential definition» of corporeal realities and so enjoys a certain intelligibility by its information; for common matter is what is correlated to the intelligible formal cause. In view of this common matter, so informed as to constitute a universal, the «individual matter» can even be said to be «intelligible tangentially»⁴¹. Nonetheless human insight is rebuffed in its attempts to grasp individuality directly, and individuality as such remains at the heart of the empirical residue. As *Insight* stated succinctly, «Individuals differ, but the ultimate difference in our universe is a matter of fact to which there corresponds nothing to be grasped by direct

⁴⁰ G 110-116, 144; In 666-669. *Insight*, p. 666, further distinguished the evil of sin into «basic sin», i. e., «the failure of free will to choose a morally obligatory course of action or its failure to reject a morally reprehensible course of action», and «moral evils», or «the consequences of basic sins». For from basic sins result «moral evils of omission and a heightening of the temptation in oneself or others to further basic sins».

⁴¹ V 83, 39-41, 53, 87, 116, 143, 154; In 25f.; «Note», 105, 107f. For the relation of form to common matter in constituting the intelligible essence cf. «A Note», 98f., 103, 105, 107f., 112; «Isomorphism», 143, 146; V 146f., 170f., 177.

insight». When the essential significance is grasped in abstraction, the empirical residue remains as «the incidental, irrelevant, and negligible». So individuality as such «pertains to the empirical residue» that involves for the human observer «mere matter of fact». Yet this «empirical residue of individuality», only partially understood in cognitional theory and metaphysics, is ultimately attributable to «God's creative decision», which involves in its transcendent reasonableness an unrestricted act of understanding⁴².

The reduction of material individuality to God's creation was already presupposed in Grace. Lonergan recognized that the contingency which Aristotle attributed to prime matter insofar as it was «not a determinate cause» had been overcome by Thomas' notion of providence. Because God is the universal transcendent cause «beyond the created orders of necessity and contingency [...], there can be no incompatibility between terrestrial contingency and the causal certitude of providence»⁴³. Yet the facticity of sin was of an entirely different order. As absolute objective falsity, its irrationality was «absolut», «not merely relative to man», but a pure «defect of intelligibility». Elsewhere Lonergan would have recourse to the traditional Thomistic doctrine of sin as the absence of what ought to be, defining it as «failure to act [...] failure to will to do the good that is commanded, or [...] failure to will to inhibit tendencies that are judged to be wrong». Denying that God caused sin was therefore easy and did not contradict the affirmation that every event is caused by God. «For basic sin is not an event; it is not something that positively occurs; on the contrary, it consists in a failure of occurrence, in the absence in the will of a reasonable response to an obligatory motive»⁴⁴.

In tension with those strong statements *Insight* reaffirmed, «There is a fact of evil». That represents basic Christian realism, but Lonergan insisted that the fact was only to be «understood by the inverse insight that grasps its lack of intelligibility». This inverse insight, once formulated, «affirms empirical elements only to deny an expected intelligibility». What differentiates the objects of its insight from the empirical residue is the lack of any compensating higher intelligibility. «The point to be grasped by insight is merely that there is no point»⁴⁵. But if there is a tension between the affirmation of sin's facticity—surely an intellectual act—and the denial of intelligibility, the tension is increased by Lonergan's doctrine on the «necessity» of sin.

THE «NECESSITY» OF SIN

When the Council of Trent had defined that man could not without special privilege long preserve the moral law in its entirety (DS 1537, 1573), the conceptualist theologians had difficulties. For they conceived freedom in terms of individual acts placed by a subject as a result of abstract deliberation about various possibilities be-

⁴² In 29-31, 26, 57, 591, 663.

⁴³ G 79, 77, 113f.

⁴⁴ G 113; V 202; In 667f.

⁴⁵ In 693, 687, 20, 19,

fore which it remained indifferent⁴⁶. If then fallen man remained truly free, he need not sin; and the multiplication of cases apparently need not assure his sinning. The typical conceptualist (Molinist) evasion consisted in the distinction between physical possibility and moral impossibility: though it was theoretically possible for avoid sin, due to the weight of concupiscence man would inevitably fall⁴⁷. Yet in Catholic theology moral action was grounded in natures, in the physical (φύσις: nature); but only what is concretely possible is binding; hence the moral observance of the natural law must be possible.

Lonergan rejected out of hand the physical-moral distinction as «glib». Moreover he noted that Thomas originally argued against the necessity of sinning since freedom of choice pertains to human nature which was not destroyed by sin; indeed, since resistance to sin fortifies one against sin, there is no necessity to yield to subsequent temptations. Yet Thomas altered his opinion on this point when he began to understand freedom in terms of psychological continuity. Since habits condition man's choices, «explicit deliberation is not needed for an act to be free»⁴⁸. Given an antecedent willingness in any direction, a means to that end need only propose itself to be chosen. Hence a sinner, spontaneously oriented by cupidity, will find sin «connatural». Sin requires full advertence and consent, but that need not include «the deliberation necessary to break down his [the sinner's] spontaneous orientation». Ultimately a sin against God also turns against the sinner and his self-love. Full deliberation would therefore uncover deterrents against sin, persuasive even to egoism. But since «it is quite impossible for man to be reasoning himself into the right attitude before each act», habits, which render action «ready, easy, and agreeable», take over⁴⁹.

Previously the Canadian Jesuit had noted that the potentiality of matter involved a law of statistical probabilities whereby «for the most part men do what is wrong». Only God is impeccable as *actus purus*. Beyond time angels, as compounds of potency and act, «for the most part [...] do what is right». In time man's spiritual powers, the counterpart of *materia prima*, point in all directions. While habits contribute to the proper actuation of human potency, short of the beatific vision «no habit or set of habits can make man's operation absolutely right». Ultimately man would need supernatural help, both the infused virtues and transient motions, to live as he ought. For that reason, as we saw, cooperative actual graces were added to cooperative, efficient habitual grace. Correspondingly the necessity of the final grace of perseverance, which Trent proclaimed (DS 1541, 1566), is manifest⁵⁰. But

⁴⁶ E. g., R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE O. P., *The Trinity and God the Creator*, tr. B. Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1952), pp. 589-593; A.-D. SERTILLANGES O. P., *S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 4th ed. (Paris: Alcan, 1925), II, pp. 194-198, 230-236; G. P. KLUBERTANZ S. I., *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), esp. pp. 242-245.

⁴⁷ E. g., L. BILLOT S. I., *De Gratia Christi*, 5th ed. (Romae: P.U.G., 1954), pp. 25-29; B. BERAZA S. I., *De Gratia Christi*, 2nd ed. (Bilbao: Mensajero del Corazón de Jesús, 1929), 250-266; C. BOYER S. I., *De Gratia Divina*, 3rd ed. (Romae: P.U.G., 1952), pp. 44-57. Cf. R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE O. P., *Grace*, tr. Dominican nuns (St. Louis: Herder, 1952), pp. 52-75, who does not need that distinction due to his Bañezian notion of freedom and his insistence that man can do nothing good without grace.

⁴⁸ G 51 n. 31, 47-49.

⁴⁹ G 50-52.

⁵⁰ G 42-46; «On God», 66, and cp. 119, 42, 125.

these graces the sinner lacks. Hence his selfish habits rule unless checked by full deliberateness. This means that, in practice, from a statistical law for sin's probability we have attained «the limiting case in which sheer impossibility emerges». For to the question, «Can a man endure the perpetual strain of such deliberations?», Lonergan responded:

The answer is flatly negative. Deliberate vigilance can succeed for a time, but not for the whole time, not even for a long time. If only he puts his mind to it, the sinner can resist every temptation. But he cannot constantly be putting his mind to it. Therefore, it is inevitable that the will give free course to the spontaneous orientation, to the *vis et inclinatio*, of his will; once he has done so, temptations has only to recur and again he will sin, freely⁵¹.

DIVINE OPERATION

Given the fact of sin, both original and actual, which disorients the will's habitual inclination, there is need of healing grace and the «liberation of liberty». To understand the premotion of grace, one must first study the double analogy of divine operations. After demonstrating that Thomas agreed with Aristotle that the mover *qua* mover is not changed in causing the motion of the moved, Lonergan explained God's operation through Thomas' «implicit distinction between a basic and a proximate analogy»: «The dependence, *esse ab alio* alio, of the virtue of causation gives the basic analogy; the dependence of the operation itself gives the proximate analogy»⁵². A hasty reading might conclude to a distinction between the virtue, or power, of operations and the operation itself, as if God first created the essence or existence and then propelled it into operation. But the creation of the power includes the creation of the operation. «What causes the substance also causes the active potency; what causes the active potency also causes what the latter causes». The basic analogy concerns rather the manner of action pertaining to God and creature. Since God is His essence and virtue, He acts by His very substance, while in a creature a distinction has to be made between the *ipsum agens* and the *vistus qua agit*. Thus in the proximate analogy, specifically regarding operation, God's causation is an unconditioned procession, presupposing no other action, but the creature's very causation is caused. But what is «causing causation» or its equivalents, «making a procession proceed» and «operating an operation»? Lonergan explains the idea in a long passage:

Suppose Peter to stand sword in hand and then to lunge forward in such a way that the sword pierces Paul's heart. In this process there are only two products: the motion of the sword and the piercing of Paul's heart. But while the products are only two, the causations are three: Peter causes the motion of the sword; the sword pierces the heart of Paul; and, in the third place, Peter causes the causation of the sword, for he applies it to the act of piercing and he does so according to the precepts of the art of killing. The sword is strictly an instrument, and its very causation is caused. Now, if causation in general is a relation of dependence, a caused causa-

⁵¹ G 51.

⁵² G 84f., 47, 55, 57, 64-69, 88. The citation of St. Thomas in Lonergan's text actually speaks not of an *esse ab alio*, but of an *essentia ab alio*.

tion is a relation of dependent dependence. Again, if causation in general is a formal content, *ut ab agente in aliud procedens*, a procession, then to cause a causation is make a procession proceed, to operate an operation, to operate within an operation. Such is the proximate analogy of operation.⁵³

The proximate analogy is in no way opposed to the basic analogy, for both rely on God's causation in creation, producing the essence or existence, which involves the subsequent caused causation, or operated operation. So in his summary Lonergan wrote:

In the *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *De veritate* God operates the operation of creatures because He is creator and conservar; in later works other grounds are more prominently asserted, namely, application, instrumentality, finality. In parallel fashion earlier works state that the creatures cannot operate without God while later works state that they cannot operate without the divine motion⁵⁴.

This passage helps us to understand how the sword in the pervious passage was employed as an instrument, whose causation is caused and what type of causality is involved. For it has linked instrumentality to application and finality.

APPLICATION, INSTRUMENTALITY, FINALITY

Lonergan followed Thomas in correlating the divine ideas to essences and providence to fate. The latter added to the former insofar as fate implied «some real participation of the divine design that was distinct from the natural form of things, that was impressed upon them as they entered into the dynamic order of events». So beyond the natural form «actual activity postulates some *virtus artis, intentio, esse incompletum* from the universal principle of being». This *intentio* is a real entity, considered «a cause, not in itself but only in conjunction with other cause»; it is the equivalent of fate which is «a cause, not in addition to, but in conjunction with, natural causes». Insofar as fate is the disposition of secondary causes, it is placed in the category of relation⁵⁵. This also explains its designation as *esse incompletum*. Though the explicit analogy is between a motion's relation to its term and an instrumental cause's proportion to the principal cause, insofar as it is underway to producing its effect, it is still not at its term, still relative, still not a complete being. The same notion applies to the *virtus artis*, which «is the *forma apprehensa* of the artist on its way through the tool to the artifact». In all of these concepts the dynamic set of relations among finite realities set in motion by the plan of God is intended. Created essences do not just act in isolation, they interact to produce something beyond themselves. They participate in God's art, being moved by Him as higher cause «so as to produce an effect within the category proportionate to the higher». Without that participation in the design of God, «the sole proportionate cause of being [...], the creature cannot produce being, substantial or accidental»⁵⁶.

⁵³ G 86.

⁵⁴ G 86, 91, 87 (and n. 104).

⁵⁵ G 83-85. «Finality, Love, Marriage», *Collection*, 20-22, distinguishes the horizontal causality of individual natures from the vertical causality resulting from insertion in an order with other beings.

⁵⁶ G 80f., 81 n. 84, 89, 122.

Now Lonergan was attempting to explain «instrumental power», or causality, by the «parallel idea» of fate. Moreover the *intentio* of God was identified with fate and recognized as but «another aspect of application». And the truth that «God applies every agent to its activity» was seen to be «practically identical» with fate, or «the truth that divine providence is an intrinsically certain cause of every combination or interference of earthly causes». Thus Lonergan concluded, «Fate and application and instrumental virtue all reduce to the divine plan». If application and instrumentality are thus identified, they are not to be actually separated from finality. The very notion of *intentio* implies an intelligent planning toward a goal. Finality is not to be imagined in the merely Aristotelian sense of an object of love, attracting intelligences or the animated spheres. «To St. Thomas God was more —a transcendental artisan planning history: “Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnia movet ad proprios fines” [God therefore moves all beings to their proper ends through intelligence]». With that the notions of art and the artisan take their proper place in illuminating Lonergan's thought. The quoted verse of Virgil, *Te tua fata trahunt*, is now to be interpreted not as a blind or even natural drawing of beings to their end; rather God deliberately moves them in a way transcending the natural movement of their forms. Furthermore, the image of the fencer becomes clear; he uses the instrument «according to the precepts of the art of killing». Art implies a fixed purpose —as with the «divine artisan». Hence the efficient causality implied in the moving of the sword presupposes the end intended. God acts efficiently to accomplish dynamically His plan through the fate of the created order. For «all causes except the highest are instruments» since «all causes are moved except the highest and every effect is at least in the category of beings»⁵⁷. This explanation of secondary causality portrays God not only as the cause of all beings but also as the manipulator of all circumstances controlling inner-worldly chains of causality so that the proper combination of them or an interference in them permits His causality to be effective through «application» even in the conquest of sin's disorder. In this way God controls the contingent through the chain of contingent causes.

Reviewing E. Iglesias' treatise on grace in 1946, Lonergan censured it for confusing the relation of efficient and final causalities: «While in fact every finite entity has two real relations of dependence —one on God as *id a quo* and the other on God as *cuius gratia*— the author appeals to God as final cause to fill lacunae in his theory of God as efficient cause of all things». Lonergan was much clearer in distinguishing the end as such, which functions in the order of execution, from the apprehended end in the order of intention. This latter has two «particularities»:

First, without it there would be no final causality at all: things do not tend to ends unless an intellect apprehends the ends and directs the things to them; secondly, the end as apprehended is the efficient cause of the act of appetition: *appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum*.

One understands then how «the end as apprehended is properly not a final, but an efficient cause»⁵⁸. For it serves the free mover as the goal of the plan of efficient causality.

⁵⁷ G 80f., 83-86, 89, 144.

⁵⁸ «On God», 60f.; G 87.

The final Latin phrase of the last quote is interesting. Though it is ambiguous, Lonergan's interpretation of it reveals his intention. Originally it describes the causality of Aristotle's Prime Mover, acting as a final cause attracting a passive will. But, according to Lonergan, despite the *Pars Prima*, Thomas rejected both Aristotle's God and the passivity of the will. Not only does God actively plan fate as an artisan but also the free human will is self-moving⁵⁹.

Clearly in all of this Lonergan exhibits a very «objectivist» view of reality. Not the individual subject in dynamic relation to the world is primary, but an attempt to gain an angel's-eye-view of objective reality has been undertaken⁶⁰. Such a view is not static, however, for terrestrial essences are in dynamic interrelation, being ordered according to their forms but also beyond them by God's master plan. Before that plan is spelled out further, it is advantageous to capture in greater detail Lonergan's vision of the interrelation between God's governance of all created realities and human freedom. For not only does God's predestination not contradict nor destroy human and angelic freedoms but also He allegedly governs them beyond their own self-governance as they are fitted into His plan, fate⁶¹.

THE EUDEMIAN PRIME MOVER

God's control of secondary causes in fate would seem totally coherent if human freedom were not involved. But the concatenations of fate is intended precisely to explain the instrumentality of human freedom. How God employs freedoms as instruments may be grasped by Lonergan's understanding of the causality of the Eudemian Prime Mover. Where Eudemus thought that even the most prudent need a special divine impulse or instigation, *instinctus divinus*, inspiring an *initium consiliandi* to achieve a fortunate purpose consistently, Thomas recognized that «the problem of the *initium consiliandi* was but a particular case of the more general doctrine of Aristotelian premotion». How God intervenes to make man «take counsel» seems ambiguous at first in Lonergan's presentation. Without doubt the Eudemian Prime Mover is «an external prime mover of the will», which receives the end to which it moved itself *mediante consilio*, by the mediation of advice⁶². Whether this intervention occurs on the will directly or over the intellect is not clear. In describing a conversion by actual grace previous to habitual grace's infusion Lonergan traced Thomas' thought from the *De veritate*, where the alternatives of an «external [Aristotelian] premotion or an *instinctus divinus* within the will» were offered, to the *Quodlibetum primum*, in which «the alternative of an external premotion was eliminated on dogmatic grounds while the internal motion of the mind was explained in terms of the Eudemian first mover». One might interpret a shift from the *ins-*

⁵⁹ G 84, 87, 94f.

⁶⁰ An «angel's-eye-view» intends a vision embracing the whole universe in its spatio-temporal extension. This would presuppose that angels can know by more than infused abstract *species*. The inherent impossibility of this understanding will be indicated at the end of the present article. In the meantime it prepares for «Restoration».

⁶¹ G 73f., 79, 89, 98 n. 37, 113f., 127.

⁶² G 100, 102.

tinctus divinus within the will» to «internal motions of the mind» as a transition from will to intellect, yet earlier Lonergan had referred to the same doctrine of *De veritate* as *divinus instinctus secundum quod Deus in mentibus hominum operatur* [the divine impulse according to which God operates in the minds of men]⁶³. The contrast between intellect and will is not great and apparently is not intended.

The Eudemian Prime Mover effects the will's interior act, which is the will of the end⁶⁴. Although this influence on the will is itself not «counsel, it leads easily to counsel. Explaining the convergence of the two lines of causation «in effecting the act of choice in the will», Lonergan distinguished the specification and the exercise:

Thus we have two first causes: the object that is apprehended by the intellect as the end, and the agent that moves the will to this end. The consequent process is that the will moves the intellect to take counsel on means to the end, and then the object apprehended as means, together with the will of the end, moves the will to a choice of the means.

Thus the will's motion to a new end is seen to initiate the *initium consiliandi*. With a change of purpose, one must pause in activity to consider and select new means. Yet the text just cited is extremely interesting. It gives rise not only to the question, already raised, about the self-moving will's freedom, if it is exercised by God, but also to the problem of the end known. How or why must the end be known if God's grace can act directly upon the will, changing its «radical orientation» without presupposing «any object apprehended by the intellect»?⁶⁵. Lonergan recognized that along with God's creation of the soul this direct intervention on the will constituted an exception to the notion of cosmic hierarchy which Thomas used to develop the «mediated execution of divine providence» through the promotions by which the higher cause always ruled the lower⁶⁶. But in what way, then, does the theory of promotions remain valid? Is not God bypassing fate to work His will directly? The answer to these questions must be postponed until another tension is discovered⁶⁷.

NATURAL-SUPERNATURAL RELATION

If grace effects the radical reorientation of the will, the will's original orientation and its possible relation to grace must be presupposed. This touches the profound problem of the natural-supernatural relation. Conceptualist theologians generally oriented the will to *bonum in communi* as its formal object. That gave rise to a tension since *bonum in communi* is an abstraction, the equivalent in the order of the good to the abstract idea of being which the mind abstracted. Yet the will represents a dynamic faculty always oriented to the concrete. Lonergan resolved that tension by identifying the will's goal as the *bonum universale*, God⁶⁸. But with that the

⁶³ M 121, 21, 39.

⁶⁴ G 134f., 122.

⁶⁵ G 124, 136 n. 94.

⁶⁶ G 73f., 74 n. 51.

⁶⁷ COLLERAN, 7-10, just left the texts about interior grace and mediation through external circumstances stand alongside each other without a further attempt at reconciliation.

problem which the conceptualists were trying to avoid, reemerged. If the will is concretely ordered to God, He must be the real God, the trinitarian God, the God of revelation and grace. Does not the natural will then invade the realm of the supernatural, usurping a place not its own? Admittedly Lonergan had considered the natural-supernatural distinction, however necessary for the progress of theology, a merely abstract one. In all creatures is implanted a natural love of God above all things, but since matter and potentiality in general incline towards defects, the acquired and infused virtues are demanded for the concrete actualization of what would otherwise be «an abstract admiration and approval for justice and the love of God». Nonetheless, a natural will oriented to the God of grace seems to be the presupposition for all free choices⁶⁹. Would not the will's radical reorientation destroy rather than liberate freedom?

A parallel tension developed in relating the will's final object to the grace that allegedly straightens it out. In identifying God as the «universal object of the will, which is the good [*quod est bonum*]» and affirming that man cannot will anything «without that universal motion», St. Thomas went on to identify a «special motion» of grace: «Occasionally God moves some in a special way to will something determinately which is good [*quod est bonum*]⁷⁰». Lonergan employed that citation and later faced the question about the incompatibility of willing God as the «ultimate end» and the conversion of the just to Him as «a special end» in whom He inheres as their own good. In response he found «not the slightest incompatibility»; for «grace moves the will to God, who is determinate indeed but also the *bonum universale* beyond all limitation and classification». Indeed grace moves the will «by being a further actuation, and so giving expansion and enlargement». Then the argument ends with the phrase, «The really free are those who enjoy the freedom of the sons of God; perfect love of God is perfect detachment from created excellence and perfect liberty in choice»⁷¹.

Lonergan's response apparently raises more questions than it answers. For how can a will oriented to God, infinite Good, be expanded by any subsequent grace? Furthermore, how can God be describes as both «determinate» and «beyond all limitation and classification»? The Canadian Jesuit did not commit a slip of the pen. What then did he mean?

THE PREMOTION IN RESTORATION

The Restoration of All Things constitutes a brilliantly speculative essay that was probably too «audacious» and exaggerated to be published by a mere student of

⁶⁹ G 102, 123 n. 29. The identification of God with the *bonum universale* is found in *Summa Theologica* I-II q. 9 a. 4 ad 6um, to which Lonergan refers. Cf. R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE O. P., *Trinity*, pp. 589f.; A.-D. SERTILLANGES O. P., II, pp. 106f.; G. P. KLUBERTANZ S. I., pp. 164-167, 228-230.

⁷⁰ G 16, 54f.; «Finality», 25; R 163.

⁷¹ G 102. One notes that the tension is only increased by the repetition of the phrase *quod est bonum*; the first usage results in translating *bonum* substantially as «the good», the second adjectivally. Yet the same Latin phrase applies to God and a determinate willing. In DT 269 Lonergan wrote of «God who moves men both to the universal good and through grace to a particular good». Clearly here grace concerns more the particular choice than the overall orientation.

⁷² G 123 n. 29.

theology in the days when theological arguments rested on the solid foundation of traditional authorities, Scripture, tradition, and the texts of St. Thomas. Yet much like Rousselot's «Primordial Adam» hypothesis, this essay exhibits the speculative structure that underpins Lonergan's later works, especially *Grace*, which allegedly interprets Thomistic texts⁷². For much of the essay is concerned with three promotions: God's in creation, Adam's, or Satan's, in the fall, and Christ's in redemption. A careful reading of the text will permit us to discover Lonergan's answer to questions previously raised and indicate how Lonergan intended to hold all the tensions together.

Insofar as material individuation serves as the prerequisite for personality, i. e., the «intelligible individuation in the actuation of intellect and will in human operation», and such operations are synthesized «in terms of the solidarity of human intellects and the statistical uniformity, as it were, of human wills», Lonergan looked for «the material unity of man in Adam» to be replaced by «the intellectual unity of man in Christ». St. Paul's understanding of humanity as an organism was explained metaphysically in terms of «the purely instrumental causality of the members of a body and the way in which the operation of the members affects the whole body»⁷³. Then emerged «the principle of promotion» which «makes these instrumental causes into a solitary chain of causation in which each instrument transfers the motion received from those before, transmitting it to those that follow». Since Adam suffered no promotion contrary to his nature, the promotion to sin came extrinsically from Satan. Thereafter Adam corrupted God's promotion and established a reign of sin before Christ intervened to «set up a new motion to harmonize, readjust, reintegrate a humanity that had reached the peak of disintegration and death»⁷⁴.

Since the will naturally follows the dictate of reason and sin is a «non-act» of the will, failing to inhibit a motion contrary to reason, there result various types of determinism. If the will does not act, the event is «determined exactly as any other physical event». If the will follows objective reason, it is «determinate in the order of pure reason». If it follows subjective reason, it is «determinate as a function of historical causation». This historical causation, or determination, refers to man's state whereby the will follows the intellect and the intellect is informed by the possibilities of thinking in its historical state, which is formed also by the ideas of men that constitute «an objective *Geist*, the common mind of man». Due to concupiscence, the result of Adam's loss of infused knowledge, the majority of humanity has to act according to the chances of their positions with incomplete acts of the intellect henceforth incapable of planning progress»⁷⁵. This lack of thought, objective reason, results in determinism, according to the Thomistic axiom, *quidquid movetur ab alio movetur*.

⁷² For Lonergan's own reflection on the essay's «daring» cf. R 140, 142. For P. Rousselot's «Primordial Adam» hypothesis, cf. his posthumously published «Idéalisme et Thomisme», *Archives de Philosophie* 42 (1979) 123-126, and J. M. McDERMOTT S. I., *Love and Understanding: The Relation of Will and Intellect in Pierre Rousselot's Christological Vision* (Rome: P.U.G., 1983), esp. 51-86, 118f., 228-238, 248-265.

⁷³ R 140f.

⁷⁴ R 141, 153, 162.

⁷⁵ R 143, 147, 154. This carries over into «Finality», 25f.

Will has to be preremoved by intellect; intellect has to be preremoved by phantasm; phantasm has to be preremoved by an objective situation and environment; finally the objective situation and environment is partly the determinate work of nature, partly the accumulated work of mankind acting now according to its limited knowledge and now against this knowledge⁷⁶.

The young theologian even imagined that «with some highly refined mathematical calculus» a scientist, capable of seeing all the data and allowing for statistical variations in the response of free wills to their intellectual conditioning would see the simple intelligibility of history. The Creator and First Mover put all potencies in mutual relation with their initial promotions, foresaw, and intended the resultant modifications of position and motion. «What can operate only as the result of a promotion and only according to pre-established laws is simply an instrument, a machine; it does not cease to have a merely instrumental causality because of the freedom of selecting between the determinate order of an objective *Geist* and the determinate order of subintellectual operation». In short, «free will [...] is a choice between two determinate orders». Man's sin but weakens in the transmission God's original «promotion and predetermination». Man chooses in the final analysis to be either God's instrument, following natural inclination, or sin's instrument in the unintelligible non-act⁷⁷.

Where sin resulted in humanity's «progressive atomization, Christ intervened to create a supernatural unity by bestowing a new intellectual form on humanity, *materia propter formam*. This form is to be accepted through intellect and will in the constitution of a moral personality in union with other human beings. As the head of the new humanity, the recapitulation of the universe and the *Primum Agens* corresponding to God, the *Primum Agens* in the original creation⁷⁸, Christ's influence has struck men in two ways. First, he «restored the harmony of man by the grace of dogma, an absolute *Geist* above the wandering objective *Geist* of humanity». This absolute *Geist* allows men to overcome concupiscence through intellectual unity. The supernatural revelation to which Christ witnessed provides not just a content but also «premoves a living and developing mind: the mind of the mystical body; «we have the mind of Christ» (I Cor. 2:16). Thus not only is the idea of dogma the formal cause of humanity's unity but Christ is also recognized as Wisdom, the formal cause of the same unity in love. He is «the absolute of intellect, in which participates the Church»⁷⁹.

If Christ heals man's intellection by His teaching and illumination, He likewise supplies «the object for the love of the will» and «the center of the love which all men must have for all men in the unity of human nature and the solidarity of human operation». This influence is not limited to the following of ideas. For as well as teaching the doctrine of charity, «the only means of overcoming the evil of error and sin», the Church «gives the human will the support of grace that flows through the sacraments». Christ was the *Primum Agens* in the order of sacrifice «that is the whole meaning of life». For from Him «by the sending of the Holy Ghost proceeds

⁷⁶ R 148, 146, 153, 162.

⁷⁷ R 147-150.

⁷⁸ R 140f., 149, 151f., 157f., 160f., 165f.

⁷⁹ R 154f., 158-160, 141.

the active spiration in the human image of the Trinity» to which corresponds «the passive supernatural love of man, the theological virtue of charity». Thus in the final antithesis between Christ's and Satan's kingdoms is revealed «the final synthesis of history, Christ as the formal cause and through the Holy Spirit the efficient cause of the end of all creation, the manifestation of divine wisdom in heaven as well as on earth». In the Church the work of Christ continues, as men have to choose to be instruments either for reason and God or for passion and sin»⁸⁰. Those choices are heavily laden with destiny. For grace is passed on by human instrumentality in history more or less efficaciously. Indeed, when Lonergan pondered the mystery of predestination and asked why all men are not «spiritual», i. e., «oriented to God in his transcendence of the transcendentals and as he is known only by faith through revelation», his response was straightforward:

It is the fault of men. Why are graces sufficient but not efficacious? It is the fault of the human instruments whose duty it is to transfer to others the motion they receive. Why does God draw some and not others? Because he made man to his own image and likeness, one in nature and in operation, because he uses instruments to draw men according to the law, «Whatever is moved is moved by something else»; because, finally, the instruments will not be even unprofitable servants, will not live exclusively for his Truth, and so cannot love as does his Love, will not love reason, and image of the Word, and so cannot love man as did the Word⁸¹.

A RETURN TO GRACE AND FREEDOM

Whereas *Grace* claimed to be an interpretation of St. Thomas and thus remained bound to Aquinas' texts, *Recapitulation* expounded directly the young Jesuit's own view of the promotions effective in creation, sin, and redemption. While it is possible that Lonergan changed various opinions between 1935 and 1939, when he finished his doctoral thesis, *Recapitulation* provides a fascinating backdrop against which to study *Grace*. Surely the notion of God's «premotion» in creation is not to be imagined as a flick of the divine finger to set the universal machine into motion. Natures are inherent principles of activity set in motion with their creation. In *Grace* Lonergan argued that the premotion sets mover and moved in the proper relation «for motion naturally to ensue». Since God is universal cause, «this law of premotion yields the theorem that God applies all agents to their activity». The subsequent formulation of the principle of application fits perfectly with the notions of creation and premotion established in *Recapitulation*:

Because the creature cannot act infinitely, it must have an object upon which or with respect to which it acts. Because the creature cannot create, it cannot provide itself with the objects of its own activity. Because God alone can create, God alone

⁸⁰ R 158-160, 141, 147f., 149. Cf. also «Finality», 26, 38, 39f.

⁸¹ R 153. There is a remarkable similarity of Lonergan's understanding of the Body of Christ with that proposed by E. SCHWEIZER, ΣΩΜΑ: TWNT VIII 1067-1081; ID., «Die Kirche als Leib Christi in den paulinischen Homologumena», *Neotestamentica* (Zürich: Zwingli, 1968), 272-272; ID., «Die Kirche als Leib Christi in den paulinischen Antilogumena», *ibid.*, 293-316. Schweizer attempts to avoid any metaphysical structure, but his picture of a dynamic, temporal efficacy to the word of God recalls Lonergan's dynamic chains of causality for good initiated by Christ.

can provide such objects, and this provision is not by chance but in accordance with the divine plan. Therefore God applies all agents to their activity⁸².

Indeed, whereas the Aristotelian premotion involves temporal, not natural, priority over its effect and led the Stagyrice to infer the eternity of the world, «St. Thomas refuted this conclusion, not by substituting a premotion that was *natura prius*, but by arguing that what came first was not in the category of change but creation, and that creation, so far from taking place in time, includes the production of time itself⁸³.

Such an interpretation explains why Lonergan never attacked baroque scholasticism's premotion *qua* premotion and why he had difficulties with Bañez' theory. Whereas St. Thomas did not add any new motions to those already known but only understood them more profoundly, Bañez' premotion added to a created agent «a special participation of the pure act of being». Moreover his premotion was faulted for being prior by nature, not by time, to the act it effects, for being a creature endowed with an infallible efficacy that should be reserved to God alone, and for being necessary to effect a choice of means. By contrast Lonergan's temporally prior premotion merely involved «some relation, disposition, proximity that enables mover to act upon moved»⁸⁴. Except for sin the pristine coordination of creation would have let God's providence set itself through effortlessly. Sin's disorder had to be reset in order by Christ's premotion, His intervention, *instinctus divinus*, into the world. This «instigation» was also an «inspiration» —two meanings of *instinctus*— since Christ both established a definitive revelation, mankind's absolute *Geist*, and instituted sacraments to give grace, enabling men to live the life of supernatural charity. In this perspective the texts about the Eudemian Prime Mover make perfect sense. For while God reorients the will by the infusion of habitual grace in the sacrament of baptism, the immediate result of that infusion consists in meritorious works of faith, repentance, servile fear, and hope. «Operative grace changes the radical orientation of the will, *motio moventis*, then the changed will responds in a new way to the apprehension of the intellect, *motus mobilis*»⁸⁵. The faith which Lonergan presupposed is not an amorphous commitment to an ineffable mystery. «Anonymous Christianity» would seem a paradox, if not a contradiction, to the young Lonergan. In *Recapitulation* he saw faith in terms of the acceptance of definite dogmas valid beyond time's mutability; in *Grace* and thereafter, at least until 1964, faith for him involved an assent on the basis of authority to propositions whose truth was hidden in the depths of God⁸⁶. These truths offered a concrete knowledge and the object of a choice. Hence the will remained free before choosing them even after it had been properly reoriented by grace. The converted adult, however, would immediately reaffirm his faith after baptism or penance and merit grace's increase. Surely Lonergan saw with Thomas that it was possible to produce an act of faith before justification which had to be attributed as a conversion to actual grace. This

⁸² G 89, 71.

⁸³ G 71.

⁸⁴ G 71, 88, 109, 144.

⁸⁵ G 125, 57f.

⁸⁶ G 8, 113. «*Gratia Operans* Dissertation», 17f., 20f., 25, 27; «Theology and Understanding», *Collection*, 131-134, In 702f., 708-711, 718-726; DT 13, 20f., 57, 61, 238, 17, 56-58, 38.

grace effected the will of the end so that the will might thereafter choose the good work»⁸⁷. So the Eudemian Prime Mover has intervened through the sacraments and preaching of the Church to convert man's will by grace and offer him a concrete object of freedom, the Church's creed, on which his freedom might exert itself. Once the will has been properly reoriented, there is no further need, as Bañez thought, of an extra premotion to assure a good act. The circumstances were already properly realized for that. If one objects that man might still sin, Lonergan would quickly reply that sinning is a «non-act», a refusal to accept God's will, which possesses no further intelligibility.

This understanding also clarifies Lonergan's critique of Molina. The mere manipulation of circumstances, being «created antecedents», can explain the infallibility, irresistibility, and efficacy of God's providence as little as can Bañez' premotions. These characteristics are grounded «in the uncreated, which has its moment not in time but in the cooperation of eternal uncreated action with created and temporal action». Hence not the creature alone nor the Creator alone, but their conjunction proves irresistibly efficacious—just as for human freedom's act the cooperation of the human intellect for specification and of God for exercise are absolutely necessary. Without God's operation to convert the will the sinner remains bound to his sin, not really free; without the intellect's specification, no object could be presented to the will for free choice»⁸⁸. The conversion to God must be God's work, yet it is mediated through created causes—to such an extent that to the failure of created causes the condemnation of human beings was attributed. Because Molina did not recognize the juncture of God and creature in the sacramental order of salvation but left the will indifferent before an offer of grace even if all the circumstances had been properly manipulated, Lonergan criticized him for not going far enough: «the Molinist lacks the speculative acumen to make his grace leave the will instrumentally subordinated to divine authority». Such is God's control that He is not bound passively to any *futurabilia* in a hypothetical order⁸⁹. The presence of God in history guarantees His efficacy.

The sacramental structure of reality was effected in history, Lonergan noted in accord with St. Paul, as «the "new creation" through Christ Jesus». God's temporal intervention constituted «a creation that in its transcendence of mystery and grace reveals the Word by the Word in a way that no single creation could achieve: to reveal the infinite there must be an infinite to be made issue with; infinite wisdom conquers the infinity of sin»⁹⁰. The Son, eternal Wisdom, provided the form of the new creation, His Mystical Body, that is the Church, and the Holy Spirit dwells in the Church to operate efficiently in its members⁹¹. This doctrine, taken from *Recapitulation*, fits perfectly into Grace. For there habitual grace gives the formal eleva-

⁸⁷ G 59f., 124f., 124, n. 33. The attribution of the *initium fidei* to habitual grace as prevenient in G 142 must apply equally to actual grace as prevenient when faith precedes baptism. As we saw, Lonergan's conversion is always linked to the Church and dogma.

⁸⁸ G 116, 101f.

⁸⁹ G 144, 110; In 663.

⁹⁰ R 161. One suspects that the original text had capitalized «infinite Wisdom». The «Editor's Preface», 135f., to *Recapitulation* informed the reader: «Lonergan's use of capitals was especially generous in this paper, and we followed the Collected Works policy of using lower cases as much as possible».

⁹¹ R 141, 159f.; «Finality», 26.

tion —this grace is administered through the sacraments of baptism and penance. Since grace was merited by Christ and results in adoptive sonship, it is easy to consider Christ the form of the Church. We already saw how habitual grace served as the basis of the gifts of the Holy Spirit who governs the justified from without through further actual graces —without violence. For of all the causalities the efficient cause best preserves the distinction between cause and effect, and we already noted how Lonergan's finality was understood in terms of the goal intended by the efficient cause. In the New Covenant the Holy Spirit employs the members of Christ's Body as instruments in reformed chains of causality to mediate in sacraments and teaching the truth and grace of Christ.

The need of intelligible words and sacramental signs also clarifies Lonergan's insistence on the validity of concepts in responding to the question, *quid sit*? Though God infinitely transcends the finite natures, He does not totally relativize them. For they serve as pointers toward Him and, as we noted previously, preserve the intelligibility necessary for the structure of human freedom. That structure allows for the juncture of God and man in Jesus Christ as well as its continuation in the Body of Christ. This structure explains also the tension in the natural-supernatural distinction. In loving Jesus Christ one joins oneself to the *bonum universale*, yet because Christ presents Himself in the limitations of His humanity and of His sacramental Church the believer needs a special grace to turn from the individualistic selfishness of sin and join himself to the «special end» that was constituted in faith by Christ and the Church. Due to this healing and elevation grace gives the will a further actuation, expansion, and enlargement as the freedom of the sons of God is attained and liberty is liberated. The natural-supernatural distinction is as abstract as it is useful and necessary, but concrete men live with wills habitually oriented, in psychological continuity, to sin or God, and only the love of God through the infusion of charity might liberate liberty⁹². In this way the will's inability to avoid sin because the original premotion of creation has been debilitated by its transmission through human instruments has been overcome, and the intellect has found stable truth in the absolute *Geist* of Christ and His Church.

This sacramental interpretation of *Grace* is supported by rare, but important passages underlining the role of the sacramental economy of salvation. Explaining the obscurity of Thomistic instrumentality, Lonergan wrote, «St. Thomas used the *virtus instrumentalis* not only to explain the universal mediation of our Lord's humanity, to explain miracles, prophecy, and the sacraments, but also to account for the occult operations of nature, the influence of magical pictures, and, with Aristotle, the generation of animals». In dismissing the latter group as mythical Lonergan implicitly accepted the validity of the former instruments. Previously in a passage on conversion as the shift from the servitude to sin to the liberty of the sons of God, he quoted Thomas: «The grace making men freely fulfill the law was not conferred by the sacraments of the Law but is conferred by Christ's sacraments»⁹³. This citation is all the more revealing of Lonergan's position because it continued the long quotation beyond what was strictly demanded to prove the change of voluntary o-

⁹² G 52, 57.

⁹³ R 82, 57.

orientation in justification. In another place when discussing how all lower causes are instrumentally moved by the higher Lonergan made reference to «Christ's mediation of prophecy, miracles, sacraments»⁹⁴. Apparently Christ, the highest cause, employs sacraments to effect His grace's bestowal.

A POSSIBLE OBJECTION

If someone should object that Lonergan's sacraments do not themselves effect grace but seem to supply only the occasions for God to grant grace directly to the will, one need only recall the controversy about sacramental causality. Although the Cajetanian tradition employed the perfective physical causality theory whereby the sacramental instrument directly produced grace in the soul, others pointed out the impossibility of a natural sign to cause a supernatural effect and of a physical sign to cause a spiritual effect. Hence some, like Pourrat, following Melchor Cano, postulated a «moral causality» whereby God looks on the dignity of the sacrament as Christ's work and gives grace in accordance with the sacrament's value. L. Billot developed the theory of intentional causality in which the administered sacrament designates efficaciously the subject of grace by placing a juridical claim in that subject which brings about the exercise of the divine power⁹⁵. Clearly in these latter theories the metaphysical distance between the sacramental sign and God's direct bestowal of grace upon the soul would have easily allowed for the young Lonergan's notion of sacramental causality. Furthermore B. Leeming, S. I., professor of sacramental theology and Christology at the Gregorian during Lonergan's time of studies, who had been influential in persuading the young Jesuit away from his early nominalism to Thomism, was basically following Billot's intentional causality theory in his course notes. Indeed, it was the intention of the «most wise artisan» which gave the instrumental causality of the sacraments a power to produce what surpassed their natural «virtue»⁹⁶. Perhaps such ideas, backed by Thomistic quotations, influenced *Recapitulation*. Even more significant is Leeming's later development. His magisterial *Principles of Sacramental Theology* indicates a change of stance. Abandoning intentional causality, he developed the notion of dispositive physical causality whereby the sacramental instrument produced the *res et sacramentum*, i. e., the character, real presence, or disposition, that calls for, or «causes», grace. Most novel

⁹⁴ G 81, n. 82. If our interpretation is correct, F. CROWE S. I., «A Note on Lonergan's Dissertation and Its Introductory Pages», *Method* 3 (1985) 3, erred slightly in describing Lonergan as a Molinist at the time he commenced his doctoral dissertation. The page in *Method*, p. 163, to which Crowe referred says, «I had been brought up a Molinist». That does not mean that he had accepted Molinism. *Restoration* proves that he was already beyond the doctrine of his teachers by the end of second year theology.

⁹⁵ For the Cajetanian tradition cf. E. DORONZO O. M. I., *De Sacramentis in genere* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946), pp. 165-168, 172-174, 180-197; R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE O. P., *Reality*, trans. P. Cummins (St. Louis: Herder, 1950), p. 247. Then P. POURRAT, *Theology of the Sacraments*, 3rd ed., trans. J. Gummersbach (St. Louis: Herder, 1924), esp. pp. 183f., 191-196. Finally L. BILLOT S. I., *De Ecclesiae Sacramentis*, 6th ed. (Romae: Gregoriana, 1924), I, pp. 116-143; also C. MCAULIFFE S. I., *Sacramental Theology* (St. Louis: Herder, 1958), pp. 37f.

⁹⁶ B. LEEMING S. I., *De Sacramentis in genere* (Romae: Gregoriana, 1933), esp. pp. 81f., 97-102, 105f. For his influence cf. «Insight Revisited», *A Second Collection*, ed. W. Ryan and B. Tyrrell (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 265, 276.

was his linking of sacramental causality to the Church as the Mystical Body, through which Christ wished to confer grace⁹⁷. To what degree his Canadian student and friend influenced him on this point remains uncertain. But in any case certain theories of sacramental causality then current would support rather than hinder Lonergan's sacramental understanding of reality.

OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

If our interpretation of *Grace* is correct, the novelty and synthetic power of Lonergan's vision stand clear. His attempt at explaining Thomas' doctrine of operative grace goes beyond while reconciling the systems of Bañez and Molina. From the latter he borrowed the chains of secondary causality, fate, that determines the free choice. Yet these secondary causes do not remain exterior preconditions to choice; when joined to the sacramental reality of Christ, God as well as man, they effectively determine it interiorly. The effective determination was described as a pre-motion and as such recalled Bañez' *praemotio physica*. But whereas the sixteenth century Dominican imagined God's influence upon the human will in terms of a created, spiritual force, or impulse, overcoming internal resistance to move the soul efficaciously to the good choice, Lonergan identified the pre-motion with the very structure of creation and then of the recreation in grace. God could not be reduced to an electrical engineer shooting bolts of electricity into the machine he constructed to assure its proper functioning. The divine causality is rooted first in creation itself with all the intricacies of its innumerable crossing chains of causality.

In the supernatural recreation Christ employs the sacramental structure of the Church to mediate promotions to men. Some are directly infused into the soul, changing the will's orientation, while others rearrange circumstances to result in the converted will's free cooperation with grace. Among the latter circumstances are the changeless truths of dogma proclaimed by the Church.

The twentieth century Jesuit overcame the limitations of his predecessors not only because of his rereading of St. Thomas' complicated doctrine but also because he conquered the individualistic presuppositions of baroque theology and the Enlightenment. Man was not imagined as an isolated individual under God, but he was acknowledged to be a member of a spiritual-corporeal community from the beginning, a community that formed him for weal and woe. This *Weltanschauung* had the great advantage of resisting Enlightenment and liberal individualism and highlighting the indispensable necessity of the Church for mankind's salvation. Indeed, the inner-historical efficacy of Christ's redemptive action, resulting in the Church, was undeniable.

⁹⁷ B. LEEMING S. I., *Principles of Sacramental Theology* (London: Longmans, Green, 1956), pp. 321-332, 346-378. In *De Sacramentis in genere* Leeming had not developed the close relation with the Mystical Body of Christ: cf. esp. pp. 80-97; moreover, it should be noted that he preferred in these notes, pp. 97-122, to characterize this dispositive causality as «intentional» rather than «physical», whereas in *Principles*, pp. 333-345, he would reject both designations as inadequate and unfruitful in favor of the link to the Body of Christ.

That Lonergan should think in such broad strokes fit very well into the era between the World Wars when his thought was first exerting itself. Evolutionary theory was permeating the intellectual scene ever more. Marxism's materialistic interpretation of historical evolution posed a tremendous threat to the Church, which the young Jesuit desired to answer. *Lebensphilosophie* and the primacy of *das Volk*, or *il popolo*, were dominant north of the Alps as well as in Fascist Italy. The Canadian living in Rome had already identified the anti-Christian bias of Nazi ideology. Even in physics the isolated atoms of the Newtonian world view had yielded to field theory and laws of probability. Catholic theology, despite its neo-scholastic, conceptualist heritage, was also adapting aspects of the dominant *Weltanschauung*. Both R. Guardini and K. Adam employed a *Lebensphilosophie* to illuminate truths of the faith, and H. de Lubac was composing *Catholicism: A Study of Dogma in Relation to the Corporate Destiny of Mankind*. Pius XI's strong emphasis on social doctrine, especially his vision of the corporate state, tended to make Catholics very aware of moral and social solidarity. Transcendental Thomists, like Rousselot and Maréchal, had rediscovered the dynamism implicit in St. Thomas' doctrine of intellection, and such a dynamism necessarily sets subject, object, world, and God into fundamental relations. And even conservative theologians were being forced by the studies of E. Mersch and others to consider the Church as the Body of Christ—an intellectual movement crowned in 1943 by Pius XII's encyclical *Mystici Corporis*, spelling out the new pope's theological vision⁹⁸.

If Word War II destroyed totalitarian visions of humanity and the tyranny of Marxism encouraged a reaction to the American ideal of rugged individualism, the *Weltanschauung* of the early Lonergan was also to undergo tremendous changes. Surely his objectivist view of salvation history, could embrace the studies of human knowing, with their unavoidable emphasis on subjectivity, that issued in *Verbum* and *Insight*. A certain complementarity could be presupposed between the objective and subjective emphases. As we noted, Lonergan referred readers to *Grace* in *Verbum*, *Insight*, and his theological treatises of 1964. Only with the publication of *Method* was the break from *Grace*'s world vision clear and decisive. Apparently the tensions between objective and subjective emphases no longer permitted their easy meshing. But if *Grace*'s theology no longer satisfied, there must have been some difficulties with it from the beginning. In these final pages we shall attempt to indicate them.

As is well known, the later Lonergan rejected his earlier «faculty psychology», preferring «intentionality analysis»⁹⁹. Beyond all doubt the first long citation of the present article, listing the four presuppositions of freedom, postulated a clear, decisive distinction of intellect and will, a distinction that reemerged constantly in *Grace* as well as in *Restoration*. What difficulties did that entail?

Faculty psychology meant that the intellect concerned itself with truth while to the will was primarily ascribed the responsibility of freedom in the realization of the good. Supernatural faith involved the acceptance of dogmatic formulas, whose truth transcends human insight, on the supernatural authority of Christ and His

⁹⁸ Perhaps one may trace Lonergan's continuing bent toward universalistic thought in his fascination with Toynbee's universal history and, later, B. Snell's *The Making of Mind*.

⁹⁹ «Insight Revisited», 276f.

Church. Such an understanding of faith, which Lonergan maintained until at least 1964, would lead to difficulties in explaining the universality of God's salvific will (I Tim 2:4), precisely because it was so tightly tied to historical revelation and the institutional Church. How might anyone outside the pale of the supernatural institution's influence be saved? Of course it might be possible to imagine that a supernatural revelation, originally bestowed on Adam, had never disappeared entirely from humanity's objective *Geist*. However delimited by weak links in the human chain, revelation persisted and was even renewed and expanded in the patriarchs. And in many ways some knowledge of Jesus Christ had penetrated to most parts of the world¹⁰⁰. Hence a scintilla of the supernatural, by the fortunate coincidence of several intersecting strands of influence, might be fanned into flame in an individual soul for his salvation. But Lonergan's view of man apart from and before Christ was at least as pessimistic as the first chapter of *Romans*¹⁰¹. The salvation of an individual from the *massa damnata* due to a felicitous coincidence of causalities would then raise questions about the justice of a God whose providence controls all circumstances of fate and leaves the majority of men to their damnation.

More fundamental than the mechanics of the universal salvific will is the question of human freedom's responsibility in accepting or rejecting grace. That question was raised early on in this article. Further precisions and elucidations have only whetted the blade of the inquiry. It has become clear that salvation depends on the reorientation of the will to a supernatural end by operative grace. Often Lonergan reiterated the will's passivity under such an operation and spent time proving from Thomas' texts that such acts as willing and understanding were considered immanent or vital, even if passive¹⁰². The will of the end then is an «indeliberate act» or «a passive act produced in the will by God without any efficiency exerted by the will itself». In short, this means that «the act of willing an end is not free»¹⁰³. Only after the end was willed, was the will free to choose among various courses of action open to it and merit —yet God had so arranged the circumstances that He controlled the free will's choices. It was only apparently indifferent. «The will has its strip of autonomy, yet beyond this there is the ground from which free acts spring; and that ground God holds and moves as a fencer moves his whole rapier by grasping only the hilt». Obviously all the glory belongs to God for whatever good is accomplished. But man's «cooperation» is, to say the least, severely restricted in choices and utterly excluded from the act of conversion, the salvific act par excellence.

The will's passivity in conversion seems to repeat Bañez' position. Though papal decrees prohibit decrying either Bañezianism or Molinism as heretical, certain inconveniences arise from Lonergan's understanding of freedom. In following the natural law, the necessity of their nature, men could not claim to have accomplished anything of their own. They remained «unprofitable servants» (Lk. 17:10)¹⁰⁴. Ana-

¹⁰⁰ This type of response to the question of God's universal salvific will was developed by R. LOMBARDO S. I., *The Salvation of the Unbeliever*, tr. D. White (London: Burns & Oates, 1956), esp. 268-274.

¹⁰¹ G 41; DT 202.

¹⁰² G 26 n. 17, 38, 126-128, 131f., 134f.; V 109-111, 130-133, 138. 166f.; DT 267-270.

¹⁰³ G 131, 123f., 36f.; «On God», 65; DT 269.

¹⁰⁴ R 142, 149, 153.

logously, once inserted into Christ, men were necessitated by His doctrine and determination, having nothing to claim as their own merit. Yet, when men exercised their freedom to resist grace, or Christ's determination, the «use» of freedom was considered not only to result in a metaphysical surd but also to be a «non-act». Thus by doing nothing men sin just as by man, s remaining passive under God's premotion, i. e., doing nothing, conversion is received before fructifying in good works. Paradoxically formulated, man accepts both grace and sin by doing nothing—the same dilemma into which Maritain's development of Bañez' position devolved¹⁰⁵.

The notion of sin quickly leads to an *aporia*. Though considering it a «non-act» or «non-occurrence» in *Recapitulation* and *Insight*, Lonergan also affirmed that it was a «fact» in *Insight* as well as in *Grace*. Of course he denied sin any intelligibility. As *De Verbo Incarnato* later explained, since sin cannot be reduced to God as the First Cause, as all positive finite beings can, it lacks «the intelligibility of cause and caused»; as a privation of being's goodness it is neither rational nor good. Consequently no answer to the «why?» of sin can be discovered¹⁰⁶. Nonetheless a question remains about its «facticity». For in his argument for God's existence Lonergan maintained that finite beings are conditioned and find their ultimate intelligibility only in God's unconditional, infinite act of understanding «grounding the explanation of everything about everything else». «For otherwise proportionate being would remain a condition that merely happened to have its conditions fulfilled; in its every aspect it would be mere matter of fact; and as mere matter of fact is nothing, it would be nothing». So the fulfilling of the conditions for conditioned beings reveals a further cause, and, Lonergan argued, «if there are no matters of fact that remain ultimately unexplained, then no conditions are fulfilled simply at random»¹⁰⁷. But does not the «fact of sin» remain unexplained? Rather than being simply nothing, sin's facticity demanded the whole final chapter of *Insight*, devoted to «special transcendent knowledge», to explain why the «solution» to the problem of sin can only be found in supernatural grace and revelation. Sin remains a conundrum to reason as well as to feelings in man's relation to God¹⁰⁸.

A parallel problem concerns the designation of Satan's malevolent influence over Adam and his progeny as a «premotion». This term might be employed only in the broadest analogy to God's premotion. Whereas God's activity creates, conserves, and informs, the devil's «activity» only disrupts, destroys, and deforms. God acts as a true cause, but *De Verbo Incarnato* confessed that even identifying Satan as the «author of sin» attains no ultimate «why?» or cause for sin¹⁰⁹. *Reconciliation* recognized the same insight in referring only to the «quasi instrumentality of communicating

¹⁰⁵ Cf. J. M. McDERMOTT S. I., «Metaphysical Conundrums at the Root of Moral Disagreement», *Gregorianum* 71 (1990) 729-732. Lonergan differed from Maritain not only in refusing an added premotion to the objective structures of creation and redemption but also in making room for a self-moving will to cooperate with grace—even if its choices were already programmed.

¹⁰⁶ DVI 593.

¹⁰⁷ In 655f.

¹⁰⁸ Interesting to note is the advance from *Recapitulation* to *Grace* and *Insight*. The former, 163f., considered that there is «no reason» for empirical individuation or matters of fact, which are due to matter; the latter works, however, grounded the intelligibility of matters of fact in God.

¹⁰⁹ DVI 593.

sin» since «sin is a privation of something» and a privation is not something to be communicated; at most one communicates the something that lacks what it has been deprived of, i. e., a debilitation of the motion that should have been transmitted»¹¹⁰. The reality of sin affronts the mind both in its concreteness and its unintelligibility. As we indicated elsewhere, any philosophy constructed upon natures and/or their corresponding necessities in thought, whether conceptualist or transcendental, is doomed to encounter antinomies in grappling with the mysteries of freedom and sin¹¹¹.

One is tempted to link the surd of sin with the surd of prime matter. The surd of sin was recognized through an inverse insight. Since the empirical residue translates metaphysically into prime matter, and its individuality is only tangentially intelligible insofar as it supports a unifying form, and individuality as such is not universally intelligible, prime matter must also be recognized only through an inverse insight. «Our direct understanding abstracts from the empirical residue»¹¹². Prime matter's unavailability to rational insight, rooted in the irreducible facticity of the singular material being, prevents the world's intelligibility from being reduced to a rational, abstract determinism. Insofar as man is composed of soul and body, being and non-being, his contingency is assured¹¹³. Yet one must not capitulate to the opposite danger of letting this material contingency, or irrationality, lead to the denying of inner-worldly intelligibility altogether, as Sartre did while celebrating the priority of non-being over being, or «existence» over essence. As we argued above, Lonergan's careful preservation of the analogy between God and the world allowed him to transcend such rationalistic extremes. Nevertheless one may ask whether Lonergan's early intellectualism was somewhat exaggerated in his argument for the necessity of sinning. Sin becomes practically, statistically inevitable because prime matter introduces the potency separating man from God's pure act as well as from angelic perfection. Even aside from original sin, which warped man's original orientation to God, Lonergan held, «since the good is ever unique and evil manifold, the

¹¹⁰ R 154, 149, 147.

¹¹¹ J. M. McDERMOTT S. I., «Metaphysical Conundrums», esp. 732-734.

¹¹² In 516f.

¹¹³ In Thomism the essence-existence distinction provides another ground for contingency. There is an underlying tension in Thomism, however, for attributing individuality to both the act of existence and matter (cf., e. g., J. A. WEISHEPL O. P., *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* [Garden City: Doubleday, 1974], pp. 208, 234, 251; É. GILSON, *Le Thomisme*, 5th ed. [Paris: Vrin, 1944], pp. 518-520; L. SWEENEY S. I., *Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality* [New York: Lang, 1988], pp. 173-186). R. O'DONNELL C. S. P., «Individuation: An Example of the Development in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas», *The New Scholasticism* 33 (1959) 49-67, traces Thomas' various attempts to solve the problem of individuation before «completing» Thomas' doctrine by grounding individuation in the (universal) form; in the same direction as regarding personal individuality: M. BROWN, «Aquinas and the Individuation of Persons», *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (1991) 29-44; P. CASPER, «Thomas d'Aquin a-t-il tenté d'exprimer le principe d'individuation à l'intérieur des propriétés transcendantes de l'être», *Aquinas* 34 (1991) 41-51. Lonergan, In 517, contrasts «the brutal factualness», apparently attributable to the empirical residue with «the lucid, fully rational factualness» grasped as virtually unconditioned and experienced in an existential judgment. In the work of K. Rahner S. I., another transcendental Thomist, the world's contingency is reduced ultimately to the prime matter that prevents finite being from being immediately self-conscious. Cf. our «The Christologies of Karl Rahner», *Gregorianum* 67 (1986) 89-96; «Karl Rahner on Two Infinities: God and Matter», *International Philosophical Quarterly* 28 (1988) 444-448, 450-454; K. RAHNER S. I., *Hörer des Wortes*, 2nd ed., ed. J. B. Metz (Freiburg: Herder, 1971), pp. 103-114.

odds always are that man will do what is wrong¹¹⁴. Though far from a Gnostic equation with moral evil, prime matter seems to incline men to sin. Faced with that dilemma the traditional theology, which *Recapitulation* followed, had postulated praeternatural as well as supernatural gifts for Adam so that in the perfection of an almost angelic nature, immortal and integral in knowing and loving, no cause for sin could be attributed to God. When all the paradisiacal gifts were forfeited by sin, a concupiscence resulted that paradoxically designated man's natural tension between body and soul and the inclination to sin resulting from the body's less than total subordination to reason¹¹⁵. Catholic theology has been wrestling for centuries with the problem of «matter», avoiding the extremes of Gnosticism, exalting spirituality to the contempt of God's material creation, and materialism, as if matter could explain itself. The existence of this «non-being», as we saw, resists all shallow rationalisms and determinisms, leaving man open for God and freedom. But if matter resists human intelligibility, preventing man from being the measure of reality even in this world, sin is an absolute surd. Hence as metaphysically unintelligible, it cannot be fastened within any rational system of coordinates, even as a statistical probability. Freedom, which allows for the rejection of God and all meaning, represents the deepest mystery in the relation of God and man.

A similar, but reversed, relation held sway between matter and sin in *Recapitulation*. Lonergan held that matter existed for or was oriented to form: *materia propter formam*. Yet the original unity of the human race, which comprised one universal nature by virtue of its single form and multiplicity in virtue of matter¹¹⁶, was destroyed by sin and led to the almost total «atomization» of humanity. Christ came to establish His Body, the Church, endowed with the intellectual armor of dogma. Clearly human individuation, or disintegration, which might be attributed to matter, was attributed *de facto* to sin. Whereas *Grace* saw sin as almost a statistical inevitability due to matter, *Recapitulation* saw effective material individualization as the result of sin. Then the proper form of humanity was due to Christ's supernatural intervention. Was there any way of attributing a natural intelligibility to a material universe that apparently resisted total spiritual integration (and sense) and even inclined free human beings to sin? However abstract the natural-supernatural distinction may be, the formal intelligibility of humanity is here at stake. Not the existential condition but the very form of humanity must, it seems, be supernatural if man is to be intelligible at all.

This tension in the natural-supernatural relation was already noted with regard to willing. The will was naturally oriented to the infinite God, *bonum universale*, and remained indifferent before all finite objects of choice. Since man's material composition would statistically result ultimately in sin, which, once committed, would lead to further sins, Lonergan explained the need of an infused supernatural habit and additional actual graces by appeal to man's concrete state in contrast to his abstract admiration for the love of God. However accurate a phenomenological

¹¹⁴ G 42.

¹¹⁵ There is a similar tension in Catholic theology about death being both natural and due to sin. Cf. our article «Catholic Doctrine on Death», in *Scripta Varia. The Determination of Brain Death and Its Relationship to Human Death* (Rome: Pontifical Academy of the Sciences, 1992), 153-176.

¹¹⁶ R 151.

description of man who desires the good but follows evil (cf. Rom. 7:15-24) that might be, the ontological dilemma remains. For love and the will's orientation themselves are not abstract, but concrete. Indeed the will's natural orientation to God provides the condition of possibility for all other choices. However vividly the imagination may portray a sinful will turned back upon itself, intent upon its own atomization and in desperate need of conversion, insofar as a natural basis of freedom remains the will must stay oriented to the *bonum universale*. The meaning of conversion, graces' «radical reorientation», then becomes difficult to conceive ontologically.

Lonerган seemed to admit that conundrum from another perspective. If sin were ultimately totally unintelligible even to God, it would seem in its facticity to escape God's control. Yet providence by its domination of fate, expediting or impeding the conjunctures of causal series, infallibly achieves its purpose. It cannot be frustrated in its application of agents to their activity through its premotions. Even in the face of sin God sovereignty rules supreme. «The sinner does not withdraw totally from the divine governance, for the sinner intends some good»¹¹⁷. Clearly presupposed are the Thomistic theses that evil is the absence of an owed perfection and that, consequently, evil can be chosen only *sub specie boni*. But the choice of a limited, imperfect good means that some intelligibility must remain in the choice itself. Were sin totally unintelligible, the sinner could not know it to choose it, and it would escape God's providence. The *mysterium iniquitatis* is so profound that every attempt even to describe it results in contradictions. From one point of view God knows and controls sin, from another it remains unintelligible to Him and outside His control.

The dialectic of affirmation and negation in reason's struggle to come to grips with prime matter and sin may be attributed to the very limitations of human knowing, caught between its finitude and its infinite ground. The type of human knowing presupposed in *Grace and Recapitulation* must certainly have shocked the student of Lonergan. Dominant was not the subjectivity of an intellectual dynamism, but the objectivity of a scientist with a flexible calculus capable of overlooking and comprehending the whole historical process in all its complexity. Earlier in this article we had spoken of an «angel's-eye-view» of history. For surely Lonergan's hypothetical scientist represents a more than human ideal of cognition. Men cannot survey, not even from the highest peak in Darien, the whole sweep of history. Yet the angelic designation was not completely accurate. Thomistic pure spirits know by infused *species* since their very spirituality prevents them from receiving impressions from without, from the material world of time and space. Nor would a divine ideal of knowing serve the required function; the eternity of God's «now» apparently does not do sufficient justice to temporal extension and it is too far beyond man's reach. Like many other outstanding Catholic thinkers: Blondel, Rousselot, Mouroux, Gardeil, Penido, and Maritain, Lonergan imagined an ideal of human knowing that was more than human, less than divine, and not angelic¹¹⁸. This means that indivi

¹¹⁷ G 112, 76f., 80, 89.

¹¹⁸ Cf. M. BLONDEL, *L'Action* (1893) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 463-465; A. GARDEIL O. P., «La structure analogique de l'intellect», *Revue Thomiste* 32 (1927) 9-12; ID., *Le donné révéélé et la théologie*, 2nd ed. (Juvisy: Cerf, 1932), pp. 132-134; M. T.-L. PENIDO O. P., *Le rôle de l'analogie*

dual men cannot remain closed in on themselves, yet their openness to something more cannot destroy inner-worldly intelligibility. The balance of a sacramental structure is delicate but absolutely necessary to retain history's significance even while referring man to a mystery of intelligence and freedom infinitely surpassing him. That balance serves as the axis on which Lonergan's future development turns.

It would be fascinating to trace Lonergan's intellectual development beyond *Grace*. Further studies of St. Thomas' thought would open new vistas, and he would finally take off in flight beyond his thirteenth century master. But the present article has already tested sufficiently the reader's patience and persistence. The tensions which it uncovered in the early Lonergan doubtless propelled the young Jesuit to reevaluate his own understanding. To another time then must be postponed a further analysis of the later Lonergan. In the meantime it is hoped that the reader's perseverance has been rewarded with the desire to reread the texts of the twentieth century's greatest North American theologian¹¹⁹.

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en théologie dogmatique (Paris: Vrin, 1931), pp. 118, 189-191; J. MARITAIN, *Distinguer pour unir ou les degrés du savoir*, 8th ed. (1963), in *Oeuvres complètes*, IV (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1983), pp. 585f.; for Rousselot cf. above n. 72; J. MOUROUX, *Le mystère du temps* (Paris: Aubier, 1962), pp. 110-120. Mouroux's thought has been explained very well by G. Comandini in a doctoral thesis submitted to the Gregorian University in 1990, *The Notion of «Body» in the Theology of Jean Mouroux*, which, I hope, will be published in the near future.

¹¹⁹ The study of Lonergan's further thought has already been published as «Tensions in Lonergan's Theory of Conversion», *Gregorianum* 74 (1993) 101-140.

How accurate was Lonergan's exegesis of St. Thomas' thought? H. BOUILLARD S. I., *Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Aubier, 1944) came to quite a different interpretation of grace in the *Prima Secundae* arguing that Thomas did not postulate the «actual graces» invented by later commentators but stressed the action involved in the infusion of habitual grace; he also interpreted Thomas' reference to the Eudemean Prime Mover solely in terms of an interior movement of the will without any reference to «deliberation» or «initiation of counsel». But see Lonergan's brief rebuttal in G 25f. n. 17. We leave to Thomistic scholars the final judgment. The reappearance of *Recapitulation in Grace* need not arouse suspicions of eisegesis on Lonergan's part; it must be recalled that the essay's speculative vision had been nourished on St. Thomas and neoscholastic treatises. Intellectual symbiosis occurs, and often only such vital thought enables a student to penetrate the profoundest intentions of his master's text. My own study of St. Thomas, «Zwei Unendlichkeiten bei Thomas von Aquin: Gott und Materie», *Theologie und Philosophie* 61 (1986) 176-203, and the reading of many modern Thomists, who cite their master at length in drawing different conclusions, lead me to conjecture that the Doctor of the Schools possessed a very flexible intellectual instrument which he applied variously, emphasizing now one aspect, now another, of his intellectual vision to respond intelligently to questions regarding faith and reason. With the whole Catholic tradition he shared a sacramental vision of reality. There is room for further study on Thomas' understanding of *gratia operans*. Yet whether or not all the fluctuations in Thomas' thought which Lonergan had to harness, excising all the blunders, oversights, and momentary aberrations, actually corroborate Lonergan's exegesis, surely his interpretation itself remained squarely in the Thomistic tradition, preserving a sacramental balance.